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The relationship between imperialism and nationalism has often been portrayed by theorists 
of nationalism and post colonial discourse theorists as antagonistic. Anti-democratic, 
aggressive empires impose their will on subject peoples who, in response, form nationalist 
movements in opposition to this imperialism. These movements, it is claimed, assert the 
nation’s right to self-determination and independence. Whilst this was undoubtedly the case 
in a number of anti-colonial movements, examples can be found that refute the apparently 
antagonistic relationship between nationalism and imperialism. Nationalism does not always 
advocate independence from states or empires. Imperialism can be a vehicle for a national 
mission or can strengthen minority nations. In certain contexts, these two anti-thetical 
concepts can be reconciled. The thesis investigates the reconciliation of nationalism and 
imperialism using the concept of imperial nationalism. This concept is used to denote a 
variety of nationalism that proposes reform of the state/imperial government for the benefit 
of the nation whilst simultaneously emphasising the benefits of the reform of the empire. An 
important element of the nationalist discourse will be the maintenance of the imperial 
connection as beneficial for the nation.  
 
A comparative historical analysis of nationalist groups in nineteenth century Scotland and 
Canada is used to highlight the relationship between nationalism and imperialism in the 
discourse of nationalist groups. Both Scotland and Canada held relatively privileged 
positions within the British Empire. Yet Scottish and British Canadian nationalist groups 
argued the existing systems for governing their respective nations were illegitimate. In 
Scotland, the Scottish Home Rule Association argued for a Scottish Parliament, focusing on 
the extent to which the United Kingdom state was unable to cope with the work created by 
the four home nations and the Empire. An important aspect of home rule for Scotland, 
however, was its extension to the other home nations and the opportunity it would present of 
reforming the Imperial Parliament for the benefit of the Empire, and by association Scotland. 
In Canada, the focus of Canada First and the Imperial Federation League in Canada was on 
reform of the system of Imperial governance. Canada had not been given control over 
relations with the United States under the British North America Act and British Canadian 
nationalists felt Canadian interests had not been taken into account in British dealings with 
the United States. The answer was to provide Canada with a voice in treaties in the short 
term and, in the longer term, to reform Imperial government in order to provide Canada with 
a voice in the affairs of the Empire as whole. The thesis investigates the extent to which 
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Chapter One 
Nationalism v Imperialism – Political Science v History 
 
Are nationalism and imperialism antithetical concepts or can they be expressed 
simultaneously in nationalist discourse? This is the question to be addressed by this 
study. The thesis takes as its starting point the observation of nationalist groups in the 
British Empire that created a discourse expressing both an imperial and national 
identity. Yet traditionally empire and nation are seen as anathema. Nations, in post-
colonial discourse at least, seek independence from empire. Empire, by definition, 
removes liberty of action from states and nations that have the right to self-
determination. The theoretical understanding of nationalism, largely based on the 
link between one nation and one state, further compounds the apparent 
incompatibility of nationalism and imperialism. This was not the case in late 
nineteenth century Scotland and Canada. Nationalist groups in these cases advocated 
the maintenance of imperial ties whilst also asserting the right of the nation to 
manage its own affairs. The focus of this thesis will be what was different about 
these cases that led to both an imperial and a national identity being expressed. 
 
Primarily this thesis is about the relationship between nationalism, imperialism and 
identity, particularly the way in which nationalist movements reconciled the 
articulation of both a national and an imperial identity in their discourses. Our aim is 
to add to the understanding of the relationship between imperialism and nationalism 
in the discourse of nationalist groups in general. Using Scotland and Canada as case 
studies, the nature of nationalism within the British Empire will be examined. In both 
these cases nationalist movements were formed that advocated reform of the existing 
system of governance to the benefit of each nation.  In addition, however, these 
groups simultaneously criticised imperial government and demanded reform for the 
benefit of the Empire. The symbols of the nation and the Empire were used to 
articulate both a national and imperial identity.  
 
The general argument of the thesis will be that nationalism and imperialism are not 
necessarily antithetical concepts but, in certain circumstances, can reinforce each 
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other. In presenting this argument, we will highlight the particular nature of 
nationalism in Scotland and Canada. Nationalism is a matter of legitimacy and 
recognition. We will also investigate the nature of imperialism, the reasons they 
supported the Empire and wanted to remain within its influence. Geopolitical 
influences were especially important to Scottish and Canadian nationalists’ desire to 
remain within the empire. Finally, the way in which nationalist groups reconciled 
these two aspects of their discourse will be examined. The key argument will be that 
national identity mediated and reinforced imperial identity.  
 
The relevance of a study of the reconciliation of dual or multiple identities may well 
be questioned. The recent reinstatement of a Scottish Parliament, however, along 
with the growing importance of the European Union and other supra-national 
institutions provides adequate grounds for such a study. The importance of local, 
regional, national and supra-national identities in a globalised world should not be 
under-estimated. The recent visit of the Scottish First Minister to Canada and his 
celebration of the Scottish Diaspora in Canada offers further evidence of the 
contemporary relevance of the interaction of dual identities.1 There has been a 
plethora of contemporary survey evidence confirming a majority of those living in 
Scotland identify with both Scotland and Britain in varying degrees.2 In Canada, the 
contemporary discussions over the official policy of multiculturalism also highlight 
the importance of an understanding of the relationship between different identities. 
 
In order to understand how and why an elite, nationalist or otherwise, can articulate 
dual or multiple identities we need to move beyond the quantitative data provided by 
contemporary surveys incorporating scales of identity. These surveys are useful in 
aiding our understanding of the number of people who hold a dual identity but rarely 
do they provide an insight into the way the two identities interact. An understanding 
of the nature of Britishness, as portrayed by Scottish nationalists in the late 
nineteenth century, can illuminate the ways in which dual national and supra-national 
                                                 
1 The Scotsman, 27 September 2005- accessed online 9/5/2006   
http://news.scotsman.com/latest_scotland.cfm?id=2154342005 
2 See for example, Bond, R., and Rosie, M., “National Identities in Post-Devolution Scotland” in 
Scottish Affairs Vol.40  (2002) 34-53 
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identities are reconciled. A comparative historical analysis of imperial nationalist 
discourses incorporating both a national and imperial identity can aid our 
understanding of the contemporary political landscape. The theoretical gains made 
by this study can inform knowledge of the relationship between nationalism and 
supra-national institutions within nationalist groups. 
 
One may well ask why it would be necessary to provide yet another study of 
nationalism and identity. Few studies have considered nationalist movements whose 
discourse argued for the maintenance of ties with an empire. The need for such a 
study is important to broadening our understanding of nationalism. Whilst many 
general studies of nationalism have identified post-colonialism as an important area 
of nationalism studies, few if any, consider nationalism within empires where there is 
no desire for independence from the empire. John Breuilly, for example, only 
classifies movements as nationalist when they seek, or hold, control of the state in 
the name of the nation.3 The list of nationalist movements he analyses in detail does 
not include nationalist movements that wanted to increase the autonomy of the nation 
within a supra-national framework such as empire. Despite his broad review of 
Czech nationalism and his acknowledgement of Palacky’s scheme for Czechs to be 
part of a federal Austro-Hungarian Empire, Breuilly classifies Czech nationalism as 
separatist. His analysis emphasises the transition from cultural to political 
nationalism.4 Breuilly focuses on anti-colonial movements, such as those in Kenya 
and India when discussing nationalism in empires.  
 
James Kellas in his review of nationalism acknowledges movements that originated 
in European settler societies, such as Australia and Canada, but claims these 
nationalist movements argued for independence from the mother country. Kellas 
distinguishes this colonial nationalism from the anti-colonial nationalism found in 
Asia and Africa.5  Anthony Smith, although recognising the existence of emigrant 
nations such as Canada and the United States, does not examine the nature of 
                                                 
3 Breuilly, J., Nationalism and the State 2nd Edition (Manchester, Manchester University Press: 1993): 
2 
4 Ibid: 131-4 
5 Kellas, J.G., The Politics of Nationalism and Ethnicity (Basingstoke, Macmillan Press Ltd: 1991): 76 
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nationalism these European settler nations displayed when they desired to remain 
within empire.6 The inference from these views would be that nations will always 
seek independence from an empire.  
 
A number of academics have looked at nations and empires from a different 
perspective. Krishnan Kumar, for example, has argued that English nationalism was 
characterised by its imperial or missionary element and was based on its superior 
position within the United Kingdom and the British Empire.7 The English nation, 
according to Kumar, provided the legitimacy for pursuing imperial ambitions. There 
is still no explanation of minority nationalisms that propose to maintain the imperial 
tie.  
 
These useful studies fail to adequately explain the nationalism of movements formed 
in late nineteenth century Scotland and Canada. When we consider the mass of 
colonial and post-colonial nationalist movements that have fought for independence 
from the metropolis in, for example, Mexico, India, Kenya, Pakistan, Peru and 
Argentina, we can perhaps understand the omission. Independence movements assert 
the right of self-determination, the right of the nation to rule itself, with no outside 
interference. In late nineteenth century Scotland and Canada, nationalist movements 
also asserted the right to self-determination to argue for more power to be given to 
the nation. They also demanded, however, a greater voice in matters concerning the 
whole of the Empire in the belief that this would bring greater recognition of their 
nation. In relation to the traditional view of colonial and post-colonial movements 
that nations and empires do not mix, as outlined by Breuilly and Kellas, the situation 
in late nineteenth century Scotland and Canada presents something of a paradox.  
 
One of the key reasons for this failure to classify minority nationalisms that propose 
to remain within an empire is theoretical. Nationalism has often been defined in such 
a way that precludes the possibility of nations wanting to remain part of a larger 
                                                 
6 Smith, A.D., Nationalism and Modernism: A Critical Survey of recent theories of nations and 
nationalism (London, Routledge: 1998): 194 
7 Kumar, K., “Nation and empire: English and British national identity in comparative perspective” in 
Theory and Society Vol 29 (2000) 575-608 
 4
system of governance where the rulers are members of a different nation. In the 
modernist paradigm of nationalism at least, the concept is defined as a matter of 
political legitimacy where nations require a state of their own. Gellner’s well known 
definition is the classic modernist view of nationalism. “Nationalism is primarily a 
political principle which holds that the political and the national unit should be 
congruent.”8 If there was any confusion about what was meant by political unit, 
Gellner clarified it on the following page. “Our definition of nationalism was 
parasitic on two as yet undefined terms: state and nation.”9 In nationalism the link 
between nations and states rests on the idea of legitimacy. What gives the state the 
moral right to govern the people within its territory? For Gellner, “…principles of 
authority depend for their legitimacy on the fact that the members of the group 
concerned are of the same culture.”10 Nationalism by this definition is the idea for 
the purposes of legitimacy the governed and the governors should belong to the same 
cultural group.   
 
When viewed in this theoretical light we can begin to understand the failure to 
classify minority nationalisms that seek to remain within an Empire. Empires are 
defined by a relation of dominance by one state over another for the benefit of the 
metropolis. In the process of creating an empire, seeking to conquer and control other 
states, empires become multi-national and therefore potentially illegitimate. 
Illegitimate in this context means that within the political unit, other nations are 
controlled by the dominant ruling nation. As Gellner put it, “political systems which 
combine cultural pluralism with a persisting inequality between cultures are 
doomed, in virtue of their violation of the nationalist principle…”11 Multi-ethnic 
empires in which there is, by definition, inequality between nations, are “in violation 
of the nationalist principle.” In other words, nationalism and imperialism are anti-
thetical concepts.  
 
                                                 
8 Gellner, E., Nations and Nationalism (Oxford, Basil Blackwell: 1983): 1 
9 Ibid: 3 
10 Gellner, E., Nationalism (London, Phoenix: 1997): 4 
11 Gellner Nationalism: 104 
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To further quote Gellner, “if the rulers of the political unit belong to a nation other 
than that of the majority of the ruled, this for nationalists constitutes a quite 
outstandingly intolerable breach of political propriety.”12 If nationalism involves the 
need for nations to be governed by those of the same culture/nationality as the 
modernist view would imply, then nationalism within Empires should always seek 
independent statehood.  Yet, there are cases where nationalist movements appear to 
desire to remain within an Imperial framework, posing a challenge to this accepted 
definition of nationalism.  
 
Of course most empires in the pre-modern world at least, were multi-ethnic and this 
was accepted as the norm. There were exceptions to this, most notably in the British 
settler empire. It will be argued throughout this thesis that Scots and British 
Canadians shared a British nationality that had the Empire and all that it represented 
at its heart. Legitimacy was not an issue in the era of divine rule, therefore the multi-
ethnic nature of Empires was not considered a threat to the legitimacy of rule. Only 
in the modern age when the idea of divine rule was abandoned did the issue of 
legitimacy within multi-ethnic empires arise. Yet in the British Empire, the question 
of legitimacy of rule arose from those groups who were British and that shared an 
identity with the rulers. It is in this exception, that Gellner’s definition needs revised 
and where we see the failure for academics to explore settler nationalism that seeks 
greater autonomy within the empire.  
 
The importance of geopolitics and international relations must be taken into account 
when viewing the desire of these nations to remain within an imperial framework. 
The importance of Britain’s strained relationship with many of her European 
imperial counterparts to the desire of Scots and British Canadians to remain within 
the Empire will be an important part of the argument of this thesis. On a theoretical 




                                                 
12 Gellner, Nations and Nationalism:  
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Scotland, Canada and the British Empire 
The British Empire was at its peak in the late nineteenth century. Yet as a 
consequence it also faced several challenges it had not previously had to face, both 
internally and externally, from nationalist groups in Ireland and Scotland to the 
newly unified Germany with imperialist ambitions of its own. The British Empire 
covered a fifth of the world’s land area and the British Navy largely controlled the 
worlds oceans. Colonies, dependencies, protectorates and dominions in Africa, Asia 
and America all played an important part in making the British Empire the envy of 
other European states. 
 
Scotland, as we shall see in later chapters, had played a vital role in exploring, 
conquering and maintaining this vast empire. Much of the Empire had been acquired 
in the post 1707 period, British North America and India being two notable 
examples. As Tom Devine and Michael Fry have so ably shown, Scots were at the 
forefront of these acquisitions and Scotland could rightly claim to be a partner in 
Empire.13 The Parliament in London also provided Scottish MP’s a voice in foreign 
affairs more generally, as well as the potential for high office.  
 
Despite this privileged position within the Empire, some Scots were unhappy with 
the lack of attention given to Scottish affairs in the London Parliament, particularly 
in light of the attention given to Irish affairs from the start of the 1880s. In 1886 the 
Scottish Home Rule Association (SHRA) was formed arguing for a Scottish 
Parliament as a solution to Scottish legislative problems. The discourse of the SHRA 
was articulated in such a way, however, that the creation of a Scottish Parliament 
would be beneficial, not only for Scotland but also for the Empire. Home Rule for 
Scotland and the more general policy of home rule all round (for Scotland, Wales, 
Ireland and England) would allow greater amounts of parliamentary time to be 
devoted to the running of the Empire, reform of imperial government and 
consolidation of the Empire.  
 
                                                 
13 Devine, T., Scotland’s Empire 1600-1815 (London, Penguin: 2003); Fry, M., The Scottish Empire 
(Edinburgh, Birlinn: 2001) 
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Canada, in contrast to Scotland, had only just been created as a formal dominion in 
1867, having previously consisted of three separate colonies, New Brunswick, Nova 
Scotia and the United Province of Canada (which itself had only been created in 
1840 by the Union of Upper and Lower Canada). The Confederation of the British 
North American colonies and the award of Dominion status made Canada the senior 
“colony” in the Empire. Canada was relatively autonomous in political terms having 
its own federal Parliament with responsibility for most aspects of Canadian domestic 
affairs. A Governor General acted as the Crown’s representative in Canada and had 
some powers to veto legislation passed but these were seldom used. Each province in 
Canada had a legislative assembly which had responsibility for local provincial 
matters.  
 
The main issue, for British Canadian nationalists in the late nineteenth century was 
the lack of a voice in foreign affairs, particularly in relation to her powerful southern 
neighbour, the United States of America. Under the British North America of 1867, 
the Act which created the Confederation, foreign affairs were seen as an imperial 
matter and control was, therefore, left with the Imperial Parliament in London. But as 
will be seen in later chapters, the triangular relationship between Britain, Canada and 
the United States quickly revealed that Canada’s interests in relation to her neighbour 
were not being taken into account. This lack of control over its own foreign affairs 
meant the potential for a nationalist movement to be formed was great.  
 
In late nineteenth century Canada, several related movements formed at various 
points arguing for greater say in Canadian foreign affairs, particularly in relation to 
the United States. Again, however, the discourse of these groups contained an 
articulation of an Imperial identity. The Imperial connection was seen as vital to the 
future existence and growth of Canada on the North American continent. Without it 
Canada would quickly fall under the control of the United States and annexation 
would soon follow. They also saw Canada as a central figure in the British Empire 
and claimed the right, as British Canadians, to a say in the governance of the Empire.  
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The nationalist movements in Scotland and British Canada provide the empirical 
material for this study. Our aim is to investigate how these groups sought to reconcile 
the apparently antithetical concepts of nationalism and imperialism. By analysing the 
nature of nationalism within Scotland and British Canada in the late nineteenth 
century, we will increase our understanding of the relationship between nationalism 
and imperialism. In addition, a greater understanding of the relationship between 
national and imperial identity and the circumstances under which they can be 
reconciled will be gained. The extent to which nationalists drew on nationalist and 
imperial rhetoric and the ways in which the two were intertwined in one discourse 
will form the basis of this study.  
 
Most studies are approached with expectations of what will be found. The link 
between theory and empirical material makes this inevitable. We expect to find 
nationalism when the interests of a particular nation are not being recognised. This 
lack of legitimacy is usually reflected through the formation of a national movement.  
In cases where these movements want to remain within an empire, we would expect 
there to be particular structural reasons, whether economic or geopolitical. We may 
also expect both nationalism and imperialism to be articulated together when there 
are simultaneous challenges to both national and imperial identity. Discourse, as will 
be argued, reflects the context it faces. It is normally a reaction to something. We 
would, therefore, expect to find either two simultaneous contexts or one context that 
challenged both identities. If this proves to be the case, nationalist discourses in 
Scotland and Canada should be different. The national context, whether Scottish or 
Canadian, should be part of the imperial context. The following chapter will expand 
these theoretical expectations and the substantive chapters will examine the contexts 
within which nationalism and imperialism arose and analyse the discourse that was 
shaped by those contexts.  
 
 
Implications for the Contemporary Political Landscape 
Supra national institutions, such as the European Union, can be seen as the modern 
day equivalent of Imperial Government. Clearly the motivation for such institutions 
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is vastly different from the desire of empire to conquer for prestige, power and 
financial gain. But in one respect, security, the need for nations and their states to 
cede some aspects of their sovereignty to a supra-national level is just as important in 
the modern world as it was for nations within empires in the nineteenth century. Any 
theoretical gains made from this study could therefore be applied to modern day 
supra-national institutions.   
 
One theoretical lens through which these different political systems can be viewed is 
the concept of multi-level governance (MLG). MLG can be defined as “a system of 
continuous negotiation at several territorial tiers.”14 Whilst this does not necessarily 
fit well with our definition of a conquering and dominating empire, the British 
Empire, as was mentioned above, granted substantial autonomy to it settler colonies, 
such as Canada. Canadian attempts to extend that autonomy were negotiated with the 
Imperial state in the same way that provincial autonomy within Canada was 
negotiated between Provincial Governments and the Canadian Federal government. 
The aim of this thesis is to discover how nationalists saw their respective nations as 
fitting into this multi-level governance structure. The theoretical knowledge gained 
from this investigation will naturally have implications for our understanding of the 
relationship between modern day nations and modern systems of multi-level 
governance.  
 
If, throughout the course of this thesis, we find that nationalism and imperialism are 
not necessarily antithetical concepts, nations in general may then be seen as 
compatible with systems of multi-level governance. It will be claimed in later 
chapters that nationalism, while certainly a matter of political legitimacy, is about the 
congruence of the political unit and the national unit, where the political unit is not 
always the state but some aspect of the state specifically created to appease 
nationalists, for example, a devolved assembly or administrative division, which is 
accepted by the nation as legitimate.15 The important aspect of this definition is that 
                                                 
14 Bache, I. and Flanders, M., “Themes and Issues in  Multi-Level Governance” in Bache, I. and 
Flanders, M., (eds) Multi-Level Governance (Oxford, Oxford University Press: 2004): 3 
15 On this point see O’Leary, B., “Ernest Gellner’s diagnoses of nationalism: a critical overview, or, 
what is living and what is dead in Ernest Gellner’s philosophy of nationalism?” in Hall, J.A., (ed) The 
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the system of governance is seen as legitimate because it is in the nation’s interests. 
Should this definition allow us to classify nationalist groups that wanted to remain 
within an empire, it will also allow us to classify nationalist groups that propose 
remaining within any system of multi-level governance. After all, Empires, despite 
the missionary zeal and relationships of dominance which characterises them, are the 
historical equivalent of systems of multi-level governance.  
 
Whilst it will be made clear throughout this thesis that the cases we are dealing with 
are historically specific and that generalisations can only be applied to other cases 
with caution, the theoretical understanding of nationalism that this thesis aims to 
generate has implications beyond the historically specific cases of Scotland and 
Canada. By generating a generic explanation for why minority nationalisms wanted 
to remain within a multi-level governance system such as the British Empire, we 
may be able to apply that explanation to minority nationalisms wanting to remain 
within other systems of multi-level governance, such as modern day Scottish 
nationalists and the EU and the Parti Quebecois and sovereignty association.   
 
Of course, an important aspect of the argument throughout this thesis is that 
nationalists in Scotland and Canada displayed an imperial identity, the specific 
reasons for which form part of this investigation. Within a system of Multi-level 
governance such as the European Union (EU) such an identity will be lacking. The 
creation of empires involves soldiers, missionaries, traders and administrators each 
of whom are committed to the Empire through an emotional investment of time, 
effort and, in some, cases their own lives. The pursuit of Empire can also be about 
the pursuit of recognition by gaining power and prestige in the international 
community. Politicians used this prestige to gain popular support among the 
electorate and the wider public for Empire thus creating a populist Imperial Identity. 
The creation of modern systems of multi-level government rarely involves anyone 
other than politicians and civil servants. The emotional investment of the public just 
does not exist. The only involvement by the electorate is through referenda which 
fail to capture the imagination in the same way as tales of Dr Livingston’s adventures 
                                                                                                                                          
State of the Nation: Ernest Gellner and the Theory of Nationalism (Cambridge, Cambridge University 
Press: 1998): 55 
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in Africa. Empires provided an opportunity for adventure and fantasy that modern 
MLGs will never be able to replicate. 
 
This does not mean, however, that the theoretical understanding generated 
throughout this thesis, in relation to minority nationalists within systems of MLG, 
cannot be applied to modern systems. Only that caution should be exercised in how 
that understanding is applied.  
 
Hypothesis and Research Questions 
 
The aim of this study is to investigate the relationship between nationalism and 
imperialism as understood by nationalist groups in Scotland and British Canada. The 
key question to be answered by this thesis is,  
 
 “Why did nationalists in Canada and Scotland articulate a nationalist 
discourse that incorporated both nationalism and imperialism?” 
 
Without reaching a conclusion prior to completing the study, it is important to have a 





The articulation of both a nationalist and an imperialist discourse by nationalists in 
Scotland and Canada reflected a mixture of geopolitical concerns and issues of state 
legitimacy each of which were seen as a challenge to the nation’s position within the 
Empire and the Empire’s position within the world system. 
  
In order to test this hypothesis fully, there are several secondary questions that must 
be addressed.  
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1) What was the nature of the nationalism espoused by groups in Scotland and 
British Canada? 
2) What was the nature of the imperialism espoused by groups in Scotland and 
British Canada? 
3) How did these groups reconcile nationalism and imperialism in their 
discourses?  
 
Each substantive chapter will address one of these questions. This will allow us to 
draw conclusions as to the relationship between nationalism and imperialism in 
Scotland and British Canada.  
 
The hypothesis can also be related to modern day systems of multi-level governance. 
Thus if our hypothesis is shown to be accurate, we may begin to talk of minority 
nationalisms articulating a discourse that includes a commitment to a wider system 





The thesis has been divided into four main chapters, each exploring a different theme 
which broadly correlates to the research questions noted above with the aim of 
adding to our understanding of the relationship between nationalism and imperialism 
in nationalist discourse. Rather than presenting the background historical material 
separately, each chapter will contain a section presenting the information needed to 
understand the historical context within which the individual groups operated. Each 
chapter is comparative, drawing on material from both Scotland and Canada to 
highlight the theoretical concerns being addressed.  
 
Chapter two will outline the methods used in the preparation of this thesis. In 
particular the question of whether a historical method exists in political science will 
be addressed. The argument will take as its premise the fact that most studies in 
political science treat history as background information rather than as the source of 
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valuable material in its own right. The remainder of the chapter will focus on the 
broad benefits of comparative analysis and the methods of document analysis used in 
the production of the substantive chapters to follow. The chapter will emphasise 
throughout that restraint will be required when inferring generalisations from any 
conclusions drawn from the historically specific cases of Scotland and Canada to a 
wider universe of cases.  
 
Chapter three will outline the theoretical framework of the thesis, developing the idea 
of imperial nationalism. The key concepts of nation, state and empire will be defined 
followed by an analysis of the nature of nationalism, its relationship to modernity, 
statehood and imperialism. The key argument of this section will be that Gellner’s 
definition of nationalism is only useful when political unit is not equated with the 
state. An investigation of the nature of identity and the role of nationalist elites in the 
formation of identity will be made. A variety of models of the way dual or multiple 
identities interact will be examined. The chapter will end with a discussion of the 
links between identity, nationalism and imperialism. The chapter will create the 
framework for the analysis of the empirical material to follow in subsequent 
chapters.  
 
Chapter four will begin the analysis of the empirical material, focusing on the extent 
to which the groups were nationalist. The chapter will be divided into four sections 
each presenting material from Scotland and British Canada. The opening section will 
present the historical background necessary for an understanding of the primary 
material to be presented. The second section will examine the use of historical 
symbols by nationalists. The significance of the symbols chosen will be analysed. 
The third section will investigate the use of the significant other by nationalist elites 
and the extent to which the Politics of Recognition informed their discourse. The 
final section will look at the specific grievances of the each movement in terms of 
democratic legitimacy and their critique of the existing systems of governance. The 
key argument of this chapter will be that failure to recognise national identity reflects 
back notions of oppression and lack of self worth. As a consequence, an identity is 
articulated expressing superiority over the other who has failed to recognise their 
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identity. The symbols of this identity were expressed in a discourse critical of the 
existing relationship between the nation and state and advocated reform of the 
system of governance. In both Scotland and Canada, historical symbols were chosen 
to assert superiority over the other involved in their discourse. 
 
Chapter five analyses the rhetoric of empire as found in the discourse of nationalists 
in Scotland and British Canada and the extent to which they were imperialist. The 
chapter will be split into four sections. The first section will examine the historical 
context necessary for an understanding of the threats and challenges to the British 
Empire. A theoretical discussion of international relations will be followed by a brief 
discussion of the decline of the Concert of Europe and its effect on British 
imperialism. The second section will examine Scotland and Canada’s place in the 
Empire, in particular the nature of the imperial relationship between Canada and 
Britain and the relationship between Scotland and Westminster. The third section 
will examine the proposals for reform of imperial government. The aim of these was 
to strengthen the weak bonds that characterised the imperial relationship with the 
self-governing colonies. This will set the context for the central argument of this 
chapter, the existence of a Greater British identity. This identity will be examined in 
the final section arguing that the levels of British emigration to Canada and the white 
self-governing dominions meant a British identity was spread around the Empire that 
formed the main link between the dominions and London.  
 
The final empirical chapter will analyse the ways in which the discourse of the 
nationalists in Scotland and Canada reconciled a national and imperial identity. The 
chapter will be organised around the themes of reconciling imperial and national 
identities, looking separately at the Scottish and British Canadian cases in order to 
highlight their differences. The first section will briefly provide some historical 
background necessary for an understanding of some of the issues to be investigated. 
The following section will examine the Scottish case arguing that Irish Home Rule 
set the context for Scottish imperial nationalism. The importance of the Empire and 
therefore the Union, to Scotland will be highlighted, as will Scotland’s influence in 
return. The third section will investigate the British Canadian case. It will be argued 
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that the influence of the United States in the history of Canada was vital to the 
discourse of imperial nationalists. This history will be examined in the context of the 
trade debates carried on in Canada in the 1880s and 1890s. These debates surrounded 
the issue of Commercial Union with the United States or the pursuit of a preferential 
imperial tariff. The final section of the chapter will compare the two cases. The 
different approaches of imperial nationalists in Scotland and British Canada will be 
highlighted. We will also examine the similarities between the two. It will be argued 
that the different nature of nationalism in Scotland and British Canada highlights the 






The aim of this chapter is to outline the broad methodology used in the preparation of 
this thesis. In order to ensure the answers to the theoretical questions posed in the 
previous chapter are robust it is important to show the methods used to generate those 
answers. Yet one of the key themes of this chapter will be that the methods used in 
social and political science will never be capable of achieving the levels of certainty 
present in the natural sciences which positivist social scientists try to emulate. The 
experimental method of natural science, where variables are held constant in tightly 
controlled conditions, is, of course, not possible in political science due to the moral 
and practical obstacles such a method would present. Politics depends, whatever 
structuralists might say, on individuals making decisions. Neither side of the 
structure/agency debate can claim the certainty of the natural sciences. The decisions 
of an individual, whatever the structural constraints, can never have the predictability 
of the actions of atoms or the formation of ice, clouds or glaciers in the natural world. 
The political world’s unpredictability is one of its most exciting attributes. This does 
not mean, however, that an understanding of politics is impossible, only that care 
should be taken when claims to generalisation are made. 
 
The methods outlined in this chapter will highlight the restraint that should be shown 
when inferring generalisations to a wider body of cases but will also show that it is 
possible to generate theoretical knowledge from a comparison of two historically 
specific cases. The method outlined is the best, perhaps the only, method available for 
such a study and showing caution in inferring generalisations should not be seen as a 
weakness of the methodology but rather as a reality in the attempts to make studies of 
social and political life scientific.  
 
The chapter will be organised into four broad sections. The first section will examine 
the nature of the relationship between history and political science and argue for a 
place for history as a method in political science rather than a separate chapter 
providing context. The second section will investigate the comparative method 
highlighting its benefits for generating theoretical understanding. The third section 
will outline the reasons for choosing Scotland and British Canada as case choices. 
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Some key similarities and differences will be highlighted and key background 
information on the groups under study presented. The final section will outline the 
methods of documentary analysis used throughout the thesis, highlighting in particular 
some aspects of Discourse Analysis that were found to be useful. The key argument of 
the chapter will be that restraint must be shown when inferring generalisations from a 
study of this nature due to the large number of potential variables involved in 
historical cases and the nature of documentary analysis. Despite this qualification, 
however, it is believed that the method outlined here is capable of expanding 
theoretical knowledge of the relationship between nations and empires.  
 
A Historical Method in Political Science? 
Given the nature of the research questions outlined in chapter one this study will 
necessarily be historical in its scope. This in itself raises certain questions as to the 
validity of any generalisations or theoretical gains that can be made. It will be argued 
that the interpretive historical method, although not claiming to be scientific, can 
provide contextual understanding that is important for the development of general 
understanding.  
 
The distinction between history and social science is often regarded as a grey area by 
practitioners on both sides of the academic border. The issue essentially comes down 
to what is history and what is political science. Birch, in an analysis of historical 
explanation in politics, outlined two broad churches in the discipline of history, the 
purist and the idealist.1 In the purists’ conception of history, all prejudices and 
contemporary preoccupations should be put to one side. Value judgements should be 
avoided. They argue that causes cannot be found for historical events, rather such 
events can be 
 
followed by another in ways that can be explained, but to say that the first 
event caused the second would be invalid, partly because it would assume an 
inevitability which is never present in human affairs and partly because it 
would assume that events can properly be detached from the whole pattern of 
life…2
 
                                                 
1 Birch, A.H., “Historical Explanation and the Study of politics” in Government and Opposition 4(2) 
1969: 221-222 
2 Ibid: 221 
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This view would leave the political scientist wishing to adopt an historical approach in 
an impossible position. Thankfully, there are options, one of which is to adopt a 
broader view of the historical discipline, the idealist approach.  
 
Idealists place a greater emphasis on verstehen, or understanding, than purists. This 
understanding should include,  
 
not only an appreciation of human motives and reasoning but also that of the 
part played in human affairs by ideas, by modes of communication and by 
those institutions which form the context within which political actors make 
their decisions.3
 
This movement from a level of explanation to wider general understanding is the 
borderline between history and political science. Emphasis is placed on understanding 
ideology, discourses, rhetoric and institutions and the effect they have on human 
decision making. This is the move from explaining events to interpreting and 
understanding action. As Charles Tilly put it, the common ground between 
interpretative history and social science comes when “we edge over from strictly 
historical questions into the effort to provide accounts, and even explanations…”4 The 
effort to move from determining what happened to explaining cases and inferring 
general propositions about a wider universe of cases is the effort to move from history 
to social and political science.  
 
But in describing this grey area it would seem that there is no real historical method in 
social science other than the simple use of historical material to explain phenomena in 
political and social science. This theme is found throughout the methodological 
literature in political science and the social sciences generally. C Wright Mills, for 
example, argued that to “fulfil their tasks, or even to state them well, social scientists 
must use the materials of history.”5 The political scientist Dennis Kavanagh argued in 
his review of the relations between his discipline and history that “the contribution of 
history, as the systematic study of the past, to political science has been more as a 
body of knowledge than as a set of methods.”6
                                                 
3 Ibid:  225 
4 Tilly, C., As Sociology Meets History (Harmondsworth, Penguin Books: 1980): 100  
5 Wright Mills, C., The Sociological Imagination (Harmondsworth, Penguin Books: 1980): 162 
6 Kavanagh, D., “Why Political Science needs History” in Political Studies 39 (3), 1991: 480. 
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If we accept then that there is no particular historical method in political science and 
historical situations are merely treated as cases, what particular issues are raised for 
the possibility of making any theoretical gains? As Seymour Martin Lipset has 
pointed out any given historical problem could have been caused by a wide and varied 
number of factors. The difficulty is in finding constants in order that we can isolate 
the independent variables.7 If the positivistic goal of political science is to explain 
phenomena in the political world then the isolation of independent variables is the 
crux of the matter. But it is the level of explanation that is important. Political science 
is unlike the natural sciences as the political world lacks the order of the natural 
world. Laws such as Newton’s Laws of Motion are virtually absent in political 
science. Therefore the level of explanation is reduced to probability rather than 
certainty.8 So if even the quantitative methodologies of political science cannot 
generate law like generalisations, where does this leave, in Lijphart’s view, the less 
scientific qualitative historical study?9
 
Lipset argued that although we cannot validate hypotheses with the rigour associated 
with the natural sciences, we can, when using historical cases, “draw out 
generalisations that can apply to similar cases.”10 Thus, there is no necessary clash 
between making theoretical gains and taking historical specificity into account.11 
Skocpol, in a similar vein, argued that placing developments in historical perspective 
allows a full contextual basis for the better understanding of a topic.12 Birch argued 
that whilst this type of analysis would not “pretend to be a scientific law”, by giving 
an account of the reasons why, “it would be far more than a statement of statistical 
probability…”13 The use of historical cases in political science involves interpretative 
understanding rather than scientific analysis. Indeed one of the major benefits of a 
historical study is that it need not be overly scientific. As Birch asserted, the pursuit of 
                                                 
7 Lipset, S.M., “Some Methodological Considerations” in Lipset, S.M., and Hofstadter, R. (eds) 
Sociology and History: Methods (New York, Basic Books Inc: 1968) 
8 Birch, “Historical Explanation and the Study of Politics”: 227 
9 Lijphart, A., “Comparative politics and the Comparative method” in The American Political Science 
Review 65(3) 1971: 685 
10 Lipset, “Some Methodological Considerations”: 51 
11 Ibid: 51-2 
12 Skocpol, T., “Emerging Agendas and Recurrent Strategies” in Skocpol, (ed)., Vision and Method in 
Historical Sociology: 359 
13 Birch, “Historical Explanation and the Study of politics”: 227 
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an interpretative historical approach in political science “is to pursue a fuller 
understanding than can be gained from the language of pure narrative without falling 
into the language if hypothesis and verification.”14 Care must be taken, however, as 
generalisations can only be applied to a finite sample of similar cases. 
 
Theda Skocpol identified three approaches to historical analysis. Firstly, a single 
theoretical model can be thoroughly investigated by application to one or more case 
studies. Second, alternative hypotheses can be explored to discover causal regularities 
and thus account for specifically defined historical processes or outcomes. Finally, a 
meaningful historical explanation approach can be adopted. Concepts can be applied 
to specific cases to aid understanding of both the case and the concepts.15 Skopol has 
claimed academics using the last of these approaches are sceptical of the value of 
general models or causal hypotheses.16 As Lipset claimed, however, there is no 
inherent incompatibility between the interpretative approach and the application of 
theoretical gains made to other cases.17 An interpretative approach can give an in-
depth contextual understanding of a topic thus increasing our understanding of 
concepts which can then be applied to other cases.  
 
 
Goldstone, in his review of comparative historical analysis, argued this type of 
interpretive investigation is carried out through “strategic narrative.” The narrative 
marshals evidence against existing theory and tests our “prior theoretical beliefs.”18 
So in the transition from history to politics a “strategic narrative” will analyse the 
important aspects of the historical evidence rather than provide a detailed narrative of 
everything that happened in that particular period. For example, in his study of small 
nation nationalism in Eastern Europe, Miroslav Hroch did not give us a detailed 
history of each nation but only told us the important information regarding the social 
backgound of nationalists in his cases under examination as they related to his 
                                                 
14 Ibid: 227 
15 Skocpol, “Emerging Agendas…”: 362 
16 Ibid: 362 
17 Lipest, “Some Methodological Considerations”: 51 
18 Goldstone, J., “Comparative Historical Analysis and Knowledge Accumulation in the Study of 
Revolutions” in Mahoney, J. and Reuschmeyer, D., (eds) Comparative Historical Analysis in the Social 
Sciences (Cambridge, Cambridge University Press: 2003): 51 
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hypothesis.19 By relating important evidence to theory or hypotheses we can build 
more convincing generalisations. The data gathered by this study has not been 
gathered to shed new light on the historical development of nationalism in Scotland 
and Canada but to add something to our understanding of the relationship between 
nationalism and imperialism in nationalist discourse. 
 
The interpretative approach will be adopted throughout this thesis with the aim of 
developing understanding and making theoretical gains that can be applied to a wider 
set of similar cases. The interpretative approach pays careful attention to the 
intentions of the individuals or groups in given historical settings.20  It deals with 
people’s experience and their understanding of that experience.21 This study will 
interpret the actions of nationalists in Scotland and British Canada through the use of 
modern concepts in political science. The method of interpretation will be outlined 
later in this chapter.  
 
It is important to remember that these generalisations must be treated with caution, as 
one of the pitfalls of the use of a historical case is to overemphasise the specific. 
Detail in historical studies is important as this gives us a fuller understanding of the 
topic. Indeed the contextual background, as has been mentioned, is one of the benefits 
of historical studies. But to move from history to political science we need to move to 
general theory and concepts and develop generalisations from the observed 
phenomenon.22 We must avoid degenerating into specificity. 
 
One important way to reduce the emphasis on specifics is to introduce more than one 
case. By doing this differences between cases can be seen but the similarities 
highlighted and generalisations inferred. Comparative historical analysis indeed, 
works entirely from this premise. By fully understanding specific cases, 
generalisations are inferred by examining the extent of difference and similarity 
across cases. This similarity and difference is “considered a crucial part of the 
                                                 
19 Hroch, M., Social Preconditions of National Revival in Europe (New York, Columbia University 
Press: 2000) 
20 Skocpol, “Emerging Agendas…”: 368; 
21 Rueschemeyer, D., “Can one or a few cases yield theoretical gains?” in Mahoney, J., and 
Rueschemeyer, D., Comparative Historical Analysis in the Social Sciences (Cambridge, Cambridge 
University Press: 2003): 313 
22 Birch, “Historical explanation and the study of politics”: 227 
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investigation.”23 The key claim of comparative historical analysis is that 
“generalisation is sought by piecing together finite sets of cases, not by sampling and 
inference to a larger universe.”24 But comparative politics has specific problems of its 
own which will now be examined.  
 
Comparative Politics: The “Human” Method 
According to Landman, “to compare is to be human.”25 Comparison is part of 
everyday life; “that car is bigger and better, that painting more beautiful, this flower 
more delicate.” Most everyday comparisons are made against a normative picture of 
something. Clearly in political science we need to be more specific. The method of 
comparison in politics, as we shall see, has its roots in a positivistic approach that puts 
the science in political science. We will argue in this section that a focussed 
comparison using two cases provides the best balance between contextual analysis 
and theoretical gains.  
 
Hague et al. claim “comparison is the foundation of any systematic branch of 
knowledge.”26 Landman and Hague et al. outline four basic reasons for comparison: 
classification, prediction, contextual description and hypothesis testing.27 
Classification involves generation of concepts. In the natural sciences, bees and wasps 
are classifications. In political science, states and nations are classifications. 
Comparative politics can also allow us to predict what will happen in certain 
circumstances. If we have observed a certain phenomenon, national revolution for 
example, in a given set of circumstances, we may predict a similar phenomenon will 
occur in another case with similar circumstances. The certainty of any prediction, 
however, must be tempered. No two given sets of circumstances are ever exactly the 
same. Unlike the natural sciences we can only deal in terms of probability. We have 
already mentioned the importance of context in the historical method. Context is also 
important in comparative studies. Comparative context sheds new light on our own 
                                                 
23 Goldstone, J., “Comparative Historical Analysis and Knowledge Accumulation in the Study of 
Revolutions”: 44 
24 Ibid: 43 
25 Landman, T., Issues and Methods in Comparative Politics: an Introduction (London, Routledge: 
2000): 4 
26 Hague, R., Harrop, M. and Breslin, S., Comparative Government and Politics: An Introduction 3rd 
edition (Basingstoke, Macmillan Press: 1992): 23 
27 Ibid: 24-5 and Landman, Issues and Methods: 4 
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country and our own realms of expertise as well giving us more information from 
which to generate theory.28 Hypothesis testing brings us back to the science in 
political science.  
 
 According to Lijphart, the comparative method is one of the basic methods of 
“establishing general empirical propositions.”29 In his positivist look at political 
science, Lijphart outlined the basic scientific approaches to political study, arguing 
that the closest political science can get to the experimental method of the natural 
sciences is the statistical method.30 He also claimed, however, that the comparative 
method resembles the statistical method in all ways excepting one. “The crucial 
difference is that the number of cases it deals with is too small to permit systematic 
control by means of partial correlations.”31
 
In what has become known generally as “the small-N problem” (where N is the 
number of cases), Lijphart underlined one of the biggest problems with the 
comparative method as a scientific method in politics. The basic problem is simply 
put: “many variables, small number of cases.”32
 
Lipset’s observation regarding the number of variables in historical cases, noted 
above, is not limited to the historical sphere. In the political and social spheres the 
number of variables affecting an outcome is almost unlimited. When dealing with 
problems at a state level as most political science problems do, the researcher is then 
restricted to a finite number of cases (the total number of states in the world) to 
compare and isolate (control) the pertinent variables. If we take nationalist groups 
asserting the right to self-determination whilst wanting to remain within an empire we 
can find only a small number of cases and most of these within the British Empire. 
The large number of variables that could cause the formation of such groups, such as 
prestige, defence, economic reasons and so on makes it very difficult to reduce such 
variables to the few that are important. As there are a finite number of cases and a 
large number of variables the small N, large variable problem becomes clear.  
                                                 
28 Hague et al., Comparative Government and Politics: 24  
29 Lijphart, “Comparative Politics and the comparative method”: 682 
30 Ibid: 683-4 
31 Ibid: 684 
32 Ibid: 685 
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There are several ways in which the small-N problem can be resolved. One obvious 
resolution would be to increase the number of cases. Increasing the number of cases is 
impracticable, however, for the purposes of this study. Other solutions would be to 
reduce the level of analysis to a sub-state, (i.e. regional) or individual level. The 
analysis can also be extended over time (i.e., both historical cases and modern day 
cases can be used.)33 Resolving the small-N problem in this way means that although 
the number of variables is still large you have effectively increased the number of 
cases in which you can control certain variables to find the causally significant 
variable or variables.  
 
Another solution to the problem is to reduce the number of variables. This can be 
done using J.S. Mill’s Methods of Agreement and Difference. When using Mill’s 
Method of Difference two cases can be selected, one where the observed phenomena 
exists and one where it does not. In all else the cases share the same variables, save 
one or two. The variable(s) in which the cases differ must then be the “cause, or an 
indispensable part of the cause, of the phenomenon.” 34 The problem, however, in 
finding cases where there are sufficient similar variables that can be held constant is 
considerable and was acknowledged by Mill himself.35 For example, if we take the 
articulation of a national and imperial identity by nationalists as the observed 
phenomenon and a large colony within an empire as basic criteria, one could quickly 
think of Canada and Mexico. Both shared a border with the United States, both were 
important colonies within their respective empires and yet Mexico desired outright 
independence, whereas Canadian nationalists wanted to remain within the Empire. 
The respective positions of power held by the British and Spanish Empires could 
prove important factors in the discourse of the nationalists but it would be extremely 
difficult to confirm all other factors were similar.  
  
Mill’s Method of Agreement has also been suggested as a solution to the small-N 
problem.36 When using the Method of Agreement the cases being compared must be 
                                                 
33 Landman, Issues and Methods: 40 
34 Mill, J.S., System of Logic (London, Longmans, Green and Co.: 1884): 256 
35 Ibid: 258  
36 Landman, Issues and Methods: 40 
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conceptualised as almost totally different whilst the observed phenomenon remains 
the same. As Mill put it,  
 
If two or more instances of the phenomenon under investigation have only one 
circumstance in common, the circumstance in which alone the instances agree 
is the cause (or effect) of the given phenomenon.37
 
In other words, cases with different political systems, sizes, geopolitical importance 
and so on, that exhibit the same observed phenomenon would be used in a research 
design using the Method of Agreement. To continue using Canada as an example, we 
would need to look for a case where other nationalist elites articulated both a national 
and imperial identity but which in many other respects was very different from 
Canada. Scotland provides such a case. It played an important role in creating the 
British Empire of which Canada was a part, yet is much smaller, had a very different 
political relationship with Westminster and a different political system. A comparison 
of these two cases then would highlight the similarities between the two and 
hypothesise that these may be important variables, for example, the existence of a 
large dominant neighbour, in causing the formation of nationalist movements. 
 
One of the problems with the Method of Agreement is selection bias, as the cases are 
chosen on the basis of sharing the same observed phenomena and not at random as 
should be the case in a scientific method.38 Again the main impact on the study will 
be the strength and reliability of any inferences that can be made to the larger 
universe. As long as this is accounted for in the conclusions, an awareness of the 
problem can limit its impact.  
 
In adopting an interpretative approach to our investigation, however, we do not need 
to control variables. Rather the aim of using the interpretative approach is to provide a 
meaningful account of nationalism in Scotland and British Canada, and in doing so 
make theoretical gains that can be applied to other cases. The principles of Mill’s 
methods, however, can still be usefully employed. In order to narrow down the 
potential number of variables we can select two cases which are as different from 
                                                 
37 Mill, System of Logic: 255; cf Guy Peters, B., Comparative Politics: Theory and 
Methods (Basingstoke, Palgrave: 1998): 66 
38 Landman, Issues and Methods: 38 
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each other as can possibly be conceived. This should then reduce the number of 
potential variables to be identified once our interpretative investigation has been 
completed. Skocpol argued that comparisons are used in interpretative studies to 
emphasis differences between cases.39 But for any theoretical gains to be made from 
an interpretive approach we also need to investigate what is common to both cases.  
 
If resolution of the small-N problem means increasing the number of cases we would 
expect greater theoretical gains to be made from a larger number of cases than just 
two. The utility of a two case comparative study can, therefore, be questioned. When 
we use more than one case, however, we go beyond the boundaries where causally 
relevant factors may be held constant. This in itself can bring substantial theoretical 
gain.40 The most acceptable trade off between complexity and generalisation is a 
focused comparison of two cases.41
 
Done well this approach has the strengths of both [case study and statistical] 
techniques but the weakness of neither.  
 
Focussed comparisons remain sensitive to the details of particular countries… 
while retaining some ability to form, and test, explanations.42
 
Hague et al. argue that the biggest increase in understanding comes when raising the 
number of cases under comparison from one to two. 43 There would therefore be no 
benefit in increasing the cases under review as there would be no greater 
understanding of the relationship between nationalism and imperialism that could be 
applied to a larger sample of cases.  
 
It is not being claimed here that law-like generalisations can be gained from a two 
case study. Indeed, the generation of laws is not the intention of this study. Focused 
comparisons of the type being carried out in this study allow in-depth understanding 
of the context of each case. This contextual depth will enable us to generate greater 
theoretical understanding which can then applied to other cases. Only through the 
                                                 
39 Skocpol, “Emerging Agendas…”: 369 
40 Rueschemeyer “Can one or a few cases yield theoretical gains?”: 322 
41 Landman, Issues and Methods: 53 and Hague et al., Comparative Government and Politics: 39 
42 Hague et al., Comparative Government and Politics: 39-40 
43 Ibid: 40 
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expansion of knowledge can we begin to attempt to make generalisations to a wider 
set of cases.  
 
With this in mind, this study aims to use a focused comparison of Scotland and 
Canada with the aim of increasing our understanding of the relationship between 
nationalism and imperialism. Using a focused comparison means the study will have 
the strengths of both the case study method, with its configurative analysis and 
detailed description, and the scientific method, with the elements of control, wider 
scope and theory building abilities. Our interpretative approach will allow a 
meaningful investigation of the substantive material without the scientific jargon 
associated with statistical analyses. By using this method we also gain the contextual 
background that can be missing from a more scientific approach. Combined with the 
historical “strategic narrative” a focused comparison will allow us to fully investigate 
the background to the relationship between nationalism and imperialism in the 
discourse of nationalists in Scotland and Canada. Whilst it will be difficult to make 
generalisations to a wider set of cases, we can increase our theoretical understanding 
which can then be applied to other similar cases. Our understanding of the 
relationship between nationalism and imperialism when used by nationalist groups 
will have been increased. The basis for understanding, having been contextual, will be 
much deeper. These benefits, it is believed, will give this study a strong 
methodological basis.  
 
Case Choices 
Scotland and Canada have been chosen as case studies since they both show the use of 
both imperial and national identities by nationalist groups. The Scottish Home Rule 
Association showed their commitment to the Empire in their statement of aims in 
1892.44 The Canadian National Association did likewise in 1874.45 As has been noted 
above the selection of cases in this way will inevitably introduce an element of bias. 
Care not to make wild claims that any conclusions must apply to the larger universe of 
cases and an awareness of bias will ensure its impact is restricted.  
 
                                                 
44 Scottish Home Rule Association, Prospectus of the Scottish Home Rule Association (Edinburgh, 
1892) 
45 Canadian National Association, “Canada First: Address of the Canadian National Association to the 
People of Canada” in Morgan, H.J., (ed.) The Canadian Parliamentary Companion (Montreal: 1874) 
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It should be noted that where Canada is used, British Canada is being discussed. 
British Canada includes all areas of Canada outside the predominantly Francophone 
province of Quebec. French Canada will not be a focus in this study other than where 
its influence on British Canada is significant. There are several reasons why only 
British Canada is being studied. Within the context of Canadian Confederation and 
westward expansion into the North-West Territories, the vision of nationalists in 
Canada was of a British Canadian nation that would rival the United States and work 
in partnership with Britain in the maintenance of the Empire. A good example of this 
vision is in the immigration policy of the late nineteenth century. The ideal immigrant 
for Canada and the Canadian west in particular was white, British and Protestant.46 
The cultural battle for control of the North-West formed an important part of the 
discourse of the early British Canadian nationalists and as such laid the basis for the 
cultural antagonism that characterised much of the period. There have been relatively 
few studies of British Canadian nationalism.47 This study will thus fill the gap in the 
literature.  
 
Scottish nationalism in this period sparked the idea of analysing the use of an imperial 
identity in a nationalist context, in particular its use by the Scottish Home Rule 
Association, formed in 1886. When comparing this movement with the Campaign for 
a Scottish Secretary of the early 1880s, it was noted that rarely was the latter 
campaign outlined in imperial terms. Yet it was a distinctively national and nationalist 
campaign. The change of approach by the later nationalists makes them distinctive in 
this context. This change will be analysed in depth to discover reasons for the 
different approaches.  
 
Scotland and British Canada make good cases for comparison when using the Method 
of Agreement. Both share a few common characteristics, such as relatively privileged 
position in the Empire, British heritage, large neighbours and so on, but are largely 
very different entities. Some of these differences will be listed below.  
 
                                                 
46 Abu-Laban, Y. and Garbiel, C., Selling Diversity: Immigration, Multiculturalism, Employment 
Equity and Globalization (Toronto, Broadview Press: 2002): 38 
47 See for example Berger, C., The Sense of Power: Studies in the Ideas of Canadian Imperialism 1867-
1914 (Toronto: University of Toronto Press: 1970); Stewart Wallace, W., The Growth of Canadian 
National Feeling (Toronto, The MacMillan Company of Canada Ltd: 1927); Gagan, D., “The 
Relevance of  ‘Canada First’” in Journal of Canadian Studies, 1970, Vol. 5 No. 4 
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Size 
The most obvious difference is the difference in size geographically. Even in 1867, 
before the geographical boundaries of Canada had been settled, Canada was 
geographically much larger than Scotland.  
 
Geographical boundaries 
Related to size is the fluidity of borders in the period under study. From 1867 to 1899 
Canada grew from a sizeable Dominion in the North-East of the North American 
continent to one of the largest countries in the world in terms of geography. 
Scotland’s boundaries on the other hand were much less fluid, having been 
established by geography and border disputes for a number of centuries prior to 1867.  
 
Political Systems  
Whilst ultimately both Scotland and Canada were ruled from Westminster, Canada, to 
all intents and purposes, was self governing in domestic matters. Scotland, as we shall 
see, had been self-administered by a number of unelected boards but political 
decisions were made in London. In the period under examination, there was a 
successful campaign for more effective local government in Scotland, as well as the 
creation of the post of Secretary of Scotland. Canada, through its written constitution, 
had a federal system that saw powers divided between provincial governments and a 
central federal parliament. These two very different forms of government necessarily 
affected the strategies adopted by interest groups and social movements.  
 
Regional Fragmentation 
Canada’s regions, as remains the case today, were much more important politically 
than the regional differences within Scotland, even between Highlands and Lowlands. 
The federal political system in Canada from 1867 gave the Provinces a political outlet 
through the Provincial Assemblies. At the federal level the Provinces competed for 
patronage and power. The patterns of settlement from the early days of colonisation, 
the existence of separate colonies prior to confederation with separate histories and 
the federal constitution all reinforced these regional identities in Canada. There were 




Scotland was regarded as one of the “old” nations of Europe, with a settled civil 
society that performed many of the functions of the State. Whilst the concept of nation 
as modern or perennial will be examined in the following chapter, the important point 
here is that the Scottish nation had been in existence prior to Canadian confederation. 
The territory called Scotland had been peopled by Scots for much longer. A Scottish 
identity based on the institutions of the Church, Scots Law and education had been 
maintained since the Act of Union of 1707. Scottish nationalists, therefore, had a 
much larger portfolio of historical events from which to select symbols for their 
discourse. By contrast it could be argued that there was no Canadian nation in 
existence in 1867. The history of the territory that became Canada was certainly 
shorter, therefore, myths and symbols had to be adopted or created. Indeed, one of the 
aims of Canada First, one of the groups under study in this thesis, was to create “a 
new nationality.”48 This difference greatly influenced the aims of the respective 
national movements.  
 
Imperial Status 
Canada had only just been promoted from Colony to Dominion by the British North 
America Act of 1867. With control over most aspects of domestic policy the Canadian 
confederation had relative autonomy from the Empire, in very similar ways to modern 
day Scotland in the United Kingdom. The difference, however, was that Canada in the 
late nineteenth century had little or no voice in relation to foreign affairs, including 
commercial treaties with the United States. The nature of this relationship will be 
examined in more depth in later chapters. 
 
Scotland could rightly claim to be an equal partner in Empire with representation at 
Westminster. Scots provided personnel for the management of the Empire from 
Africa to Australia. Governors, army regiments and, above all, emigrants were 
provided by Scotland. A quick glance at the list of Prime Ministers of Canada in the 
period under question shows the influence of Scots in the political realm in Canada.49 
                                                 
48 Foster, W.A., Canada First: Or Our New Nationality – An Address (Toronto: 1888) 
49 John A. Macdonald and Alexander McKenzie, the first two prime ministers of Canada following 
Confederation in 1867 were both Scots. George Brown, editor of the Toronto Globe and leader of the 
reform movement was also a Scot. A number of Scots, or Scots descendants were involved in the 
Conferences that led to the creation of the British North America Act in 1867.  
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Scotland, however, had little control over its own domestic policy due to the 
dominance of English and Irish MPs and the preponderance of Imperial business to be 
dealt with. The campaign for a Scottish Secretary intended to redress this problem. 
The difference in Imperial Status was shown in the aspirations of each nation in the 
Imperial realm.  
 
Economy 
Although there is an argument that both Scotland and Canada were peripheries to a 
larger economic core (England and the United States respectively), they were at very 
different stages of development. In 1867, industrialisation in Scotland had largely 
been completed. In Canada it was in its infancy, a legacy of the reciprocity 
agreements with the United States and Imperial economic policy. The focus in Canada 
had been on raw materials and it was only with the introduction of Macdonald’s 
National Policy that a native industrial base began to take hold in Canada.  
 
These differences and others will be highlighted throughout the study. The importance 
of these differences lies in the need to be aware of contextual factors that may have 
influenced the observed outcomes.  
 
Aside from sharing in common nationalist groups that advocated the maintenance of 
imperial ties, both Scotland and Canada shared other similarities. Some of these are 
listed below.  
 
British Heritage 
The nature of Canadian settlement and formation gave Canada a large British 
immigrant population that continued to grow throughout the nineteenth century. 
Scotland had been part of Great Britain since her Union with England in 1707. 
Loyalty to the Crown, British political values and a common Imperial history meant 
that both Canada and Scotland characterised this shared British heritage. This 
informed much of views expressed in political life in both cases.  
 
Larger/More Powerful Neighbours 
Both Scotland and Canada shared borders with much larger neighbours. Fears of 
Anglicisation and Americanisation, to the extent of Canadian fears of annexation, also 
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informed many of the issues in political life. The desire for recognition by these 
neighbours was equally important in the discourse of imperial nationalists in Scotland 
and British Canada.  
 
Threats to position/existence of nation 
Both Scotland and British Canada faced threats either to their existence or their 
position within the state or the Empire. The United States was seen as an aggressive 
neighbour with designs on the annexation of Canada. The recognition of Ireland by 
Gladstone’s Irish Home Rule bill placed Scotland’s position within the United 
Kingdom under threat. Imperial nationalism was in many respects a reaction to these 
threats. 
 
Relatively Privileged Position in the British Empire 
As has been implied both Scotland and Canada held relatively prominent and 
privileged positions within the British Empire. Compared to some of the African and 
Asian colonies their level of autonomy and voice in the affairs of the Empire indicated 
the privileged position of Canada and Scotland.  
 
An awareness of some of these points of comparison will be important in helping us 
develop our understanding of the cases. Using the interpretative approach will allow 
us to examine what was different about the cases and further narrow down the 
similarities that were significant in causing the observed phenomenon.  
 
Time Period 
The late nineteenth century was distinctive as a period in which European imperialism 
was at its height. Russian expansionism to the North of India and the Scramble for 
Africa in which Germany, France, Italy, Britain and Belgium were all involved 
renewed interest in Empire in Britain. The importance of these challenges that faced 
Britain in this period, and what makes it distinctive from any other period in British 
imperial history, lies in the way in which the British Empire had to adapt to 
competition from other European powers, where before there had been none. Prior to 
the 1870s Britain had been pre-eminent in terms of Empire. Few other powers had the 
financial or military capability to challenge Britain’s influence across the world. This 
changed very quickly with the unification of Germany and the expansion of Russia in 
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Asia. Britain had to formalise previously informal imperial relationships in order to 
protect its economic and strategic interests. The approval of the Confederation of the 
British North American colonies in 1867 was symptomatic of this point.  
 
In order to investigate an alternative view of the relationship between nationalism and 
imperialism, we must select a time period when groups apparently articulating both a 
national and imperial discourse were present. In Canada, both Canada First and the 
Imperial Federation League in Canada were formed in the late nineteenth century. In 
Scotland the Scottish Home Rule Association was formed in 1886. The period from 
Canadian confederation through to the Boer War, stands out as an important time for 
the Empire and for both Scottish and Canadian nationalists.  
 
One issue that will need to be addressed here is the time lag between the formation of 
movements in Canada and Scotland. When comparing movements across time periods 
one has to be aware of changes in attitude, values and meaning of concepts. Indeed, 
the meaning of Empire may even have changed over this time period. It will be 
important then to identify the meanings that were attached to each concept of nation 
and empire in these different time periods when comparing Canada First (1868-1873), 
the Canadian National Association (1874) and the Scottish Home Rule Association 
(1886). The potential effect of change in meaning over time will need to borne in 
mind. Of course, concepts may also mean different things to different groups in 
separate contexts. This will also need to be addressed in the substantive chapters later 
in this thesis.  
 
The Nationalist Groups 
There are four main groups that articulated an imperial and national identity in 
Scotland and Canada in the late nineteenth century. In Scotland, the Scottish Home 
Rule Association (SHRA) articulated a nationalist and imperialist discourse. Elements 
within the Imperial Federation League in Scotland also advocated imperial and 
nationalist ideals. In Canada, the Imperial Federation League played the paramount 
role in articulating nationalism and imperialism. Its predecessor, at least in some 
respects, Canada First, was primarily a nationalist organisation but upheld the 
importance of the imperial connection. The Canadian National Association (CNA), a 
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final political fling of Canada First, had consolidation of the Empire as part of its 
platform.  
 
Scottish Home Rule Association  
The Scottish Home Rule Association was formed in 1886, following the introduction 
of an Irish Home Rule Bill by Prime Minister William Gladstone. The origins of the 
SHRA lay in a meeting called by the Honorary Secretary Charles Waddie, an 
Edinburgh printer.50 The executive of the SHRA comprised the Secretary Charles 
Waddie, the Chairman, Professor J.S. Blackie, a Gaelic revivalist and Vice President 
of the Highland Land Law Reform Association (HLLRA) and the Treasurer, William 
Mitchell, a lawyer and active member of the Liberal Party in Midlothian.51 The 
General Committee of the SHRA showed the wide range of interests Scottish Home 
Rule attracted. The broad church of Scottish nationalism included Radical Socialists 
such as R.B. Cunnighame Graham and Kier Hardie, joint founders of the Scottish 
Labour Party, to MPs concerned with crofting rights such as G.B Clarke, Tory 
romantics such as the outlandish Australian born Theodore Napier and Gaelic 
nationalist Ruaridh Erskine of Mar.52 The important point here, however, is that 
although a wide range of people were members of the SHRA, the general tone of the 
movement was dictated by the centrists in the party such as Waddie and Mitchell.  
 
The SHRA was essentially a pressure group whose main aim was to secure a Scottish 
Parliament that dealt with purely Scottish matters, leaving common British concerns 
and imperial matters to be dealt with by Westminster. Branches of the Association 
were formed across Scotland, including, Galashiels, Fort William, Dingwall, Dundee, 
Aberdeen and Glasgow.53 Although there were calls in later years for a wider network 
of branches to be formed, it was noted by the executive that sufficient members would 
need to be recruited to fill those branches.54 The grassroots support for Scottish Home 
                                                 
50 Mitchell, W., Is Scotland to be Sold Again? (Edinburgh, SHRA: 1893): 8 
51 SHRA, Petition to Scots MP’s, Lords and Lord Provosts of Burghs (Edinburgh, SHRA: 1886) For 
Blackie’s links to HLLRA see Hunter, J., “The Gaelic Connection: The Highlands, Ireland and 
Nationalism” in Scottish Historical Review Vol 54 (1975), 178-204; For William Mitchell see Mitchell, 
J., Strategies for Self Government: The Campaigns for a Scottish Parliament (London, Polygon: 1996): 
69 
52 Mitchell, W., Home Rule for Scotland (Edinburgh, SHRA: 1892) – Membership details taken from 
back cover. 
53 The Scotsman, 21 July 1886: 8 
54 SHRA, Proof for Private Perusal – Strictly Confidential – (Edinburgh: 1892/3) 
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Rule found its outlet in local Liberal Associations. In 1888, home rule supporters had 
been asked to form a branch of the SHRA only where the local Liberal Association 
did not support the measure.55  
 
The SHRA can best be described as an elite level pressure group. Its clear aim was to 
change opinion within the Liberal Party in favour of Scottish Home Rule. To some 
extent it could claim success. The Scottish Liberal Association adopted Scottish 
Home Rule as policy in 1888.56 The Liberal leadership in England, however, 
remained unmoved. Most of the SHRA members were involved in local or national 
politics. Various methods were adopted by the SHRA including letters to the press, 
pamphleteering, motions in Parliament, and publication of Parliamentary Division 
Lists indicating which MPs supported Scottish Home Rule in Parliament. In 1892, 
electors were asked by the SHRA to use Scottish Home Rule as a test question for 
candidates. An increasing number of Scots MPs supported Home Rule motions in 
Parliament after these elections, until in 1894, a majority of Scots MPs were in favour. 
The movement had effectively come to an end by 1900. A second Scottish Home Rule 
Association was formed at the end of the First World War.  
 
Canada First 
The history of Canada First is complex. It began life as a small group who met in 
Ottawa in 1868 through a mutual acquaintance, Henry Morgan, a civil servant. The 
original members included Morgan, Charles Mair, a poet from Lanark, Ontario, 
George Denison, a lawyer and cavalry officer from Toronto, William Foster, a 
Toronto lawyer who had written for the Toronto Telegraph and Robert Haliburton, an 
anthropologist from Nova Scotia with business interests in the coal industry.57 The 
time the group spent together was short, less than a month, before they went back to 
their respective homes. In that short time, however, they agreed to “labour for the 
moderation of political partisanship, the mitigation of localism and sectionalism, the 
purification of politics and the cultivation of a Canadian national sentiment.”58  
                                                 
55 Mitchell, W., Scotland and Home Rule (Edinburgh, SHRA: 1888): back cover 
56 Kellas, J.G., “The Liberal Party in Scotland” in Scottish Historical Review Vol. 44 (1965): 13 
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58 Willison, J.S., Sir Wilfred Laurier & the Liberal Party: A Political History Volume 1 (George 
N.Morang & Co, Toronto: 1903): 70. 
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Within a year Canada First had expanded to around a dozen nationalists that had 
formed a pressure group representing British Canada’s interests during the rebellion 
against the proposals to transfer governance of the North West from London to 
Ottawa at Red River in 1869-70. Public meetings were organised and letters sent to 
the press with the intention of bringing public attention to the plight of Canadians in 
Red River during the transfer of power from the Hudsons Bay Company to the 
Canadian Confederation.59 Following the successful conclusion of the Red River 
affair and the incorporation of Manitoba into Canadian Confederation, the group 
turned their attention to encouraging the settlement of the North-West through the 
formation of the North West Emigration Aid Society. The main aim of this group was 
to ensure British Canada was the predominant provider of settlers of the North 
West.60
 
The final stage in the evolution of Canada First was the formation of the Canadian 
National Association (CNA) in 1873. The CNA was an attempt to formally enter the 
political arena. Although they never fielded a candidate in any federal or provincial 
election they gave their support to Thomas Moss, a Liberal Candidate and a Partner in 
Foster’s law firm.61 Moss won the by-election by a substantial margin.62 A Manifesto 
was issued by the CNA in 1874 despite no candidates being put forward for the 
federal election in that year. The manifesto outlined the programme of the 
Association, a key policy being the maintenance of the imperial connection and a 
voice in treaties affecting Canada.63 A newspaper was formed, The Nation, as the 
mouthpiece of the CNA and support came from future Liberal Leader, Edward Blake. 
A branch of the Association was formed in New Brunswick.64
 
Canada First is probably best understood as an intellectual movement which took 
various forms between 1868 and 1874. The movement as an organisation had come to 
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an end in 1875, although The Nation continued in print until 1876. The significance of 
the movement lies in it being the first British Canadian nationalist movement. 
Electorally it was unsuccessful, but as a pressure group it fared better. Its influence on 
future British Canadian nationalist groups makes it worthy of inclusion.  
 
Imperial Federation League (Britain/Scotland) 
The Imperial Federation League was formed in London in 1884. The formal 
objectives of the IFL were passed in the form of the following resolutions.  
 
That in order to secure the permanent unity of the Empire some form of  
Federation is essential 
 
That, no scheme of federation should interfere with the existing rights of local 
parliaments, as regards local affairs 
 
That any scheme of federation should combine on an equitable basis the 
resources of the Empire for the maintenance of common interests, and 
adequately provide for an organized defence of common rights65
 
Federation was in some cases a misnomer as the movement attracted a wide range of 
politicians and activists, including John A. Macdonald, the Canadian Prime 
Minister,66 and the Earl of Rosebery, not all of whom advocated a formal federation 
of the empire. 
 
Branches of the IFL were formed in Scotland in 1887. The first meeting of the 
Glasgow and West of Scotland branch was held in private but included J.A Baird MP 
and the Rev. W.G. Duncan in its attendees.67 The report of the first annual meeting of 
the Glasgow Branch showed that the Earl of Glasgow had been elected Chairman of 
the Branch with a number of MPs being among the Vice Presidents.68 The Edinburgh 
and East of Scotland branch of the IFL was given a much grander inauguration, 
although still a private meeting, with the Chairman of the IFL, the Earl of Rosebery, 
presiding. The social background of some of the forty members present was varied. 
Religious leaders, advocates, MPs and academics attended the meeting held in the 
                                                 
65 Imperial Federation League, Imperial Federation League in Canada – Report of the First Meeting 
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Royal Hotel in Edinburgh. Indeed, the Principal of Edinburgh University, Sir William 
Muir, agreed to become President of the Branch.69 The “cosmopolitan character” of 
the University was apparently one of the driving factors behind the formation of the 
Edinburgh branch.70 Although there were only two branches of the League in 
Scotland, meetings were held across the country to discuss Imperial Federation, 
including Arbroath, Greenock, Aberdeen, and Kirkcaldy.71
 
It should be noted here that not all members of the IFL in Scotland were in favour of 
Scottish Home Rule. The Earl of Rosebery flirted with the idea on a number of 
occasions, finally conceding its necessity in 1893.72 Other prominent members of the 
IFL who supported Scottish Home Rule were Lord Reay and R.C Munro Ferguson, 
Liberal member for Leith.73
 
Imperial Federation League – Canada 
On 9th May 1885 the first meeting of the Imperial Federation League of Canada 
(IFLC) took place in Montreal. The resolutions of the British League were adopted 
and it was also resolved that:  
 
to the end that the Mother Country and the Colonies may remain perpetually 
under a common sovereignty, a United Empire in its foreign affairs and, with 
constitutional liberty for every part as regards internal administration, a 
readjustment of the several constitutional authorities of the Empire, should as 
occasion arises be made in such manner as to increase the practical efficiency 
of Imperial Unity.74
 
The meeting was attended by a large number of MPs, Senators, merchants, advocates, 
bankers and religious leaders from across Canada, as well as a number of prominent 
Montreal citizens. Letters of apology and support were received from a similar social 
grouping.75
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A quick analysis of the composition of the General Committee of the Imperial 
Federation League in Canada at its inception shows that the League was well 
represented across Canada. Of a total of 123 committee members, 93 were from the 
heartland of Ontario and Quebec. This is unsurprising given that the original meeting 
was held in Montreal and the concentration of population in the Central provinces. 
This also means that around a quarter of the committee were from the other 
provinces.76   
 
But representation of the League throughout Canada grew quite rapidly and within 
four years twenty-three branches of the League had been formed, with representation 
in each of the large cities and in most of the provinces. Again it should be noted that 
fifteen (two thirds) of the twenty-three branches were based in Ontario with only one 
in Quebec, the original branch in Montreal. Four branches had been formed in Nova 
Scotia, one in New Brunswick and two in British Columbia (Vancouver and 
Victoria).77 Again the prominence of the heartland is shown but this time it is based 
on Ontario not a combination of Ontario and Quebec. The Toronto Branch of the 




Since this study is using historical cases, document analysis will form the backbone of 
the substantive chapters. This method is arguably the oldest of the political and social 
science research techniques and is scarcely less important than quantitative or other 
qualitative methods, although these different techniques are not mutually exclusive.78 
This section will outline the broad method of documentary analysis, along with the 
potential issues with this method. 
 
Meaning is the crux of any documentary analysis and according to Scott, exists on 
two levels: literal meaning and interpretative meaning.79 Literal meaning is the 
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content of the document. What does the document actually say? There can be several 
problems in ascertaining the literal meaning of a document, however, such as 
language, date formats, deciphering handwriting and the meaning of technical terms 
(historically or in modernity.) But as Scott, rightly points out “the literal meaning of 
the words in a document give only its ‘face value’ meaning; they are the raw materials 
from which the real significance must be reconstructed.”80
 
Interpretative meaning has undergone some changes in the recent past, with debates 
over the most productive approach.81 Three strands of interpretative understanding 
can be discerned: content analysis, semiotics and textual analysis. Content analysis 
sprang from a quantitative approach to documentary analysis. The important topics 
were held to be those mentioned most often. So, for example, in an examination of a 
pamphlet on Scottish Home Rule, we would expect words and phrases such as, nation, 
Scotland, Parliament, Home Rule, Union and so on. This gives us an indication of 
what the document is about but it does not give us any depth of understanding. It is 
relatively simplistic and unsubtle.82
 
Scott suggests that these attempts by content analysts and semioticians to find the 
“objective meaning of the text itself, [by] arguing that its cultural significance 
depends on what messages it actually contains and not on what its author may have 
intended” have missed the point.83  
 
The text as an objective cultural entity, therefore, is ephemeral and must be 
reunited with the intentions of its author and the perspectives of its audiences. 
Texts must be studied as socially situated products.84
 
One method which aims to achieve this is discourse analysis. This approach draws its 
inspiration from interpretative sciences such as hermeneutics, which seek to 
understand concepts in their context and the relationships between them within the 
text.85 Discourse analysts examine the way systems of meaning, or discourses, “shape 
the way people understand their roles in society and influence their political 
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activities.”86 The focus of this approach is given to four key concepts: antagonism, 
agency, power and hegemony.87 Students of nationalism will be familiar with these 
concepts from any analysis of a document produced by nationalists. The task of 
nationalist elites, after all, is to articulate a position critical of the state.88 In creating 
this antagonism, a frontier is erected between the subject and the “other”. In using this 
aspect of discourse analysis, identifying the antagonisms and their signifiers becomes 
an important task. A key aspect of this approach is the persuasive power of contrast 
structures in which the subject is compared favourably with the other.89
 
Discourse theory argues that actions of agents are dependent on the discourses with 
which they identify. The different systems of meaning created by each discourse 
means that individuals will interpret different situations in different ways.90 For 
example, post-colonial discourse claims there is a direct contradiction between the 
view of empire held by colonisers and colonised. The former articulate an imperial 
discourse which generally upholds their right to empire based on racial or cultural 
superiority. The colonised create an antagonistic nationalist discourse based on their 
negative experience of empire.  
 
Finally, discourse theory gives priority to hegemonic practices, i.e., efforts to become 
master. Power and hegemony go hand in hand. As Howarth argues, “the concept of 
hegemony centres on who is going to be master.”91 In becoming master, the dominant 
discourse gains power, as it decides the dominant form of conduct. In this sense a 
discourse becomes politically constructed. Politics in essence is about power. A 
discourse is therefore a politically constructed system of meaning. In the above 
example, the discourse would organise behaviour using symbols of oppression and 
contrasting symbols of freedom to become the hegemonic discourse in the colonial 
society. Once that status had been achieved the discourse would organise the 
behaviour of society toward ending the colonial occupation. Once that occupation had 
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ended the colonised would gain power. The discourse would then change given the 
change in circumstances. It would no longer be necessary to articulate a discourse 
aimed at ending colonial occupation. 
  
Although this is not a study in discourse analysis, our focus is on the arguments of the 
groups, some of the principles of discourse theory, as applied in political science, can 
be used to identify and highlight some of the key concepts used by nationalists in 
Scotland and British Canada. In particular use will be made of the concept of 
antagonism. The discourse of the groups will be broken down to examine the nature 
of the antagonistic frontiers. As we shall argue in later chapters, identity is 
experiential and relational. Identifying who nationalists were antagonistic towards 
will aid our understanding of their identity.  
 
As with the historical comparative method in general, document analysts must be 
careful to moderate their conclusions. The various interpretations of a document 
opens and closes various doors for audiences and this variety must therefore limit the 
strength of any claims to generalisations for a study using this technique.92 Some of 
the principles of discourse analysis will be used to identify the key themes that can 
then be analysed in greater depth through textual analysis. But of course the context 
within which a discourse is articulated is very important. A general interpretive 
understanding technique situates the documents in the context of the times ensuring 
the key concepts are understood by the researcher as they would have been by their 
intended audience. The arguments, themes and style of document will all be important 
in outlining the strategy used by the relevant groups and this analysis will form the 
main substantive chapters of the thesis.  
 
Conclusion 
The key theme of this chapter has been the importance of showing restraint when 
inferring any generalisations drawn from this study to the larger universe, whilst at the 
same time maintaining the scientific goal of political science. The above summary of 
some of the issues involved in historical, comparative and documentary research has 
shown that the use of all three within political science is an acceptable method and not 
                                                 
92 Ibid: 34-5 
 43
incompatible with claims of science, despite any weaknesses the approach may have. 
The research design to be adopted in this study is seen as the most effective in 
developing a deep understanding of the relationship between nationalism and 
imperialism in nationalist discourse and why these concepts were articulated together, 
thus enabling us to address the research questions. The broad method then is a 
comparative historical analysis using an interpretative approach. The cases, Scotland 
and British Canada, and time period were chosen due to their exhibiting movements 
that articulated the particular concepts under study. The basis of comparison will be 
the discourse of each group. The articulation of their antagonisms creates boundaries 
which informed both imperial and national identities. The analysis of these 
antagonisms and the assertions of power that followed is the main approach of this 
thesis. The key themes of nationalist discourse will be ascertained through analysis of 
the various documents produced by each movement and its members. These 
documents will be set in their historical context by providing historical background at 
the beginning of each chapter. This context allows the discourse to be presented as it 
would have been understood by the contemporary audience. The key issue with all 
aspects of the approach is that any inferences to the larger universe will necessarily be 
restricted in scope. Despite this a deeper understanding of these particular cases 




Nationalism, Imperialism and Identity 
 
The aim of this chapter is to provide the theoretical framework for the thesis. The 
central theme of this thesis is the relationship between nationalism, imperialism and 
identity. The starting point for this study was the failure of general studies of 
nationalism to explain the existence of nationalist groups that simultaneously 
advocated a nationalist and an imperialist stance. Although typologies such as those 
of Breuilly and Kellas1 note the existence of post-colonial nationalisms where 
nationalists argue for independence from the empire, they have failed to classify or 
examine nationalisms that desire greater self-government and wish to maintain links 
with the empire. This study aims to fill the gap in the literature.  
 
Before we can begin to examine the substantive material, however, we need to 
identify and define the concepts that will inform our understanding of that material. 
Very few areas of social science lack debate over definitions of concepts. Theoretical 
debates are just as vigorous. Nationalism studies are no exception. Defining the key 
concepts and developing a strong theoretical framework allows us to interpret and 
understand the material to be presented in subsequent chapters. The purpose of this 
chapter is to define the key concepts used in this thesis and to develop a theoretical 
framework which will guide our investigation of the empirical material.  
 
The chapter will be organised into three broad sections. Firstly the key concepts of 
nation, state and empire will be discussed. Definitions will be provided following a 
discussion of the key debates in relation to those concepts. The relationship between 
nations, states and empires will also be examined. The following section will 
examine the nature of nationalism. The relationships between nationalism, 
modernity, statehood and imperialism will be discussed. An understanding of the 
causes of nationalism and imperialism will also be presented. The final section will 
investigate the nature of identity, in particular the role of the elite in articulating 
identity. The links between dual and multiple identities will be analysed. The 
                                                 
1 Breuilly, J., Nationalism and the State 2nd Edition (Manchester, Manchester University Press: 1993); 
Kellas, J.G., The Politics of Nationalism and Ethnicity (Basingstoke, Macmillan Press Ltd: 1991) 
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relationship between identity, nationalism and imperialism will also be examined. 
 
Nation, State and Empire 
Nation 
 
The debate over the multitude of definitions of the nation surrounds three distinct but 
inter-related issues: the age of nations, the organic or artificial nature of nations and 
whether nations are inclusive or exclusive. The argument of this thesis is that nations 
are modern, artificial constructs that use the history of their territory to create the 
impression that the nation is perennial. Although nations can be identified 
objectively, in terms of territory, values, culture and so on, they are essentially 
artificial constructs existing in the minds of its members. It will be further argued 
that nationalists use the materials of history to legitimise the nation and raise 
consciousness of its “existence.”  
 
One of the main problems in presenting a definition of nation is the balance between 
objective and subjective definitions. Objective definitions tend to ignore the self 
awareness element of subjective definitions of the nation. By way of example two 
contrasting definitions of nation can be presented. Anthony Smith provides a good 
example of an objective definition.  
 
A named human population sharing an historic territory, common myths and 
historical memories, a mass public culture, a common economy and common 
legal rights and duties for all members2
 
These factors can all be objectively noted by academics. Smith’s definition, however, 
has limitations. For one, many of these factors can also describe states, which also 
have common economies, legal rights and duties for citizens or members. States 
generally also have an historic territory and a mass public culture. We are left then 
with myths and historical memories to distinguish nations from states. States, 
however, also have histories, conflicts with neighbours that create borders and 
establish sovereignty. Another important element missing from Smith’s definition is 
                                                 
2 Smith, A.D., National Identity (London, Penguin Books Ltd: 1991): 14 
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the necessity for members of the nation to be aware of sharing these myths and 
memories with other members of the nation. Without this there can be no sense of 
belonging to a community. 
 
Benedict Anderson provides the classic subjective definition of the nation which 
incorporates this sense of belonging. The nation, according to Anderson,  
 
…is an imagined political community – and imagined as both inherently 
limited and sovereign.  
 
It is imagined because the members of even the smallest nation will never 
know most of their fellow members, meet them, or even hear of them, yet in 
the minds of each lives the image of their communion.3
 
Anderson’s definition stands in complete contrast to Smith’s. There is no mention of 
mass public culture, common economy or even of myths or historical memories. And 
yet the idea of a large community which is aware of common bonds (whatever nature 
they may take) provides a clearer sense of the murky nature of the concept of nation. 
One problem with Anderson’s definition is his use of the term “political 
community.” The view presented in this thesis is that nations are not necessarily 
political entities, although national elites may attempt to mobilise the nation for 
political ends.  
 
Whilst objective factors, such as language or territory, are undoubtedly important in 
identifying a nation, it is impossible to understand the nature of a nation without 
relating the consciousness of belonging to a larger community.4 As Connor claimed, 
the essence of the nation is a “psychological bond” that unites the nation and 
differentiates it from others.5 In other words members of a nation are aware of 
objective factors such as territory, language, myths, history and community that bind 
them to each other and make them different from other nations or communities. Thus 
                                                 
3 Anderson, B., Imagined Communities: Reflections of the Origins and Spread of Nationalism 
(London, Verso: 1991): 6 original emphasis 
4 Hobsbawm, E.J., Nations and Nationalism since 1870: Programme Myth and Reality (Cambridge, 
Cambridge University Press: 1992): 73 
5 Connor, W., Ethnonationalism - The Quest for Understanding (Princeton: Princeton University 
Press: 1994): 196 
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Connor has defined a nation as a “self-aware ethnic group.”6 In this sense the nation 
is not a tangible phenomenon but an artificial construct. The symbols, history and 
territory of a people are real enough but the nature of a nation is in the sense of 
belonging that can only exist in the imagination. Nations, in this sense are artificial. 
 
To provide a working definition then, we can say that a nation is a community of 
people aware of sharing a common heritage, myths, history, mission and culture. 
This definition opens the door to one of the key debates in defining nation, whether 
the nation is old or new. 
  
The modernist/perennialist debate is perhaps the main issue in nationalism studies. 
The basic debate is whether nations have always existed but have only recently been 
woken from their sleep (the perennialist position) or if they are a modern invention 
created for the purposes of the modern state. A third element of this debate is the 
argument of ethno-symbolists, such as Anthony Smith, who claim modern nations 
are the antecedents of ethnic communities of the middle ages. Briefly, the 
modernists, such as Gellner, Anderson and Hobsbawm, claim the nation resulted 
from the collapse of the medieval structures of society, the rise of industrialisation 
and urbanisation and the creation of the modern state.7 Gellner’s classic argument 
claims the nation is a result of the need for modern states to have a common culture 
to provide legitimacy for its actions. The nation was created through state sponsored 
education in a “high culture.” In this way citizens were created who could 
communicate with each other. The nation was the resultant unit.8
 
Perennialists begin from the premise that nations have always existed in one form or 
another. Modern nations, they claimed, share much in common with their 
                                                 
6 Connor, W., “A Nation is a Nation, is a State, is an Ethnic Group, is a …” Ethnic and Racial Studies 
1, 1978, cited in Hutchinson, J., and Smith, A.D.(eds), Nationalism (Oxford, Oxford University Press: 
1994): 45 
7 Gellner, E., Nations and  Nationalism (Oxford, Basil Blackwell: 1983); Anderson, Imagined 
Communities; Hobsbawm, Nations and Nationalism; See also Mann, M., “A Political Theory of 
Nationalism and its Excesses” in S. Periwal (ed) Notions of Nationalism (London, Central European 
University Press: 1995) and Breuilly, Nationalism and the State. 
8 For a fuller discussion of Gellner’s argument see also, Gellner, E., Thought and Change (London, 
Weidenfeld and Nicolson: 1972); Gellner, E., Nationalism (London, Phoenix: 1997); Hall, J.A., (ed) 
The State of the Nation: Ernest Gellner and the Theory of Nationalism (Cambridge, Cambridge 
University Press: 1998) 
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counterparts in antiquity and the middle ages. Nations therefore have deep roots in 
both history and the psyche. 9 There can be little doubt that nationalists use rhetoric 
displaying notions of the ancestry of the nation. The problem the perennialist 
position presents this study with is the existence of a separate British Canadian 
nation which shared its ethnicity with other nations, i.e., Scotland, England, Wales 
and Ireland. Undoubtedly “older” nations such as England and Scotland have a sense 
of ancestry handed down through the history of the nation but to claim Scotland was 
once a homogenous ethnic group would be stretching the point.  
 
Ethno-symbolists, such as John Armstrong and Anthony Smith also claim nations 
have ethnic origins, but prefer to analyse the symbols used to create ethnic 
boundaries. Armstrong argued the key to understanding ethnic group identity, and 
therefore nations, is the symbolic boundary mechanism that differentiates groups 
from one another.10  These symbols, such as a territorial name, develop common 
links between different groups over a long time period. Anthony Smith takes these 
ideas a step further, arguing the ethnie, is a preparatory stage prior to the formation 
of nations, where the name, symbols and myths of the nation are adopted. The ethnie 
itself is formed from ethnic groups coming together. In Smith’s analysis nations are 
generally formed around a dominant ethnie.11 Ethno-symbolists avoid the problems 
the perennialist position creates in relation to new nations such as the United States 
or Canada. Smith argues that the ethnic roots of the United States were an Anglo-
American Puritanism born from a reaction against British colonial policy in the late 
eighteenth century. Despite the multi-ethnic nature of the modern United States, 
American national identity still rests on this Anglo-American political community.12 
The American ethnie has its roots in the way British identity was adapted in the new 
world.  
 
The problem of defining nation can clearly be seen from the above discussion. 
Nations are communities that rely on a mutual sense of belonging expressed through 
                                                 
9 Smith, A.D., Nationalism and Modernism: A Critical Survey of recent theories of nations and 
nationalism (London, Routledge: 1998): 159-60 
10 Ozkirimli, U., Theories of Nationalism: A Critical Introduction (Basingstoke, Palgrave: 2000): 172 
11 Smith, National Identity: 38-9 
12 Ibid: 149-50 
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attachment to a set of symbols that members of the nation identify with and that will 
differentiate them from other nations. These symbols will generally be historic in 
nature. Whilst these historical symbols originate from the territory of the nation they 
can only acquire real significance in the modern age when communication allows the 
nation to be imagined through print media, widespread travel and regular contact 
with the agencies of the state. By communing with members of the nation through 
newspapers, travel and education, an individual becomes aware of belonging to a 
wider community: a nation. 
 
One final aspect of the nation must be acknowledged prior to moving on. Some 
theorists have claimed that nations take on two different forms. Nations, according to 
these categorisations, can either be civic or ethnic.13 Civic nations tend to be based 
on territorial political communities to which members or citizens are bound by a 
common historical territory, a common civic culture and ideology.14 In this 
conception of the nation, members could choose the nation they identify with the 
most. Membership of a nation is not restricted to those born within its borders. By 
contrast, ethnic nations emphasise the blood ties and common roots that distinguish a 
particular nation. In this organic conception, the nation is “first and foremost a 
community of common descent.”15 France and the United States are commonly held 
up as the classic examples of civic nations. The principles of the French Revolution 
and the American Declaration of Independence highlighted the people as a political 
community. The recent problems in the Balkans and in parts of Africa are generally 
characterised as ethnic nationalism.  
 
The distinction between the two concepts, however, is blurred and not particularly 
useful. The idea that civic nations are more liberal cannot be sustained on closer 
examination. After all when a citizen is welcomed into a new political community 
they must express loyalty to the symbols of the nation. Desecration of the ‘Stars and 
Stripes’ in the United States is a punishable offence. The recent ban on Muslim head-
                                                 
13 See for example, Kellas,  The Politics of Nationalism and Ethnicity; Smith, A.D., National Identity ; 
Ignatieff., M., Blood and Belonging: Journeys into the New Nationalism (London, Vintage: 1994); 
14 Smith, National Identity: 11 
15 Ibid: 11 
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dress in French schools is another example of the conditions laid down for 
membership of the civic nation. Whilst in general the contrast between civic nations 
and ethnic nations is not especially useful it will help shed some light on some of the 
substantive material to follow.  
 
The distinction between civic and ethnic nations has been developed in recent years 
by liberal theorists seeking a more satisfactory distinction.16 This liberal view of the 
nation sees members as “free and autonomous participants in a communal 
framework,”17 i.e., a nation that has no membership restriction. Rather than the 
distinction being between different types of exclusive nation the distinction becomes 
one between liberal and illiberal nations. As we noted above many civic nations 
impose conditions on national membership. They also fail to adequately recognise 
minority groups within the state.18 Liberal theories of the nation counter this by 
arguing that minority identities, incapable of forming a state of their own, should be 
included in the wider national identity.19 Not only will this enable them to access 





Definitional problems are also an issue when debating the nature of the state. There 
is no need to examine the debates in great detail here. This study is not about the 
state but about the relationship between nationalism and imperialism. However, an 
understanding of the nature of the state is required before we can begin to examine 
the nature of its relationship with the nation and empire. 
  
There are two approaches to defining the state: the institutional approach, what the 
state looks like, and the functional approach, what the state does.20 According to 
                                                 
16 See for example, Tamir, Y., Liberal Nationalism (Princeton, Princeton University Press: 1993) 
17 Ibid: 33 
18 Kymlicka, W., Multi-cultural citizenship: A Liberal Theory of Minority Rights (Oxford, Oxford 
University Press: 1995): 194 
19 Ibid: 194; see also Miller, D., On Nationality (Oxford, Oxford University Press: 1995): 188 
20 Mann, M., States, War and Capitalism (Oxford, Blackwell: 1988): 4 
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Mann, the predominant definitions, originating from Weber’s classic definition, 
contain a mixture of both approaches.21 Mann defined the state as,     
 
A differentiated set of institutions and personnel embodying centrality in the 
sense that political relations radiate outwards from a centre to cover a 
territorially demarcated area, over which it exercises a monopoly of 
authoritative binding rule-making, backed up by a monopoly of the means of 
physical violence.22
 
This definition will be used throughout the thesis. The following discussion breaks 
the definition into its key elements and develops those relevant to this study.  
 
The state as an organisation, or set of institutions, is differentiated to the extent that it 
performs all and only political activities. It recognises individuals under its rule have 
interests that are non-political and pursued autonomously from the state.23 The extent 
to which any activity is non-political can always be questioned but for the purpose of 
this discussion the state can be seen as secular and independent of civil society. The 
state is therefore impersonal.24  
 
The state is distinguished from other organisations and institutions by virtue of its 
territorial centrality. Only states have a centralised authority over a demarcated 
territory. Other organisations may be centralised but will extend beyond territories, 
for example multi-national corporations. States are centralised because all political 
activities must originate from or refer to the state. This raises two aspects of the state. 
The state has sole control of political activities within its territory and it exists within 
a system of similarly conceived states.25 The territorial borders of the state are 
unified and defensible against other states, thus introducing the notion that the state 
is the sovereign power within its territory.26 In order to secure its territory from both 
internal and external threats the state must centralise its decision making thus 
                                                 
21 Ibid: 4 
22 Ibid: 4  (original emphasis) 
23 Poggi, G., The State – Its Nature, Development and Prospects (Cambridge, Polity Press: 1990): 21 
24 Held, D., “The Development of the Modern State” in Hall, S., and Gieben, B., (eds) Formations of 
Modernity (Cambridge, Polity Press: 1992): 88 
25 Poggi, G., The Development of the State: A Sociological Introduction (London, Hutchinson and 
Co.: 1978): 87 & 92; Mann, States, War and Capitalism: 3 
26 Poggi, The Development of the State: 93 
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ensuring “flexibility and speed of response” to those threats.27 The state as sovereign 
power means the state is the highest level of power.28 In other words nothing exists 
above the level of the state.  
 
States hold a monopoly of authoritative binding rule making. In other words, only the 
state has the authority to make laws within its territory which the citizens of that 
territory must then follow. The state is the sole source of political power. This raises 
an important question, the legitimacy of the state to make laws. Ultimately, states can 
use coercion to enforce laws if and when order breaks down. In Weber’s classic 
definition, states claim monopoly control of the legitimate use of physical force 
within their territory.29 The ideal scenario for a state is for citizens to obey laws, not 
because of coercion and the threat of violence but because compliance is considered 
right. The state gains legitimacy by representing the interests and needs of its citizens 
rather than the interests of a king or the nobility or a property owning class.30 Power 
becomes depersonalised through the development of a system of public law creating 
regulations that guide the functions of the state and the behaviour of its citizens.31 
Laws are made by a central decision making body which is supreme, i.e., it is the 
only decision making body in its territory capable of making laws, and bureaucracies 
implement the decisions made. When the state fails to represent the interests and 
needs of its citizens its claims to legitimately rule the territory are lost. These issues 
will be examined in some more detail when the relations between nations, states and 




Definitions of empire have also been the subject of debate among social scientists 
and historians. To a large extent this has been due to academics approaching the 
subject in different ways. On the one hand empire has been studied through the lens 
                                                 
27 Mann, States, War and Capitalism: 18 
28 Poggi, The State…: 24 
29 Weber, M., “Politics as a Vocation” in From Max Weber: Essays in Sociology Gerth, H.H., and 
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30 Held, “The Development of the Modern State”: 88 
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of international relations, whilst others have looked at the internal workings of 
empires.32 The basis of both, however, is the domination, subjection and exploitation 
of one territory by another.  
 
Dominic Lieven defined empire from a broad functional viewpoint. An empire must 
be “a great power” that plays “a major role in shaping not just the international 
relations but also the values and culture of an historical epoch.”33 In addition, empire 
implies “possession of widespread territories” and all the problems of control this 
brings.34 Finally, empires are generally authoritarian polities enjoying direct 
administrative control over their territories.35
 
For the most part Lieven’s definition is unexceptionable. Empires are usually 
authoritarian and have administrative control over large territories which they exploit 
economically. Generally the British Empire, the focus for this study, followed this 
model, despite the rhetoric of the Empire claiming its aim was to spread the art of 
free self-government.36 Yet Lieven acknowledges that the varied methods of ruling 
empires make it difficult to give such a general definition. One way to avoid this 
problem is to look at the relations between empires and colonies, the imperial 
relationship.  
 
The imperial relationship between metropolis and colony is widely seen as being a 
power relationship.37 The sovereignty of the subject peoples, their ability to make 
and implement decisions on their own behalf, is taken away by the imperial power. 
Michael Doyle summarises the relationship thus, 
                                                 
32 Doyle, M, Empires (New York, Cornell University Press: 1986) is an example of the former, while 
Eisenstadt, S.N., The Political Systems of Empires (London, Collier-Macmiillan Ltd: 1963) is a good 
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33 Lieven, D., “The Russian Empire and the Soviet Union as Imperial Polities” in Journal of 
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34 Ibid: 608 
35 Ibid: 609 
36 Hobson, J.A., Imperialism: A Study (London: 1905): 114 
37 See for Example, Doyle, Empires:19; Reynolds, C., Modes of Imperialism (Oxford, Martin 
Robertson and Co. Ltd: 1981): 1; Lichtheim, G., Imperialism (London, Penguin Press: 1971): 9; 
Lieven, Empire: 20; and Porter, B., The Lions Share: A Short History of British Imperialism 1850-
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In sum, the scope of imperial control involves both the process of control and 
its outcomes. Control is achieved either formally (directly or indirectly) or 
informally, through influence over the periphery’s environment, political 
articulation, aggregation, decision making, adjudication, and implementation 
and usually with the collaboration of local peripheral elites. The scope of the 
outcomes covers both internal and external issues- who rules and what 
rules.38
 
The essence of the imperial relationship is the exercise of authority or power by one 
state over another. In losing its sovereignty to another state, the subjugated territory 
loses its statehood and becomes a colony, at least in the formal colonial relationship. 
A sovereign state has the ability to protect its territory from conquest and can impose 
its decisions on the population within its scope.39 In contrast, a colony is unable to 
impose decisions or protect its territory and therefore by definition is not sovereign 
and not a state. 
 
The ability of a state to make its own decisions without the interference or influence 
of other states would rule out the possibility of an imperial relationship. But as Doyle 
and others have pointed out, within the context of the state system, the existence of 
informal relationships of control can be just as important in defining an imperial 
relationship.40 Lieven argued the power and influence of the British navy, combined 
with British financial and economic power, was such that there was no need for 
formal empire in South America.41 Indeed this was the case for much of the mid-
nineteenth century British Empire. It was only when other states threatened British 
interests that formal colonisation resulted, for example during the Scramble for 
Africa in the late 1880s and 1890s. 
 
The imperial relationship can be formal, in the case of a conquered state whose 
actions are controlled by the imperial power, or informal, in the case of hegemonic 
relationship between two states, i.e., where the subordinate state is forced by 
structural constraints created by the imperial power into certain decisions or actions. 
                                                 
38 Doyle, Empires: 40 
39 Lichtheim, Imperialism: 8 
40 Reynolds, Modes of Imperialism: 1 
41 Lieven, Empire: 90 
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It is important to understand, however, that within both of these formal and informal 
categories, there will be varying degrees of control. For example, both Canada and 
India were formally controlled by Westminster, but Canada had complete autonomy 
in domestic affairs, unlike India. The nuances of this relationship will be developed 
in the substantive chapters to follow.  
 
For the purposes of this study, empire will be defined as a relation of dominance by 
one state over another, the dominance being used for the benefit of the metropolis, 
whether economically, strategically, or politically.  
 
Relations of nations, states and empires 
 
The final task of this section is to analyse the ways in which nations, states and 
empires interact with each other. The key argument of this section is that within the 
context of empire, the relations of the three are inextricably linked.  
 
The term nation-state is often used by historians and social-scientists, when in fact 
few nation-states have ever existed.42 By nation-state we mean a state whose 
territorial boundaries match those of a nation and whose citizens are also members of 
that nation. A nation can provide a state with legitimacy; therefore, a nation-state can 
be seen as an ideal-type. Indeed, the aim of some nationalist movements is to obtain 
statehood for their nation.43 Montserrat Guibernau uses the distinction between 
legitimate and illegitimate states to convey the difference between nation-states and 
states with more than one nation or states containing only part of a nation.44 The 
important point to note here is that whatever term is used nations and states do not 
always cover the same territory. In some cases, a state will contain more than one 
nation and in others a nation will claim the territory of more than one state. This 
clearly introduces issues of legitimacy and representation. The competency of a state 
                                                 
42 Anthony Smith claimed that only 9% of the 132 independent states in 1971 were ethnically 
homogenous, i.e., nations. See Smith, A.D., The Ethnic Revival (Cambridge, Cambridge University 
Press: 1981): 9  
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controlled, or at least dominated, by one nation to represent the interests of another 
nation will be called into question if representation is inadequate. If the state 
apparatus is controlled by members of one nation in a multi-national state and the 
state does not take into account the needs and interests of the other nations the 
legitimacy of the system will break down.45 Solutions to the problem of legitimacy 
revolve around controlling aspects of state power affecting the nation. The focus will 
be the nation. We will return to this issue later in the chapter.  
 
In the introduction to this thesis, we noted the often troubled relationship between 
nations and empires. Post-colonial nationalism of the kind found in Latin America, 
Asia and Africa demonstrates the multi-ethnic nature of many empires, as noted by 
Lieven.46 The subjection and exploitation of national territories by empires has often 
led to national rebellions in which nations have gained statehood. Often these nations 
have been created by the common experience of living under a particular colonial 
administration, such as in Latin America.47 The imperial management of these multi-
ethnic territories was vitally important if the empire was to survive, particularly in 
the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. Various methods of accommodation 
and repression were adopted to ensure the territories remained under imperial 
control. In India, for example, British administrators collaborated with Indian elites 
to maintain order over this vast territory. Without these collaborators, British rule in 
India would have been impossible.48 By contrast, Canada was given almost complete 
autonomy in domestic affairs following Confederation in 1867.  
 
Nations, however, are not always a threat to empire. In many instances the pursuit of 
empire can legitimise the state in the eyes of the nation. By pursuing imperial 
ambitions the state can bring prestige to the nation on the world stage or allow the 
nation to spread its values to new territories and peoples, thus legitimating the state’s 
imperialist policies. An important element of any national discourse will not only be 
                                                 
45 This was the premise for much of Scottish nationalism in the period under study, but also from the 
mid 1980s to the late 1990s. See for example, Mitchell, J., Strategies for Self Government: The 
Campaigns for a Scottish Parliament (London, Polygon: 1996) 
46 Lieven, “The Russian Empire and the Soviet Union as Imperial Polities”: 608 
47 Anderson, Imagined Communities: 52 
48 Ferguson, N., Empire: How Britain made the Modern World (London, Penguin: 2003): 189 
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its history but its future. The future glory of the nation in nationalist discourse can 
often turn into claims for imperial conquest. This is particularly important for 
smaller, weaker nations that may see maintenance of links to an empire as their route 
to greater power and prestige on the world stage. As we shall see throughout this 
thesis in both Scotland and British Canada, maintenance of the imperial connection 
and the pursuit of the imperial mission were important in legitimising Westminster 
rule. The mission of Britons across the world to spread liberty and freedom was 
undoubtedly a factor in the expansion of the British Empire. One of the driving 
factors behind Hitler’s invasion of Austria, Czechoslovakia and Poland was the 
reunification of German speakers across Europe. In this case the pursuit of Empire 
was driven by the mission to reunite the Greater German nation.  
 
The relationship between empire and state was noted above when discussing the 
nature of the imperial relationship. States pursue imperialist ambitions and use the 
forces at their disposal to conquer territory belonging to other states, thus creating 
empires. In international relations, as in nature, every action has an opposite reaction. 
The creation of empire creates antagonism in rival states which challenge the right to 
empire or pursue their own imperial ambitions. State and national discourse become 
an imperial discourse where the supremacy of one nation on the world stage takes 
centre stage. The disputes between the great European powers in the late nineteenth 
century over various imperial possessions neatly illustrate this point. The ability of 
other states to prevent the extension of empire is the only constraint on imperialism. 
In creating forces sufficient to conquer large expanses of territory, the state provokes 
other states into maintaining sufficient forces for the defence of their own interests. 
Security becomes a relative matter. The more powerful another state is perceived to 
be, the greater the need to increase capacity for defence. The result is a competition 
between states in the form of arms’ races, alliances for defence or security and the 
orientation of the state towards foreign affairs. States need to control the 
environments in which they operate. This pursuit of power leads to states having 
rival spheres of influence as they attempt to control other states, hegemonically or 
directly, in the pursuit of their own security. The pursuit of empire, according to 
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Central to the discussion of the relationship between nations, states and empires is 
the concept of nationalism. This section of the chapter will examine the nature of 
nationalism. Definitions of nationalism will be presented. The relationship between 
nationalism and modernity will form an important part of that discussion. A 
chronology of the formation of nationalist movements will be offered. The final part 
of the section will look at the relationship between nationalism and 
empire/imperialism and in particular whether nationalism must always seek 
statehood. The argument of this section will be that nationalism primarily concerns 
the legitimacy of government expressed in terms of identity and culture. The 
relationship between nationalism and imperialism is contingent on the form of 
colonisation, whether formal or informal, settler or non-settler colonies.  
 
The classic definition of nationalism comes from Ernest Gellner’s Nations and 
Nationalism. Gellner argues that “Nationalism is primarily a political principle, 
which holds that the political and the national unit should be congruent.”50 Whilst on 
the face of it this could imply national independence (a nation with a state of its own) 
not all political units are states. The political unit could be an independent state, a 
federal province, or even an administrative region. The important point is that the 
members of the nation accept it as a legitimate form of government for that nation. 
Nationalism, in this sense, is a matter of political legitimacy. Brendan O’Leary has 
argued that Gellner’s theory of nationalism puts political legitimacy at the heart of 
the phenomenon. Nationalism, he argued, claimed “the governers must be conational 
with and representative of the governed.”51 This could, of course, still be interpreted 
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as meaning national independence but by introducing the concept of political 
legitimacy, Gellner’s definition can still be applied to situations where independence 
is not sought by a nationalist movement.  
 
A state gains legitimacy by representing the interests of all citizens within its 
territory. In multi-national states representing the interests of each nation is essential 
if the state is to maintain that legitimacy. O’Leary argued this meant the governors 
must be representative of the governed. In Britain, we should find Scotland, England, 
Ireland and Wales must each have representation within the government. The small 
nations achieved this through Secretaries of State who represented the interests of 
each nation in Cabinet and separate administrative units, such as the Scottish and 
Welsh Offices, to implement policy. In addition they each had a number of 
representatives in Parliament. When these representations failed to produce 
legitimate results, for example when policy did not match the cultural values of the 
nation, nationalism was the result. This happened in the 1980s when the individualist 
policies of Margaret Thatcher were seen as being alien to the social democracy of 
Scottish identity. Broad nationalist support for a Scottish Parliament grew in this 
period. The important point is that nationalism was a political reaction to perceived 
illegitimate government.  
 
Guibernau has argued that states that have more than one nation within their borders 
have the potential to become illegitimate. She contends the state does not equally 
favour all the nations within its territory. Attempts by the state to homogenise the 
population will, therefore, inevitably lead to conflict between nation and state.52 The 
state thus becomes illegitimate because it fails to effectively represent the interests of 
all the nations within its territory. The nature of the conflict, however, is the 
important point. Nationalism is no doubt a political reaction to the state’s failure to 
recognise its interests and identity. But nations can claim recognition of their identity 
through means other than chasing statehood. Political gains made by nationalists in 
Spain, Belgium, Canada and the United Kingdom provide ample evidence.53  
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The discourse of nationalist elites, although not claiming statehood for the nation, 
can still be nationalism. The expression of national identity, the use of the “other” 
and boundaries and linking historical symbols with the current crisis all lay the basis 
for nationalist agitation. When reform of the state becomes the focus for a campaign 
and the symbols of the nation are used in that campaign to find resolution of a 
national problem, that campaign takes the form of nationalism. Reform of the state in 
favour of the nation defines nationalism, not only claims for national independence.  
 
A related aspect of this discussion is the right to self-determination, a key point of 
nationalist rhetoric. When the legitimacy of government breaks down, nationalists 
will assert the nation’s right to self-determination, the right to decide the legitimate 
form of government for the nation. The rhetoric of self-determination is clearly 
rooted in democratic ideals. The idea that governments, and therefore states, express 
the will of those who elect them, lays the foundation for different nations to claim the 
right of their people to elect a government that will express the will of the nation. 
The right of national self determination is a key element of nationalist discourse. It 
asks only for the right of the nation to determine its future without undue interference 
from other nations. It brings us back to the issue of the governed and governors being 
conational. It not only enables nationalists to claim the existing form of government 
is illegitimate, is not expressing the will of their nation, but also to propose an 
alternative form of government which is legitimate, i.e., will express the will of the 
nation.   
 
The process of deciding the legitimate form of government for the nation must be 
political.  Elites will compete to mobilise the nation behind each differing conception 
of how to represent the nation’s interests.  In other words they will compete for 
power, which in the modern world is about control of the state, or at least aspects of 
the state that affect the nation.54 Nationalists will articulate a discourse proposing 
reform of the government of the nation and compete against the dominant state 
discourse for support among the members of the nation. It is through competition for 
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power that the nationalist discourse is articulated. Dominant state discourses that 
have been internalised to such an extent that they are just “common sense” are 
challenged by a nationalist discourse that seeks to alter that “common sense.”55 For 
example the dominant British state discourse in the late nineteenth century had been 
internalised through Parliament, the Union Flag, the Empire and the Monarchy to 
such an extent that it was taken for granted. The discourse of the Scottish Home Rule 
Association challenged this dominant discourse by seeking to alter the power 
relationship within the United Kingdom state through the creation of a Scottish 
Parliament.  
 
This competition between discourses is necessarily carried on in the political arena. 
Thus nationalism is essentially about politics. But the politics of nationalism can only 
make sense when examined in its specific political context.  Nationalism, in the 
words of John Breuilly, is "a parasitic movement shaped by what it opposes."56 This 
antagonistic element of discourse theory mentioned in the previous chapter is a good 
place to begin the analysis of nationalist movements and their discourses. To 
understand how nationalist movements are formed we must examine the context 
within which they arise.  
 
Many theorists have argued that nationalist movements form as a result of the 
transition to modernity.57 Industrialisation breaks down existing social structures of 
society. The importance of culture, as a form of communication through symbols and 
practices, becomes more important. Without culture, communication and therefore 
the role of the individual in society would be impossible. Anthony Cohen has argued 
that culture only exists in reality at the local level,58 what Gellner describes as “low-
                                                 
55 Sutherland, C., “Nation-Building through discourse theory” in Nations and Nationalism 11 (2), 
2005, 185-202:193 
56 Breuilly, Nationalism and the State: 396 
57 The classic examples are from Gellner, Nations and Nationalism and Anderson, Imagined 
Communities but see also Deutsch, K., Nationalism and Social Communication: An Inquiry into the 
foundations of Nationality (London, Chapman and Hall Ltd: 1953) and Taylor, C., “Nationalism and 
Modernity” in  Hall, J.A., (ed) The State of the Nation: Ernerst Gellner and the theory of nationalism. 
(Cambridge, Cambridge University Press: 1998) 
58 Cohen, A., “Belonging: The Experience of Culture” in Cohen, A., (ed) Belonging: Identity and 
Social Organisation in British Rural Cultures (Manchester, Manchester University Press: 1982): 9-10 
 62
cultures”.59 Industrial society, however, needs context free communication for its 
operation. Literacy is a prime requirement for citizenship. States, therefore, cultivate 
a “high-culture” through state-sponsored education systems. The education system 
may also use existing high-cultures. According to Gellner, the internalization of this 
high culture through the nationalism of the state creates the nation.60
 
Other modernists have outlined similar processes whilst emphasising different 
aspects of the industrialisation process. Anderson, for example, highlights the 
importance of print capitalism in creating standardised languages, crucial for a “high 
culture”, that allow the newspaper an important role in imagining the nation.61 Karl 
Deutsch claimed in the 1950s that the increased communication between classes and 
regional centres facilitated by the processes of modernisation led to the formation of 
nations.62  
 
Despite the claim to historical longevity of the nation by nationalists, we have argued 
that nations are unique to the modern era. Historically speaking nationalism, as a 
political expression of nationhood and governance, must also be a relatively new 
phenomenon. There is no doubt that nationalism as a principle of political legitimacy 
is an outcome of modernity. There was no need for political legitimacy in the pre-
modern age when monarchy claimed to rule by divine right. Political legitimacy was 
seen in the eyes of rulers and ruled to be derived from God, not the people. Nations 
did not express themselves politically because the concept of rule by the people had 
not been fully established. It is only in the period since the American Declaration of 
Independence and the French Revolution that the principle of national self-
determination and the link between state and nation could really take shape. In the 
transition to democratic rule, states began to rule in the name of the nation. Where 
more than one nation existed within its territory one nation would become dominant. 
At this stage the legitimacy of rule becomes an issue. The rise of print capitalism, the 
creation of state education systems, the decline of absolutism and the increased 
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facility for quick communication that resulted from modernity were important in 
state attempts to homogenise its population. In many cases the state was successful. 
Where there was a sufficiently strong sense of national identity among members of a 
minority nation, however, attempts at homogenisation led to nationalist campaigns. 
Modernity was thus an important condition for the rise of nationalism.  
 
Whilst modernity was the context against which nationalism arose, we must search 
for its causes in the political arena. In politics the actions of the state have particular 
importance. Decisions to accommodate, assimilate or ignore nations within the 
boundaries of a multi-national state will largely determine whether nationalism will 
appear.  Michael Mann has argued nations, and therefore nationalism, "originated as 
movements for democracy" and the "failure to institutionalise democracy generated 
exclusionist nationalism."63 Institutionalising democracy, however, can mean a 
variety of things. It is widely accepted, for example, that democracy generally means 
representative democracy.64 If the sub-state nation's interests, or at least the interests 
of sub-state elites in that nation, are represented effectively at the state level then 
system will be seen as legitimate. Failure to institutionalise representation will 
generate nationalism. Elected representatives may be sufficient if their voice can be 
heard within the multi-national state.  But despite the extension of the franchise in 
Scotland in 1867 and 1884, and an increase in the number of Scottish MPs in 1885, a 
nationalist movement still appeared.  Even the nationalist agitation leading to the 
creation of a Secretary for Scotland (an institutional representative) in 1885 was 
insufficient. When, therefore, the sub-state nation's interests are no longer considered 
to be represented effectively we would expect a nationalist movement to be formed. 
 
Democratization, however, has other effects. The move towards democracy and mass 
representation resulted in a “direct access society,” where everyone became an equal 
and autonomous citizen of the state.65 In claiming autonomy and equality for each 
individual, the democratic ideal maintains that decisions be made by the whole and 
not just the most influential part.  To quote Charles Taylor, 
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 ... if it appears that in some systematic way, there are obstacles to certain           
 sections of the population being heard, then the legitimacy of democratic rule            
 in that society is under challenge.66
 
In making equal citizens of everyone in its territory the state must recognise 
everyone's voice.  At the heart of this idea lies the concept of dignity. Taylor, in his 
Politics of Recognition, claimed there should be no distinction between first and 
second class citizens in a modern democracy. Each person within the state must be 
given equal recognition.67 Failure to do so will be seen to threaten the worth of an 
individual's identity and therefore their dignity. Lack of adequate representation of an 
individual’s interests is failure to recognise their identity. By not recognising their 
identity the state excludes that individual from the state and therefore removes the 
legitimacy of the system in their eyes.  
 
In modern societies, however, recognition of every single person by the state is 
impossible, hence the need for groups representing the interests of a number of 
individuals, such as political parties or pressure groups. The principles applying to 
individuals are equally applicable to political parties and pressure groups. Within a 
multi-national democratic state such as the United Kingdom each national identity 
must be given equal recognition in order to prevent the potential break-up of the 
state. None should be treated as a second class identity. Direct recognition is sought 
from the state, which acts as a significant other. Non-recognition or mis-recognition 
of one national identity "can inflict harm, can be a form of oppression, imprisoning 
someone in a false, distorted and reduced mode of being."68 By not recognising the 
nation's identity the state effectively claims the nation does not exist, thus threatening 
the self-worth and dignity of the nation. The legitimacy of the system comes into 
question. The non-existence of the nation becomes a driver for nationalist elites to re-
create and articulate a national identity that becomes the focus of the sought-after 
dignity.  This identity claims superiority over the "other," in this case those 
                                                 
66 Ibid: 204 
67 Taylor, C., “The Politics of Recognition” in Gutman, A., (ed) Multiculturalism (Princeton, 
Princeton University Press: 1992)”: 27 
68 Ibid: 25 
 65
influential in the state or recognized by the state. Nationalism, with its roots in the 
extension of democracy, thus becomes a form of identity politics.   
 
Thus far we have argued that nationalism is a political principle claiming the political 
unit and national unit should be congruent. As a matter of politics, nationalism has its 
roots in the extension of democracy. Nationalism has also been seen as a product of 
modernity. The role of the state in creating the conditions necessary for nationalism, 
the creation of standard languages, increased literacy and so on has been noted. 
Actions of the state in recognising national identities are also important. Nationalism, 
as a political principle, would have been a massive failure without widespread 
support from members of the nation. The next section will analyse the process 




Miroslav Hroch has identified three phases in the formation of nationalist 
movements: Phase A, the period of scholarly interest; Phase B, the period of patriotic 
agitation; and Phase C, the rise of a mass national movement.69 For the purpose of 
this study the third phase is irrelevant. The rise of a mass nationalist movement never 
happened in Canada and did not happen in Scotland until well into the twentieth 
century. What is of interest here is the first two phases and how, in some ways they 
interacted, particularly in Canada. The ways in which nationalists linked empire and 
nation is best discovered through analysis of the nationalist discourse created by the 
groups identified as scholarly groups and political agitators. Hroch’s outline, for this 
reason, will be explored a little more.  
 
For Hroch, the period of scholarly interest defined the beginning of any national 
revival. Driven by a desire, born of the Enlightenment, to acquire knowledge of 
every new phenomenon, and by affection for their region, a group of individuals, 
usually intellectuals, would pursue a passionate “study of the language, the culture, 
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[and] the history of the oppressed nationality.”70  At no stage did these individuals 
develop any kind of organisation and rarely (and without success) did they pursue 
any kind of agitation. The first phase of the Canada First movement is characterised 
by this type of scholarly interest.  
 
When considering national or imperial identity, a key role is accorded to nationalist 
elites in “inventing traditions” and creating the symbols of the group identity. One of 
the first stages will be an interest in the history of the nation. This period of scholarly 
interest, or cultural nationalism, as John Hutchinson describes it, pays close attention 
to the nation’s history using heroes and myths to create the symbols and invented 
traditions of the nation.71 The main aim of cultural nationalists is the attempt to find 
the golden age of the nation and establish its distinctiveness and honour.72 Once this 
has been achieved, the myths, traditions and symbols of that nation can then be 
communicated to the members of the nation through print, education or, in the 
modern era, radio and television and the internet. This takes us to Phase B in Hroch’s 
typology.  
 
Phase B, the period of patriotic agitation, or as Hroch described it “the fermentation-
process of national consciousness,” is the crucial phase in the development of any 
national movement and will determine the success or failure of the mass movement. 
Its success lay in the ability of the group to integrate objective political, economic 
and other factors into a coherent identity or ideology.  
 
The driving force in this era of national agitation was a group of patriots, 
already dissatisfied with the limitation of interest to the antiquities of the 
land, the language and the culture, and saw their mission as the spreading of 
national consciousness among the people.73
 
The form a nationalist agitation takes will vary depending on the context and 
strategies available to nationalist elites. According to James Mitchell, the strategy a 
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nationalist group adopts will depend on the type of group that is formed.74 This can 
be a circular argument in some ways as the type of group formed depends on the 
strategy nationalist elites decide has the best chance of success. Access to 
government circles, financial resources and the nature of the political system are all 
structural factors affecting the type of movement formed. As Breuilly claimed, the 
movement will be shaped by what it opposes, i.e., the particular form of the state.75
 
The nationalist agitation phase will form the basis of analysis in the substantive 
chapters to follow. Although nationalists in Scotland and Canada failed in their 
ultimate aims, the important aspect of their discourse for the purposes of this study 
was the integration of both national and imperial identities.  
 
Nationalism and Imperialism 
 
At the basic level imperialism is about the pursuit, maintenance and defence of 
empire. Imperialism has many faces, economic, moral, religious, and more. The 
common link between all of them, however, must be the political subjugation of 
territory and states “independent of their will or consent.”76 Within those states and 
territories, nations may exist or, from the administration divisions of empire, nations 
may be created, as in Latin America. The relationship between nationalism and 
imperialism will often be contingent on the form of imperial relationship. This 
section will examine the relationship between nationalism and imperialism offering 
an alternative view from that prevalent among typologies of nationalism that 
emphasise anti-colonial nationalism as the typical outcome of imperialism.  
 
The prevailing academic view claims nationalism to be an inevitable outcome of an 
imperial relationship. Empires impose their political will on colonised territories and 
nations. Alien cultural values confront the elite of the subjugated nation who adopt 
some of these alien values, nationalism being one, assert their right to national-self 
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determination and rebel against the domination of the imperial power.77 The result of 
these anti-colonial/nationalist movements was the independence of the colony from 
the empire, the creation of a state for the nation. Although in many cases colonial 
boundaries became the state boundaries, often there would be a number of different 
ethnic groups and nations within these boundaries. The common domination by the 
imperial power was sufficient to unite these groups in the pursuit of independence.78 
There is no doubt this was the case in a great deal of imperial relationships, 
particularly in Asia and Africa in the twentieth century. But to focus purely on these 
areas leads to an overemphasis of the desire for independence from the empire. At 
the heart of this is the extent to which nationalism inevitably leads to statehood.  
 
Imperialism, as the political subjugation of peoples independent of their will and 
consent, does not always lead to the same type of imperial relationship. In some 
cases the relationship will be formal as in the control of India by the British, in others 
it will be informal as in the economic exploitation of Argentina. We can also 
distinguish between settler colonies where subjects/citizens of the imperial power 
occupy the conquered territory and non-settler colonies where the territory is 
occupied by another nation. The difference between the two types of colony will 
obviously affect the nature of the imperial relationship. Settler colonies will tend to 
share the values and culture of the imperial power and are therefore more likely to 
accept imperial control. The Declaration of Independence by the thirteen American 
colonies in 1776 is the exception that proves the rule. In non-settler societies, the 
success of the imperial venture may rely on the co-option of indigenous elites into 
the imperial project. Failure to achieve this, or the subsequent breakdown of 
collaboration may lead to anti-colonial nationalism.  
 
Different types of imperial relationship will clearly have an effect on the nature of 
nationalism found within any given empire. In non-settler societies it is likely anti-
colonial nationalist movements will be formed unless indigenous elites can be co-
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opted into the imperial project.79 In settler societies the imperial ideal may be 
transported to the “new world.” The acceptance of imperial control as legitimate may 
hinder the formation of nationalist movements. Nationalism, however, may still 
materialise if imperial control is no longer seen as legitimate. The independence 
movements in Latin America are a good example of settler nationalism seeking 
statehood.80 Within the British Empire each of these different types of nationalism 
has existed. On the one hand the independence movements of the non-settler Indian 
sub-continent claimed statehood. Nationalism could also be found in settler colonies, 
such as Rhodesia.81
 
Yet in between these two extremes we find settler nationalist movements seeking 
greater autonomy whilst also maintaining imperial ideals. The term “Imperial 
Nationalism” will be adopted to categorise the type of nationalism expressed by 
these groups. Krishnan Kumar has used the terms “imperial nationalism” or 
“missionary nationalism” to describe English nationalism.82 His use of the term 
relates to the extent that the national mission and imperial mission were one and the 
same thing. This thesis will use the term in a slightly different manner. Imperial 
nationalism for the purpose of this thesis describes a political movement seeking 
greater voice for the nation within an empire and claiming this will benefit both the 
nation and the empire.  
 
Imperial nationalist groups are the movements to be studied in this thesis. It could be 
argued these movements are not nationalist but are merely arguing for reform of the 
imperial system whilst maintaining the identity of the imperial power. But this relies 
too much on a definition of nationalism in which statehood is the goal of nationalists. 
Nowhere in our definition of nationalism taken from Gellner is statehood mentioned. 
Rather nationalism claims the political unit must be congruent with the national unit. 
In many cases the political unit will be the state. But the state can devolve political 
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functions and can use this as a method of maintaining legitimacy in multi-national 
states. Federalism in Canada was used to appease French Canadian fears that their 
identity would be threatened by the predominant Anglophone culture. For much of 
the twentieth century Scotland accepted administrative devolution as a legitimate 
form of government within the United Kingdom, allowing distinctively Scottish 
implementation of government policy. By contrast, it could be argued the failure to 
grant home rule to Ireland led to the creation of the Irish Free State in the 1920s. The 
important point, as has been mentioned previously, is that the political unit is seen by 
the nation as a legitimate form of government. 
 
Imperialism and nationalism can also interact in other ways. Empire can be pursued 
for a number of reasons, often combined together. Religious mission, military 
strength and economic gain often go hand in hand in the imperialist ideal. In the late 
nineteenth century in particular, the pursuit of empire was seen as essential to the 
strength of the nation as well as the state. Empires, as well as being economically 
necessary, were seen as having a mission to bring glory to the nation and spread the 
values of the nation around the world. In Britain, politicians used the Empire to unite 
the British people in a common cause and to boost the confidence of the nation in the 
face of external competition.83 Stories of daring and adventure in Africa, Asia and 
North America inspired those lower down the social scale. Soldiers and 
expansionists such as General Gordon and Cecil Rhodes became national heroes.84 
These attempts brought legitimacy to the state through what Weber described as the 
“prestige of power.”85 According to Weber, the prestige of power “means in practice 
the glory of power over other communities; it means the expansion of power, though 
not always by way of incorporation or subjection.”86
 
Obviously this is not nationalism as a political principle claiming the political unit 
and national unit should be congruent. Rather this is nationalism with a small N 
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where the nation claims superiority over other nations. This could be an important 
factor in the substantive analysis to follow. If the state successfully instils the idea 
that empire is important for the confidence of the nation it is likely any nationalist 
agitation will adopt the language of this imperial discourse. The new discourse will 
incorporate elements of imperial discourse and merge them with a nationalist 





Central to the material presented in this thesis is the concept of identity. This section 
will examine the nature of identity, both individual and collective, and the role 
played by elites in the formation of identity. An analysis of the relationship between 
dual or multiple identities will also be carried out. The key argument of this section 
will be that identity is both experiential and contextual and that identities other than 
local ones are socially constructed and exist, to a lesser or greater extent, in our 
imaginations.  
 
Identity can be seen as the way people categorise themselves and conceive of their 
role(s) or position(s) in society.87 Identities can thus only exist in societies. They do 
not exist in isolation.88 Identities can be individual or collective. Someone can be a 
father, uncle, son and brother and also be working class, Catholic and Scottish. In 
pre-modern feudal societies identity was an uncomplicated and unimportant concept. 
Lairds, peasants, Nobles, and Royalty all knew their place in society and how to 
conduct their relationships with others.89 The transformative processes of modernity 
have destroyed these unproblematic identities and made identity a much more 
important concept in society. These changes have been mirrored in the last few 
decades of the twentieth century with claims that traditional social structures, such as 
class, have fractured reducing the importance of “meta-identity.”90 Whilst people can 
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have different forms of identity, individual or collective, the important point is the 
way identity is acquired.  
 
J.G Herder, widely seen as the founder of the romantic movement in nineteenth 
century Germany, argued identity is gained through language.91 By learning our 
language we become aware of our selfhood and our nationhood.92 Herder’s 
essentialist position regarding language is problematic. The idea that language is not 
inherited but in someway natural, cannot be sustained, particularly when confronted 
with the evidence not only of invented languages such as Esperanto but also official 
languages being adopted by different linguistic groups in nations such as China and 
India. Hobsbawm argued that national languages are “almost always semi-artificial 
constructs,” attempts to devise a standard literary idiom from a multiplicity of spoken 
idioms. 93  
 
If, however, we equate language with culture much of Herder’s discussion remains 
pertinent. The same language can be spoken by different nations. There must, 
therefore, be some other cultural factors to differentiate between the two. We can 
argue that it is through our culture, rather than language, that we become aware of 
our selfhood and nationhood. Culture is the medium through which we become 
“conscious of our innerself and as the key to the understanding of [our] outer 
relationships. It unites [us] with, but it also differentiates [us] from others.”94 In this 
sense we can already begin to see that identity is not generated inwardly. Rather we 
develop identity through a dialogue with others.95  
 
We can develop this theme further. Our day to day cultural experience of life 
ingrains our way of doing certain tasks, whether in work or leisure. These cultural 
experiences are part of who we are, part of our identity. When these cultural 
experiences are compared with those of other cultures we become much more aware 
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of our own identities. Our own experiences of life are inherited from our ancestors 
who have developed the best way of doing a particular task, or acting a certain way 
in their own particular environment. When faced with other cultures that act 
differently from our own, we instinctively defend our own experiences because they 
have been handed down for generations. This heightened awareness of cultural 
differences increases our own sense of identity.96 Through daily life and contact with 
others we experience our identity.  
 
Linked to this is the creation of boundaries. Armstrong has argued that the creation 
of boundaries is vital in understanding ethnic identities, and therefore national 
identities.97 Our own understanding of who we are is dependent, according to this 
view, on who we are not. The inability to communicate with other groups “initiates 
the process of ‘differentiation’ which in turn brings recognition of ethnic 
belonging.”98 By differentiating those with whom we can communicate from those 
with whom we cannot, we create a boundary in our minds. This boundary delineates 
the group.  
 
An important aspect of the above discussion is the handing on of culture from 
generation to generation. Culture in this way links us to our past. Herder argued that 
language served the same function. Through language man is “able to enter into 
communion with the way of thinking and feeling of his progenitors to take part, as it 
were, in the workings of the ancestral mind.”99 But we, as human beings, do not act 
passively in this “communion” with the past. In the same way that identity is not 
generated by the self, neither is it taken with blind acceptance. As Taylor, put it “my 
discovering my own identity doesn’t mean that I work it out in isolation, but that I 
negotiate it through dialogue, partly overt, partly internal, with others.”100
 
This negotiation with others, and the role of the “significant other” in identity, is 
fundamental to our understanding of who we are. The “significant other” is important 
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in creating or maintaining awareness of identity. They can have two different 
functions, both based around the notion of recognition. Firstly the “significant other” 
can be someone from whom we desire direct recognition.101 Mis-recognition or non-
recognition of our identity by a significant other can create notions of oppression, 
self-hatred and inferiority in the self.102 At the heart of this is the idea that identity is 
the focus of our own self-worth. If you fail to recognise my identity correctly then in 
some way my place in society is perceived by me to be worthless. The second role 
significant others can play is as a contrast or foil to our own identity.103 By 
comparing our identity favourably against another identity we increase our sense of 
place in society and our sense of self-worth. 
 
Thus far we have looked at identity from a general perspective arguing that identity 
is negotiated through our experience of everyday life and contact with significant 
others. As identity only exists within a given society we can see that because there 
are different levels of society, there must be different levels of identity. For example, 
local societies will generate local identities. International societies will generate 
national identities. Before we can begin to examine the relationship between 
different identities we need to examine the nature of different levels of identity, local, 
regional, national and imperial.  
 
If we understand identity to be gained through experience of everyday life, i.e., 
identity is experiential, then the logical conclusion would be that the only culturally 
grounded identity is a local one.104 Being in day to day contact with others who share 
our values, practices and experiences creates a complex cultural reality through 
which we experience identity. Experience of relationships with neighbours and local 
shops and experience of the local landscape create a grounded local identity. In other 
words, there will be no need to create an image of the collective in our minds. By 
contrast with every increase in the size of a community the relationship becomes less 
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concrete and the collective more “a place of the imagination.”105 We are unlikely to 
know all the members of a wider geographical area hence a region, a nation or 
empire becomes an “imagined community.”106 Any identity other than a local one 
then must be seen as an artificial construction. The process of constructing this 
imagined group then becomes the important part of the discussion.  
 
In general the principles of constructing “a place of the imagination” are similar to 
formation of local identity. Significant others play a major role. The difference is in 
the nature of the experience of the wider communities. Rather than day to day 
contact with those of the local community, we engage in a dialogue with newspapers, 
novels, teachers, and political institutions. Clearly one can never experience 
everything that happens in a large territorial unit. We therefore rely on information 
from this wider range of sources to tell us we belong to a large group sharing a large 
territory and similar cultural characteristics. These cultural characteristics, however, 
become simplified as the size of the unit of identity increases. As Cohen argued, 
“with each ‘ascending’ level I increasingly simplify (and thereby misrepresent) the 
message about myself.”107 Identity at “higher” levels is based on a series of symbols 
which identify people as belonging to a particular group. The symbols create in the 
mind an impression of the boundaries between different groups. 
 
The concept of “invented traditions” is important in the use of symbols to construct 
identity. As we discussed above, history and links with our ancestors form an 
important part of who we are. “Invented traditions” start from this basis. They are, as 
Hobsbawm put it, “responses to novel situations which take the form of reference to 
old situations or which establish their own past.”108 These symbols construct and 
maintain identity in three ways. First, they establish or symbolise social cohesion, or 
the membership of real or artificial communities. Second, they establish and 
legitimise institutions, status or relations of authority. Finally, they socialise and 
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inculcate beliefs, value systems and conventions of behaviour.109 So for example, 
tartanry is just one invented tradition that has come to symbolise the cohesion of the 
artificially constructed community that is Scotland. The key to this concept, one that 
will be borne in mind throughout this thesis, is that the successful invention of a 
tradition involved “emotionally and symbolically charged signs of club 
membership…”110, such as flags, anthems, even heroes. For Hobsbawm, the nation 
itself, as novel and constructed but portrayed as ancient, was an invented tradition. 
The reduction of the nation and national identity to a series of symbols or invented 
traditions makes it easier to identify and recognise particular groups. The job of 
creating these symbols and traditions falls to the scholars and elites we discussed 
above. 
 
So far we have argued that identity is multi-faceted, experiential, gained through 
contact with significant others and through dissemination of symbols and invented 
traditions by elites. National identity on this basis can be defined as a sense of 
belonging to an imagined community of people occupying a certain territory and 
identified by a set of symbols and invented traditions which unite the community and 
differentiate it from other nations.  
 
At a basic level imperial identity is not radically different. It is still imagined as a 
community and symbolism and invented traditions remain important. The differences 
arise in the nature of the symbols and traditions, and the pursuit of domination over 
groups seen as culturally inferior, as we shall see in the empirical chapters. In some 
ways the link between the two identities can become blurred. The mission of the 
nation may be to spread the word of their god to the rest of the world or to achieve 
greatness in relation to another nation. This mission can lead to the pursuit of 
imperialism and the national identity then becomes imperial. The interaction between 
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Identity exists on different levels as we have mentioned above. The interesting point 
for this discussion is how these different identities interact in one person or group. 
Anthony Smith has argued that ethnic and more general cultural identities are formed 
in “concentric” layers, like ripples on a pond into which a stone has been thrown. 
People may feel loyalty, not just to their family, village, region, or ethnic group, 
“they may also feel allegiance to different ethnic communities at different levels of 
identification simultaneously.”111
 
Citing the Ancient Greeks as an example, Smith argued that Dorians and Ionians, to 
name but two, would feel loyalty to their own ethnic group, as well as to a wider, 
more general Hellenic culture.112 This is a good visual model of the nature of 
multiple identities that gives an indication of the interaction of each layer. Visually 
we have the impression of one identity made up of many different layers. Each 
successive layer informs the outer ring which in turn relies on the inner ring for its 
existence in the same way that the top layer of bricks in a wall cannot exist without 
the lower bricks. Yet this is not how Smith envisions the working of the model. 
According to Smith, “at any one time one or other of these concentric circles of 
allegiance may be to the fore for political, economic or demographic reasons…”113 
In other words, an individual will display a different identity depending on the 
context.  
 
There is no doubt that as a political actor an individual will select the identity most 
relevant for the particular task in hand. For example, when voting in the Scottish 
Parliamentary elections the considerations may be based on a purely Scottish 
identity. But following Smith’s logic when involved voting in elections for the 
Westminster Parliament an individual may adopt a purely British identity, as it is the 
British context in which they are voting. Yet many Scots will vote in British 
elections in pursuit of Scottish aims. British political parties in Scotland have 
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Scottish identifiers in their names, Scottish Labour Party, the Scottish Conservative 
and Unionists. Scottish identity informs Britishness. 
 
This is not to say that the idea of identity as contextual is not useful. Clearly we have 
different identities which we call upon for different reasons and occasions. The 
critique of Smith’s argument is based on his assertion that when we display an 
identity it exists in isolation. Smith himself argued in his general discussion of 
identity that “the self is composed of multiple identities and role[s]…”114 The 
implication from his use of the term “the self” would be that each individual has one 
distinct identity, which is then composed of different layers. But in his argument that 
follows Smith claims only one identity is displayed dependent on context. He 
effectively implied there is no interaction between the different layers of identity. 
 
To further illustrate this point we can return to the work of the anthropologist, 
Anthony Cohen. Whilst Cohen argued that local identity is the only identity situated 
in a cultural reality, he did not rule out the possibility of other identities. Indeed, 
taking as his starting point the idea that boundaries create cultural awareness, his 
interpretation of Frederick Barth’s work on ethnic boundaries, he argued that cultural 
boundaries are not natural phenomenon.115 In a similar manner to Smith, Cohen 
argued that these unnatural boundaries could be invoked and ignored by those within 
them for different purposes.116 We have different identities and these can be used or 
ignored dependent on the context.  
 
The difference between Cohen and Smith becomes clear with Cohen’s emphasis on 
the locality as the only “real” cultural identity. Higher levels of identity, he argued, 
are simplified through symbols that aid the imagination of community. Advancing 
this idea Cohen argued that everyone has a unique identity rooted in the local cultural 
experience. Far from denying the existence of higher identities, this local cultural 
experience informed each ascending level of an individual’s identity. In other words, 
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a “man’s awareness of himself as a Scotsman…has to do with his particular 
experience as a farmer in Aberdeenshire…local experience mediates national 
identity.”117
 
In the final chapter of his edited work, Belonging, Cohen uses his case study of 
Whalsay fishermen in Shetland to illustrate his ideas. In a further elaboration of 
issues of multiple identities, Cohen argued that an individual’s national identity is 
based on their local identity. When identities are displayed in a specific context, each 
identity an individual has will inform the other identities, whilst retaining the 
contextual element of identity. Our experience as an Invernessian or Glaswegian will 
inform our understanding of Scottishness. 
  
Although people may identify with different elements of their society for 
different purposes, we do not have to assume that their self-perceptions are 
wholly inconstant. Rather we should expect to find a strong element of 
continuity among them such that, for example, an individual brings to his 
membership of any one collectivity (or to his playing of any one role) his 
experience as a member (or player) of others.118
 
The Whalsaymens’ collaboration with Scots fishermen studied by Cohen provided an 
excellent example of this point. Although the Whalsaymen were fiercely proud of 
their local identity and would normally stress their uniqueness in the face of 
mainland identity they collaborated with the Scottish National Fleet in order to 
protect their unique local identity. The islanders felt that without a voice in the 
National Fleet to protect their uniqueness their local culture would have been 
eroded.119 Thus their local experience mediated their national identity 
 
Whilst only being a subtle shift of tone from Smith, the argument of continuity 
between identities answers the main criticism of Smith’s thesis relating to concentric 
layers. The imagery of the concentric rings can still be usefully employed, as the idea 
of each ring successively informing its outer identity is consistent with the approach 
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taken by Cohen.   
 
Graeme Morton provided further illustration of this idea in his important contribution 
to the debate on Scottish nationalism in the mid nineteenth century. In his Unionist 
Nationalism, Morton argued that a “dual (if not multiple) identity is part and parcel 
of being Scottish within the United Kingdom.” 
 
Our realisation is strong: that in the three peripheral nations, and in England 
also… the idea of ‘Britishness’ is distinct in each, built around a number of 
competing and intermixed identities. There is, of course, much commonality 
in the British experience, but it means something unique to each of the four 
nations.120
 
This is a clear illustration of Cohen’s argument when extended beyond the local 
arena. The idea of being British was different within each of the four nations because 
in each the national experience mediated their sense of ‘Britishness’. Thus 
celebrations of Wallace and Bruce in securing Scotland’s freedom to negotiate Union 
with England could be made alongside support for Britannia and the Hanoverian 
monarchy.121 The Union with England could be celebrated because, thanks to the 
efforts of Bruce and Wallace, Scotland had voluntarily entered the Union. They were 
not forced into the partnership through conquest, unlike Ireland. The symbols of the 
locality were used to celebrate the wider identity.   
 
Hobsbawm argued that identities are not chosen like a pair of shoes where only one 
pair can be worn at a time.  
   
They had, and still have, several attachments and loyalties simultaneously, 
including nationality, and are simultaneously concerned with various aspects 
of life, any of which may at any one time be foremost in their minds, as 
occasion suggests.122
 
Identities only become prominent in peoples minds when “one of these loyalties 
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conflicted directly with another”123, for example between Canada and the Empire. 
Once again the issue of boundaries in the imagination becomes the important point. 
This time, however, the boundaries are between different identities held by the 
individual. Linking ideology with identity, Hobsbawm’s used as examples of these 
tensions, socialist groups, who should stress the international nature of the working 
class struggle, but who became national liberators. These groups clearly 
demonstrated that political “movements could simultaneously express aspirations 
which we regard as mutually exclusive.”124  
 
This tension between identities was clear in both Scotland and British Canada. The 
Scottish Home Rule Association, a nationalist group, was quick to point out the 
benefits of a Scottish Parliament to the Empire. They also argued that reform of 
imperial government would benefit Scotland. In British Canada, the Imperial 
Federation League argued that reform of the imperial governance was essential for 
the survival of Canada as a nation. National identity and imperial identity were key 
parts of nationalist discourse. Throughout the remainder of this thesis we will see 
further examples of this when reviewing the discourses of nationalists in Scotland 
and British Canada.  
 
An investigation of the way in which these apparently mutually exclusive identities 
are reconciled is one of the aims of this thesis. The interaction of imperial and 
national identity was a key feature of the discourse of Scottish and British Canadian 
nationalists. If, as we have argued in this section, identity is experiential and 
contextual, we would expect a discourse that articulates both an imperial and national 
identity to be a reaction to two different, but related contexts: one imperial and one 
national. Alternatively, we might find one context which affects both identities. The 
key point lies in the proposed solution to the contexts. Mutually exclusive identities 
can be reconciled by arguing that the proposed reforms will strengthen both 
identities. The proposals of the groups being studied will therefore form an important 
element of the analysis to follow.   
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But if identities only come to prominence when they are in conflict, as Hobsbawm 
indicated, and Barth and Cohen have argued, what happens in between times of 
conflict. According to Michael Bilig, national identity is instilled through every day 
life. “The apparently latent identity is maintained within the daily life of inhabited 
nations.”125  In other words, the daily reminders of the nation, whether through 
media, education and so on maintain this latent identity, which in fact “is a form of 
life” not “an inner psychological state.”126 Identity is constantly maintained through 
the use of four symbols or stereotypes: the nation as community (an us), the 
homeland (national territory), the other, and the nation among a world of nations.127  
 
The use of these symbols further emphasises the boundaries that are so important in 
understanding identity. The nation has a boundary, physical or artificial, that 
differentiates it from other nations in the worlds. The physical boundaries of the 
nation are also highlighted. The significant other may be an ancient foe or a 
dominant neighbour. Either way the boundary between them and us is created 
through use of historical symbols.  
 
Relationship between identity and nationalism  
 
The importance of the other, boundaries, and history to identity has been noted 
above. National identity rests on constant reference to significant others, territory, 
artificially constructed boundaries and history. The artificial nature of national, and 
imperial, identity means these boundaries are maintained through symbols, whether 
flags, historical heroes and so on. In the discourse of nationalist elites, these symbols 
are used as signifiers of the identity to which they are appealing. Thus Scottish 
nationalists use the Saltire, Robert the Bruce, William Wallace, Bannockburn and so 
on to highlight that the political project they are proposing revolves around the 
Scottish nation. It is this link between national identity and the political project that 
makes a campaign nationalist. Nationalism brings together national identity with 
reform of the state. In some ways nationalists do not only appeal to national identity 
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but play a role in maintaining and defining national identity. By constant reference to 
symbols of the nation, nationalist elites make the nation a part of everyday life. 
Bilig’s Banal Nationalism becomes part of the political scenery.  
 
Imperialism has a similar relationship with identity, although it need not be political. 
Imperialists, those wanting to maintain or extend empire, will use the symbols of 
imperial identity to appeal for support for their imperialist activities. The mission of 
the nation is an important factor in imperial identity and provides the link between 
national and imperial identity. National identities in these cases see themselves as 
superior to those being conquered. Where the perception of superiority is acted upon 
the national identity becomes imperial. The British national mission to pacify and 
civilise the non Western world was based on the superiority of British government 
and religion. This mission became a key symbol of British imperial identity. In 
Canada, for example, the Imperial Federation League used the civilising mission of 




The above discussion of nations, states, empires, the nature of nationalism and 
imperialism and the relationships between these concepts will situate the substantive 
chapters to follow firmly in their theoretical context. These concluding paragraphs 
will bring together the discussion by looking at the nature imperial nationalism from 
a theoretical perspective.  
 
Nationalism has its roots in modernity and in particular the democratisation of the 
state. Democracy created equal citizens who expected their interests to be 
represented by state. In multi-national states, nations also came to expect equal 
treatment and representation in the state. Failure to provide this representation leads 
to a crisis in the legitimacy of the state. Nationalism is the result. Statehood, 
however, is not always sought. Nationalist groups can seek accommodation by the 
state and recognition of national identity and interests.  
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Imperial nationalism as a concept identifies nationalism within, but not in opposition 
to, empire. The nature of imperial nationalism can be similar to nationalism within 
multi-national states, in that accommodation by the state can be sought by 
nationalists rather than outright independence. Of course, multi-national states use 
accommodation as a means to ensure democratic ideals of equality of representation 
are upheld. Nationalists express their claims for representation in terms of the 
legitimacy of the state and the right to self determination. Empires by their very 
nature, despite their rhetoric, are anti-democratic. If the Imperial state, however, 
accepts the principle of accommodation, as the British Empire did in the nineteenth 
century, then the principles of democracy are introduced. Failure to institutionalise 
democracy will then lead nationalists to put forward a discourse critical of the 
governance of the empire but not of the empire itself. Imperial nationalism is the 
result.  
 
In the chapters to follow, therefore, the key issues will be recognition, representation, 
legitimacy and self-determination. Imperial nationalism in this sense is not very 
different from any other sort of nationalism. But this study, although investigating 
the nature of imperial nationalism as an alternative form of nationalism, is concerned 
with the reconciliation of imperial and national identity in imperial nationalist 
discourse. The discussion of identity, in particular the issue of boundaries, context 
and experience, will all be important. The boundaries of the Empire and between the 
nations of the Empire as they were understood by imperial nationalists need to be 
examined to fully understand the nature of national and imperial identity. The 
relationship between these two identities and how they were reconciled by imperial 
nationalist movements will form a key part of the study. If context is important in the 
expression of identity and the ideas of Cohen and Morton are correct we would 
expect imperial nationalism to take different forms in Scotland and Canada. Different 
societies should generate different identities. National identity should mediate and/or 




Nationalist Discourse in Scotland and Canada 
 
The key aim of this chapter is to identify what was nationalist about the discourse of 
the nationalist groups in Scotland and British Canada. Later chapters will examine 
the imperialist element of the discourse and how the two were reconciled. The aims 
of these nationalists groups were mentioned in the introductory chapter. In Scotland, 
the Scottish Home Rule Association campaigned for a Scottish Parliament within the 
United Kingdom framework. In Canada, more control over Canadian foreign affairs, 
especially commercial treaties, was demanded by Canada First and the Imperial 
Federation League in Canada. Both of these demands could be seen as an extension 
of democracy or decentralisation of government. The rhetoric employed by the 
groups, however, marks the discourse of these groups as nationalist. Reform of the 
state was to be for the benefit of the nation. This chapter will examine the discourse 
of these groups, highlighting the extent to which the rhetoric was nationalist. The 
way in which nationalists conceived their respective nations will also be examined.  
 
The argument of this chapter is that nationalism is not necessarily about statehood 
but about being able to influence or control the decision making machinery of the 
state as it affects the nation. The concepts of political legitimacy and recognition, 
combined with national symbols and “significant others” characterise nationalist 
discourse. Our expectation is that Scottish and British Canadian nationalists 
displayed these characteristics.  
 
The chapter will be divided into four sections each presenting material from Scotland 
and British Canada. The opening section will present the historical background 
necessary for an understanding of the primary material to be presented. The second 
section will examine the use of historical symbols by nationalists. The significance of 
the symbols chosen will be analysed. The third section will investigate the use of the 
significant other by nationalist elites and the extent to which the Politics of 
Recognition informed their discourse. The final section will look at the specific 
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grievances of the each movement in terms of democratic legitimacy and their critique 
of the existing systems of governance.  
 
Historical Background 
Late nineteenth century British and Imperial politics is a complex subject. In order to 
simplify matters the key themes of the period have been selected as they relate to the 
movements being examined. The key themes for Scotland will be Irish Home Rule, 
the Campaign for a Scottish Secretary, Governmental Decentralisation and the 
Reform Acts. In Canada the key themes were Confederation, the Red River Affair of 
1869-70 and the Fenian raids in 1866. The main points of each theme will be 
presented briefly. The discussion to follow is not intended as an in-depth history of 
Scotland and Canada in the late nineteenth century but rather as an introduction to 
the key political issues in the period under study. 
 
The Scottish Political System and the Campaign for a Scottish Secretary 
For much of the nineteenth century Scotland was governed from London by the 
Home Secretary with the assistance of the Lord Advocate, Scotland’s chief Law 
Officer. Scotland was represented in the House of Commons by 60 Members of 
Parliament. Scottish Legislation was initiated, debated and enacted by Westminster. 
Implementation of policy, however, was left in the hands of a number of ad-hoc 
administrative boards. The boards were responsible for the administration of a 
number of policy areas, including administration of the Poor Law, Public health, 
schools, prisons and crofting.1 As the nineteenth century progressed the lack of 
accountability and the abuse of patronage by these boards made it clear that reform 
of Scottish government was necessary.2 As we shall see below the campaign for 
Scottish local government (not national government) was important in this regard.  
 
There has been some debate over the extent of Scottish autonomy in the nineteenth 
century. James Kellas has argued that Scotland had its own relatively autonomous 
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political system.3 Midwinter et al. argue that politically Scotland was not 
autonomous in decision making but rather was part of a unitary state where decisions 
were made in Westminster and Whitehall.4 Brown et al., however, claim that the 
administrative boards in implementing policy had a massive impact on Scottish life 
and reflected Scottish Presbyterian Paternalism in which the Scottish middle classes 
saw themselves “as natural rulers…”5 Whilst political decisions may have been 
made in London, the administrative boards had considerable autonomy in 
implementing that policy. The extension of the role of the state in social policy in the 
late nineteenth century and the controversy over the accountability of the 
administrative boards in part accounted for the agitation for a Scottish secretary in 
the 1880s.  
 
The position of Secretary for Scotland had been suspended following the Jacobite 
rebellion of 1745-6. For much of the nineteenth century the Lord Advocate was the 
central figure in Scottish politics. Demands for the reinstatement of the Secretary for 
Scotland had been made in the 1850s by the National Association for the Vindication 
of Scottish Rights but nothing had been achieved when Gladstone came back into 
office in 1880.6  
 
The key figure in the campaign for a Scottish Secretary was the Earl of Rosebery, a 
leading Scottish Liberal, who had played host to Gladstone during the latter’s 
Midlothian campaigns. In 1881, Rosebery supported Lord Fife in a debate in the 
House of Lords where a proposal was made “considering the importance of Scottish 
affairs and the strong feeling on the subject in Scotland” for the appointment of 
someone other than a law officer.7 Rosebery believed the lack of a Scottish Secretary 
meant the Scots were “mumbling the dry bones of political neglect, and munching 
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the remainder biscuit of Irish legislation.”8 The debate yielded quick results. 
Rosebery was appointed as under-secretary at the Home Office with responsibility 
for Scottish affairs.9 Once in post, however, Rosebery quickly became disillusioned 
with the continued control of Scottish affairs by the Lord Advocate and his lack of 
influence in the House of Commons. He continued to campaign for a Scottish 
Secretary with a cabinet position.10 In early 1883, Rosebery finally came to the end 
of his tether. Having accepted the post of under-secretary on the understanding that 
the position was temporary, he discovered there were no plans to elevate the post. He 
resigned from the Gladstone government in June 1883.11
 
Despite the apparent petulance of Rosebery, a scheme for the establishment of a 
Local Government Board was approved by Cabinet in the spring of 1883. The Local 
Government Board (Scotland) Bill was thrown out of the House of Lords as it was 
too close to the end of the Parliamentary session for consideration, although the 
Lords agreed to consider a similar bill if “Scottish opinion was clearly marshalled 
behind it.”12 A massive public meeting was held in January 1884 organised by the 
Convention for Royal Burghs expressing support for the reinstatement of the post of 
Scottish Secretary.13 The meeting represented all shades of opinion in Scotland and 
was described as the greatest collection of Scots ever seen by the Earl of 
Dalhousie.14 There were further delays in the post’s creation due to obstruction by 
Irish nationalists, the Reform Act controversy of 1884 and the introduction of the 
Redistribution Bill in 1885, in which Scottish representation at Westminster was 
increased from 60 MPs to 72. The post of Secretary for Scotland was finally 
reinstated in 1885.  
 
Whilst the creation of the post was welcomed by most, it did not resolve the 
legislative blockage at Westminster. Gladstone had claimed in 1881 that he was 
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“extremely anxious to pass a Local Government Bill for Scotland…”15 in order to 
relieve the pressure of business at Westminster. Given the pressing nature of foreign 
affairs and the Irish problem, as well as a lack of consensus in Scotland on the 
matter, a bill was never introduced. The matter was very much at the forefront of 
campaigning for the 1885 election. Lord Salisbury, the Conservative leader, Lord 
Rosebery, the leading Liberal in Scotland, and numerous local candidates made 
election speeches in favour of local-self government. Rosebery, speaking in Paisley 
in October 1885, went so far as to claim “the movement on behalf of local 
government is one of the strongest tendencies of the time…”16 Lord Salisbury had 
argued the week before that,   
 
large reforms in our local government, in the direction of increasing the 
power of that government, were absolutely necessary. They must provide that 
Local Authorities had sufficient powers, and that they got them by 
diminishing the exaggerated powers heaped on the central authorities in 
London. The people in these localities should govern themselves.17
 
The debate over local government rumbled on into the late 1880s. The important 
point is that in the periods immediately before and after the Reform Act of 1884, 
which extended democracy and equalised the franchises in the four nations of the 
United Kingdom, the principle of decentralising power was often discussed in 
Scotland. It was perhaps only natural that national self government would enter the 
discussion.  
 
The Origins of the Irish Home Rule League 
Had Irish Home Rule not reached the political agenda in 1885, the post of Scottish 
Secretary may have been sufficient to quell the disquiet in Scotland over 
Westminster’s inability to legislate for Scotland. The delay in Parliament passing the 
legislation for a Scottish Secretary was largely due to the tactics of Irish Home 
Rulers during Gladstone’s ministry of 1880-1885. Gladstone’s decision to adopt Irish 
Home Rule as government policy in 1885 and his introduction of an Irish Home Rule 
bill in Parliament in April 1886 altered the position in Scotland. The political 
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impetus for the formation of the Scottish Home Rule Association came from 
Gladstone’s decision to propose Irish Home Rule.  
 
The background to the formation of the Irish Home Rule League in 1873 is not only 
important contextually but also provides some additional comparisons for the 
purpose of this study. Since the seventeenth century the British monarchy had begun 
settlement of Catholic Ireland through a system of plantations. Ireland had been 
colonised and, effectively, run from London for nearly two centuries prior to being 
brought into a formal Union with Scotland and England in 1801.18 The initial 
impetus for bringing Ireland into closer ties with Westminster was an uprising of the 
United Irishmen, a nationalist group, who had been supported by a small force of 
French troops. Although the rising was brutally crushed, the strategic importance of 
Ireland in the defence of Britain was clearly highlighted. An enemy of Britain had 
supported an Irish rebellion in the Empire’s backyard. This could not be allowed to 
happen again. The Act of Union that came into effect on January 1st 1801 can be 
seen, at least from the British point of view, as a consolidation of the Empire.19
 
Ireland was split over the Union. The Protestants in Ulster were clearly in favour of 
the Union, being British in origin. But there were also sections of the Catholic south 
that could see the economic benefits of the Union to Ireland. On the other hand there 
were significant numbers who remained opposed to the Union. As the prominent 
Irish historian F.S.L. Lyons has pointed out, as late as 1845, at the beginning of the 
potato famine, “Irish politics were still the politics of repeal [of the union], not of 
hunger.”20 These tensions lasted throughout the late nineteenth century.  
 
In the period from 1845 to 1867 various attempts at rebellion by a number of Irish 
nationalist groups, such as Young Ireland and the Fenian “Brotherhood,” were 
quickly and brutally crushed by the British authorities. 21  The rebellions did nothing 
to dispel the vicious caricatures that abounded in mid and late Victorian Britain. The 
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Irish peasantry were “presented as illiterate and confused louts at best, as subhuman 
porcine creatures at worst.”22 These stereotypes inevitably coloured political 
decision-making and debate and were reinforced throughout the nineteenth century.23 
Matters reached a head late in 1867, following reprisals against the arrests and 
execution of a group of Fenians. The Manchester Martyrs, as they were known, 
became symbols of a resurgent Irish nationalism. An attempt by Fenians to blow up 
the wall of Clerkenwell Prison at the end of 1867 in London killed a number of 
innocent people and roused anger in Britain.  
 
The political opportunity for the formation of an Irish Nationalist party came with the 
introduction of the Secret Ballot Act in 1872. Prior to the Act, Irish politics had 
followed the British pattern; the politicians returned were predominantly Liberals 
and Conservatives. Irish nationalists had rarely asserted themselves in Parliaments 
since the Union of 1801, largely due to landlord intimidation during elections. With 
the introduction of the Secret Ballot Act in 1872, however, the situation changed 
drastically.  
 
In 1873, the Irish Home Rule League was formed with Isaac Butt as leader. The 
League had as its aim the creation of an Irish Parliament dealing with purely Irish 
matters, whilst retaining the connection with Westminster for defence, foreign and 
imperial affairs.24 Butt saw Irish Home Rule as a solution for the problems of the 
Empire as well as for Ireland. The League, however, was divided between 
republicans and home rulers. Under Isaac Butt there was no concerted action by 
Home Rulers and only one or two rebels used obstructionist tactics in Parliament. 
Butt’s preference was to remain moderate and conciliatory in order to gain the 
respect and attention of the government of the day. With 59 Home Rule MP’s elected 
in 1874 Butt should have been in a strong position. It was not until after his death in 
1879, however, and the accession of Charles Parnell Stewart that the Parliamentary 
tactics of Irish Home Rulers gained the attention of Parliament.25
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Parnell’s assumption of the leadership of the Home Rule League changed the nature 
of nationalist politics in Ireland. A concerted campaign of Parliamentary obstruction 
combined with a land war substantially raised the stakes. In the early 1880s, rent 
strikes, violence against landlords, the withholding of harvests and boycotting 
landlords wreaked havoc in the countryside in response to continued evictions. 
During the 1880 parliamentary session, a total of 14,836 speeches were made, of 
which 6,300 were by Irish Home Rulers.26 Nearly half of all speeches were by about 
a sixth of all MPs. This brought the work of Parliament to a virtual standstill. The 
combined attack by nationalists put Ireland firmly at the top of Gladstone’s agenda 
following his successful return as Prime Minister in 1880. A new land Act was 
introduced in 1881, along with a new Coercion Act. Although the Act met some Irish 
grievances, such as fixity of tenure and fair rent, it was met with indifference and 
violence. This violence was laid at the foot of the Home Rule League and Parnell 
was arrested in October 1881.27
 
Following secret negotiations in 1882 between Parnell and representatives of 
Gladstone, the Irish leader agreed “to cooperate cordially with the Liberal Party” 
provided Irish rent arrears were wiped out.28 In what became known as the 
Kilmainham Treaty, named after the gaol where Parnell was imprisoned, the Irish 
leader was released and Irish rent arrears were waived. Parnell’s experience 
increased support for Home Rule and the increase in the Irish electorate following 
the 1884 Reform Act led to 85 seats being won by the Irish Home Rulers in the 1885 
election. Parnell held the balance of power.29
 
Against this backdrop Gladstone concluded the only solution was to offer the Irish 
home rule. Comparing Ireland with Canada in the 1840s, Gladstone claimed “Canada 
did not get Home Rule because she was loyal and friendly but she has become loyal 
and friendly because she has got Home Rule.”30 Gladstone introduced his Irish 
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Home Rule Bill into Parliament in April 1886. It proposed an Irish Parliament with 
an upper chamber of peers and landlords and a lower chamber comprising the 
existing 103 MPs augmented by another 101. The stumbling block for the bill was 
the absence of Irish representation at Westminster. Ireland, it seemed was to be 
treated as a colony. Taxation for imperial affairs and defence would not be 
accompanied by representation. The bill foundered on this point and was defeated by 
343 to 313.31 Gladstone’s ministry gave way to the Conservatives under Lord 
Salisbury. 
 
Irish Home Rule’s influence on the Scottish Home Rule Association 
The introduction of the Irish Home Rule Bill in April 1886 was the impetus required 
for the formation of the Scottish Home Rule Association. The SHRA themselves 
acknowledged the debt owed to Irish Nationalist politics. In its first Petition to 
Parliament, the SHRA made clear the influence of Irish Home Rule on the formation 
of the movement.  
 
…your petitioners embrace the earliest opportunity of expressing their 
gratification that, by the Bill for the future Government of Ireland, which 
recently received so much attention from your honourable House, the 
principle of devolving on a National Legislature, local legislative and 
administrative powers…has been recognised.32
 
The SHRA Manifesto of 1892 distanced the movement slightly from Irish Home 
Rule but still acknowledged the debt owed by Scottish Nationalists.  
 
No doubt the success of the Irish agitation in forcing Mr Gladstone to espouse 
the cause of Ireland was an encouragement to us; but our grievances and our 
discontent were of longer standing.33
 
The programme of the SHRA also owed much to the Irish Home Rule League. Both 
movements favoured remaining within the British Empire whilst reforming the 
United Kingdom state to devolve domestic legislative power to a national parliament. 
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The SHRA used Irish Home Rule debate to attempt to raise motions for Scottish 
Home Rule. In 1893, by resolution of the SHRA executive committee, Scots MPs 
were petitioned to raise a motion for Scottish Home Rule during either the committee 
stage or the second reading of the Irish Home Rule Bill.34  
 
The influence of Irish Home Rule on Scottish nationalists will be examined further 
throughout this chapter. It is clear that Irish Home Rule was a trigger for the 
formation of the Scottish Home Rule Association. As the SHRA Treasurer William 
Mitchell claimed, Gladstone’s support for an Irish Parliament made home rule “a 
matter of practical politics.”35
 
Confederation of the British North American Colonies 
On 1 July 1867 the colonies of Nova Scotia, New Brunswick, and the United 
Province of Canada (to become Ontario and Quebec) came together to form the new 
Dominion of Canada. A detailed examination of the intricacies of the process of 
Confederation is not necessary here, except to say it was a carefully negotiated 
settlement in which each province both gained and lost. The importance of 
Confederation for the purpose of this study is as a backdrop to Canadian relations 
with the United States and its effect on the formation of British Canadian nationalist 
movements. Only a brief discussion of the reasons for Confederation will be given 
here. 
 
As with any historical phenomenon there was more than one cause for Canadian 
Confederation. Some causes, however, are more important than others. According to 
the historian, Kenneth McNaught, the Northern victory in the American Civil War 
posed real dangers to British North America.36 Ill-feeling between Britain and the 
American North threatened to involve the British North American colonies in a war 
between the two countries, as it had in the War of 1812. The British saw the 
breakaway of the South as the end of the United States experiment. The Americans 
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were angered by British friendliness towards the Southern rebels.37 Suggestions were 
made in some quarters of the Union that the British North American colonies should 
be attacked in revenge.  
 
Two specific incidents brought the threat into perspective and had lasting effects past 
Confederation. In 1861, two Southern confederate envoys to Britain were seized by a 
United States warship whilst aboard the British steamship “The Trent.” This attack 
brought into focus for the British the problems of defending British territory. Ten 
thousand troops were sent to British North America as reinforcements. The second 
incident occurred in 1864 when southern confederate refugees to Canada raided St 
Albans in Vermont. Although the refugees were captured by Canadian officials when 
they recrossed the border, some Americans felt the punishment they received was 
insufficient. By the end of the Civil War in 1865 there was a real spirit of resentment 
between the British in the North and the Americans in the South.38 Special interests 
in America pressed for annexation of Canada.39
 
The forces for Canadian Confederation had begun working in 1864 with the 
Charlottetown conference, initially intended as a meeting to discuss the Union of the 
Maritime Provinces. The American announcement of the abrogation of the Treaty of 
Reciprocity in 1865 provided further support for a union in British North America 
based on the need for greater inter-colonial trade. The final straw, however, was the 
Fenian invasion of 1866.  
 
The Fenian movement gained substantial support from Irish emigrants in the United 
States. The movement in America, however, had split into two factions. One 
believed all resources should be put into planning and implementing insurrection in 
Ireland. The other faction, known as “the senate wing”, claimed an invasion of 
Canada “might provoke a favourable setting for an Irish revolt.”40 By invading 
Canada, relations between the United States and Britain may have deteriorated to 
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such an extent that war was declared, thus committing troops to North America and 
weakening defences in Ireland. In 1866, Irish veterans from the Northern forces in 
the Civil War massed on the border of the British colonies in the North. Only at Fort 
Erie in the Province of Canada did an invasion force actually cross the border but 
they were quickly defeated by well prepared government forces.41 The Americans 
did nothing to prevent the invasion and only made moves to round up the Fenian 
forces when it realised “The Brotherhood” were in decline.42  
 
The Fenian attacks were clearly never a real threat to British North America but they 
did reveal the existence and extent of American unfriendliness.43 The raids were 
important in persuading opponents of Confederation in New Brunswick to support 
the union of the British colonies. They were also important in persuading Britain to 
support the confederation idea.44
 
The central idea of Confederation was survival, whether the cultural survival of 
French Canadians who would secure their own province, the economic survival of 
Nova Scotia following the abrogation of the Reciprocity treaty or the survival of an 
emerging British Canadian identity against United States aggression. When the 
British North America Act was put in place, however, Nova Scotians returned to the 
Provincial legislature a majority against confederation.  Their leader, Joseph Howe, 
immediately appealed to London to repeal the Act. The request was denied despite 
persistent calls for repeal. The stage was set for the new Prime Minister of Canada, 
John A. Macdonald, to use his powers of negotiation that had proved so effective 
during the Confederation debates in Quebec and London.  
 
Canada First’s reaction to the Nova Scotian Secession Crisis 
A year after confederation, following the Nova Scotian secession crisis, five men 
were introduced to each other while on business in Ottawa.  George Denison, Charles 
Mair, William Foster, Henry Morgan and Robert Haliburton spent most of their 
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evenings in Ottawa discussing “the future of Canada, her brilliant prospects, and the 
duty of her sons to study her interests and to do all in their power to advance her 
welfare.”45 The exact nature of what was discussed by the Corner-Room set can only 
be inferred from Denison’s later recollections in letters and obituaries but the need to 
find something that would counteract the secession crisis in Nova Scotia must have 
been at the forefront of their debates.  
  
In his obituary of John Schultz, the sixth member of Canada First and future senator 
for Manitoba, Denison claimed the early group had two main aims: the expansion of 
Canada westwards and to foster inter-colonial trade.46 Both of these aims were 
actively pursued but the fact that Haliburton had already outlined the inter-provincial 
trade idea in his article on The Coal Trade of the New Dominion and that very shortly 
after the April meetings he wrote Intercolonial Trade: Our only Safeguard against 
Disunion, may have resulted in Denison mistaking actions taken for aims originally 
stated. It should be noted that Haliburton was the only one to talk of inter-provincial 
trade and the only one of the five not from Ontario.   
 
Haliburton’s second pamphlet, according to Denison, was important to the pro-
confederation cause in Nova Scotia47 and was written as a direct response to the 
threat of secession. The article outlined some very important ideas and it has been 
argued that it was the forerunner of Macdonald’s national policy of the following 
decade.48 The crux of Haliburton’s argument was that Nova Scotia and New 
Brunswick prior to confederation had very close commercial links with the United 
States but given the Fenian raids of 1866 and the United States’ attitude to the United 
Kingdom, political union with the United States was not a valid option. Since the 
repeal of the reciprocity treaty, the markets for Nova Scotia’s two main commercial 
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activities of coal and fishing had been lost.49 Given the Western and Eastern 
provinces of Canada saw each other as foreigners, Haliburton argued the only bonds 
that could unite Canada were "the bonds of commerce."  
 
To suppose that a country so remote from us, which has no share in our trade, 
and no interest in our prosperity and reserves, can safely be entrusted with the 
control of our resources and of our destinies, and that we can remain to the 
end of time as we now are, a mere political tributary of Canada, is to imagine 
an anomaly which is without precedent in the history of a free people.50   
 
Nova Scotia, in the eyes of Haliburton and Canada First, could only be secured for 
the Canadian Confederation if trade with the rest of Canada, particularly in coal, 
could be encouraged. 
 
The second aim of Canada First was to secure the North West against French Canada 
and the United States of America.  
 
The Campaign for the North West 
Following the negotiations for the surrender of the Hudson’s Bay Company’s charter 
over the North-West territories along with the agreement for their admission into 
confederation in December 1870, the Dominion parliament passed an act early in 
1869 for the temporary government of the region on its admission to the Dominion 
at the end of that year. This Act allowed for the direct administration of the North-
West from Ottawa.51 In the autumn of 1869, in recognition of his efforts during the 
negotiations for the transfer of the region, William McDougall was appointed 
Lieutenant Governor for the North West.52 In October the Metis set up a provisional 
government in the North West to prevent the entry of the Canadian party who were 
advised not to enter in November 1869.53  
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This warning was ignored and by the 2nd of November all of McDougall’s party were 
under detention and Fort Garry had been taken. Charles Mair, a member of 
McDougall’s party, managed to escape and fled to Winnipeg.  Here, however, he was 
recaptured along with John Schultz, a recent recruit to Canada First and leader of the 
Canadians at Red River. The pair were held at Fort Garry.54 Both of them escaped in 
January 1870 and independently made their way to Toronto. Before they arrived, 
however, an Ontarian Orangeman, Thomas Scott, was court martialed and executed 
by Louis Riel, leader of the Metis, on 4 March 1870. 
 
Canada First organised a welcome meeting for Mair and Schultz that served the dual 
purpose of expressing British Canadian indignation at the presumption of power by 
the Metis at Red River. The meeting was also intended to pressurise the government 
to send an armed force to the region to remove the provisional Metis government and 
to seek revenge for the execution of Scott.55 The meeting held in Toronto to 
welcome Mair and Schultz on April 6 1870 was so well attended that it had to be 
moved outside.56 The meeting resolved that,   
 
This meeting expresses the strongest indignation at the cold blooded murder 
of poor Scott … and considers that it would be a gross injustice to the loyal 
inhabitants of Red River, humiliating to our national honour, and contrary to 
all British traditions, for our government to receive, negotiate, or treat with 
the emissaries of those who have robbed, imprisoned and murdered loyal 
Canadians, whose only fault was zeal for British institutions, whose only 
crime was devotion to the Old Flag.57
 
The resolution clearly showed the symbolism of British Canadian nationalism. The 
protection of loyal Canadians and British institutions and honour was vital for 
Canada First. The relative size of the Metis population, however, could not account 
for the reaction. The support of the United States for the Metis reveals the real reason 
for the nationalist reaction of Canada First.  
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Canada First perceived the American policy of Manifest Destiny as a threat to the 
survival of the Dominion. Westward expansion through the prairies without the 
admission of Manitoba into the Dominion would have been impossible. The “revolt” 
at Red River, with the advertised support it had from the United States (through the 
newspaper of the provisional government), was seen, by Canada First, as a massive 
threat to the future integrity of Canada.58 This defensive nationalism is one of the 
causes for Canada First’s reaction to the rising at Red River. 
 
In addition to the public meetings, Foster, on behalf of the Canada First group, used 
the editorial pages of the Toronto Telegraph, whose editor, George Kingsmill, was 
one of “The Twelve Apostles”, to urge support from the public for these meetings 
and succeeded in raising Ontario to a fever pitch with spirited and passionate 
editorials.59 One such editorial appeared a few days after the public meeting held to 
welcome back the fugitives. Referring to the government’s intention to receive three 
delegates of the Metis’ provisional government and hear their grievances, Foster 
asked if,  
 
Sir John Macdonald proposed to bring the Government and the people of 
Canada down to the level of Riel and his fellow rebels, to treat with and make 
himself and his colleagues the equals of murderers and to shake the hands 
that were red with Canadian blood? …The country must be opened up to our 
people, and loyal men must be protected in the enjoyment of their rights for 
all time to come… What could Sir John Macdonald hope to gain by receiving 
the rebels? … Must this be taken as more evidence of the fact that Sir George 
[Cartier] was the leader and Sir John the follower?60
 
The delegates, however, had been sent to discuss the terms of the Act which had 
been passed in the previous year for the direct government of the North West from 
Ottawa. This was, after all, the main reason for the rebellion, despite the perceptions 
of Mair and the Canada First Committee. After foiling attempts by the Canada First 
Committee to have the three arrested in Ottawa and convicted of Scott’s murder,61 
the Canadian government met the delegates and negotiations were completed that 
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resulted in the Manitoba Act of May 1870. This act, in effect, created a new Quebec 
in the North West by giving equal status to the French and English language.62
 
The campaign to send an armed expedition continued and more meetings were held 
throughout Ontario that showed similar levels of support to previous meetings. An 
announcement was made to send an expedition under Colonel Wolesley to Red 
River in May 1870 after the completion of the negotiations for the Manitoba Act.63 
Although the Manitoba Act had ended the rebellion, there are several reasons why an 
expedition was still sent. Firstly, Sir John A. Macdonald had a dilemma over 
Ontario’s demands for armed force and Quebec’s indignation at the demand. 
Something had to give and Macdonald must surely have known that the expedition 
would incur little resistance and so Quebec would be satisfied that no blood was 
shed. Ontarian demands would also have been met. Secondly, and perhaps more 
importantly, there was evidence to suggest that the United States would benefit from 
the rebellion and that they were showing a keen interest that had not been 
discouraged by Riel or his followers. The United States had sources in the region64 
and the newspaper of the provisional government was openly advocating annexation. 
Sending an expedition to the North West would have sent a clear message to the 
United States that Britain was fully behind Canada’s westward expansion.  
 
The next few years saw Denison and Foster attempting to build support for “the new 
nationality”, although there would appear to have been little organised activity by 
Canada First. Not until 1873 and the formation of the Canadian National Association 
(CNA) did Canada First become a formal political party. Following their support of 
Thomas Moss, Foster’s law firm partner, who stood in the West Toronto by-election 
in 1873,65 the CNA issued a manifesto early in 1874 outlining its political 
programme. Many of the principles revolved around increasing democracy, 
increasing the franchise, compulsory voting, and representation of minorities. The 
key point, however, was the first principle. “British Connection; Consolidation of the 
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Empire and in the meantime a voice in the treaties affecting Canada.”66 The CNA 
never put any candidates forward in the general election of 1874 and faced a 
ferocious attack from The Globe.67 A combined attack from both Conservatives and 
Liberals effectively killed the CNA before it could get started, although a branch was 
formed in the Maritimes.68 By the end of 1875, the Association had disappeared and 
its mouthpiece, The Nation newspaper, went out of print in 1876.69 With the end of 
The Nation came the end of the Canada First movement. 
 
In terms of Hroch’s typology of nationalist movements, the groups discussed above 
are patriotic agitators. The role of these groups was to preach their conception of the 
nation. In their discussions of the problems of political legitimacy facing the nation, 
they used various historical symbols to create the imagined borders of the 
community.  
 
Borders of the Mind - Imagining Nations and Inventing Traditions 
Symbols and invented traditions play an important part in identifying groups. 
Symbols and traditions are selected or invented by nationalist elites to reflect the 
identity they are attempting to portray. Symbols are often historic in nature creating 
an image of a temporal as a well as a spatial identity in which we join in communion 
with both our ancestors and our contemporaries. Given the contextual and 
experiential nature of identity, symbols will often reflect the context in which they 
are deployed and reflect the historical experience of the nation, especially in relation 
to a “significant other.” 
 
Historical symbols in a nationalist discourse usually assert the nation’s right of self 
determination. Nationalist elites will use examples from history that show the nation 
enforcing its right of self determination. This achieves two things. Firstly, it 
establishes the existence of an independent nation in the past. Secondly, it provides 
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inspiration for the campaign nationalists are pursuing in the present. These historical 
examples form part of the symbolic boundary mechanisms of the nation. By 
establishing the boundaries of the nation in our imagination, historical symbols not 
only tell us who belongs to the nation but also who does not belong. They also 
establish the ‘significant other’ of the nation, allowing us to imagine the nation by 
creating visual symbols representing its cohesion and status.  
 
The symbols will also reflect the context of the present day. They are used by elites 
to illustrate the key points of their discourse in shorthand. The symbols chosen will 
quickly identify the other. They will have been ingrained in the national psyche 
through education, folklore, myth and tradition. The symbols may show an assertion 
of power over the other. The antagonism of the present may be highlighted with 
similar examples of domination in the past which has been overcome by an assertion 
of power or the success of a nationalist discourse. This links the present problems of 
legitimacy with historical examples of similar problems. The complexity of the 
problem is reduced to a few symbols thus making the contemporary issue easier to 
understand. It also introduces the idea that the problem is not unique to the present 
day but is recurring and unlikely to be resolved without a nationalist campaign. Thus, 
linking historical symbols with the current problem helps make sense of the present.  
 
It should be noted that the significant other does not always have to be placed in an 
antagonistic position. The significant other can be used in several ways, whether as a 
contrast or an example. It follows from this that assertions of power over the other 
are not necessary for national identity to be sustained. Sacrifice, defeat and 
martyrdom are also important in forging collective grievances and maintaining 
identity. It is contended here, however, that in a political nationalist discourse 
historical examples are more likely to assert the power of the nation than its 
weaknesses. Historical examples themselves can act as significant others. By 
providing a positive example of what can be achieved, we are more likely to follow 
the example in the modern day. 
  
Bannockburn and the Scottish Wars of Independence 
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The Scottish Wars of Independence, fought in the late 13th and early 14th Centuries 
following invasion by Edward I of England, and particularly the success at the Battle 
of Bannockburn were key symbols of Scottish identity in the discourse of the 
Scottish Home Rule Association (SHRA.) Indeed, there were several pamphlets 
dedicated solely to Bannockburn itself. 70 As symbols of identity, Bannockburn and 
the Scottish Wars of Independence were important on several counts: they asserted 
the right of Scotland to national self-determination, established the “significant 
other”, emphasised national cohesion (winning wars is impossible without cohesion) 
and enabled the nation to be imagined as temporal as well as spatial.  
 
The colourful Theodore Napier, resident of Victoria, Australia, for thirty years, and 
President of the Scottish National Association of Victoria, argued on a number of 
occasions that the Anniversary of the Battle of Bannockburn, 24th June, 1314, should 
be celebrated as Scotland’s Independence Day.  
 
Every American, man, woman, and child knows the date of their 
Independence Day, but how many Scotsmen could tell the date of their 
greater Independence Day? …we want our own feelings revived in regard to 
our great ancestral struggle for liberty. It is a sacred duty for Scotsmen to 
hand down to their ancestors the records of their ancestors and religious 
liberty.71
 
The SHRA, through Napier, wanted to establish (invent) a tradition of celebrating 
Scotland’s historical past thus creating the impression that Scotland was an ancient 
nation. The anniversary was to be a ceremonial reminder that Scotland’s status as a 
nation was independent from England.  
 
Had it not been for Bannockburn, Scotland would have fallen into the same 
deplorable condition that Ireland is in, and have remained to this day a 
conquered province of England.72
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Scotland had been a conquered province of England during the Wars of 
Independence but had fought for its right to determine its own future. Bannockburn 
established Scotland as an independent nation. The use of Bannockburn also 
reflected the context of the times as seen by the SHRA.  
 
Is not Scotland now virtually ruled by England? Her representatives in the 
Imperial House of Commons number but 72, while England has 465; 
consequently Scotland’s vote is constantly out-voted by the English and Irish 
majority in matters that interest Scotland alone. This reduces Scotland to the 
condition of an English province. Was it for this that our ancestors fought?73
 
By giving Scotland the status of conquered province in both the historical and 
contemporary contexts, the SHRA linked the present problem with the historical 
past. This enabled them to draw inspiration from the defeat of the English in 1314 
and the assertion of Scotland’s right to self-determination. If self-determination could 
be achieved in the middle ages surely Scotland could assert its right to determine her 
own future in the late nineteenth century. The implication presented by the SHRA 
was that their generation had a responsibility to ensure the sacrifices of their 
ancestors in the Wars of Independence were not forgotten.  
 
The comparison of historical battles with present situations inevitably leads to the 
conclusion that the present state of affairs is also a battle, one which must assert the 
independence of the nation. The SHRA viewed the campaign for a Scottish 
Parliament in this light. 
 
The political war of our time is happily conducted in a different manner, but 
it is the same battle we have to fight, the right of Scotsmen to be masters in 
their own country.74
 
These assertions lie at the centre of nationalists’ understanding of the nation/state 
relationship. The Union would work if it were not for the domination of the English. 
But because the Union did not work, i.e., there was interference in Scottish affairs by 
another nation, the nature of the Union must change. The use of the English as “the 
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other” through Bannockburn not only clearly differentiated Scots from the English 
but established the antagonism in the shape of a power relationship injurious to 
Scottish interests. Scotland had been conquered in the fourteenth century and, 
according to the SHRA, found itself in a similar position in the 1880s. The English 
dominated the United Kingdom Parliament.  
 
The SHRA claimed the independence won in the fourteenth century enabled 
Scotland to negotiate Union with England as “coequal partners.”75 Bannockburn 
created equality between Scotland and England which the nationalists believed 
existed through to 1707. Yet, the SHRA believed the Union negotiations had been 
conducted unfairly. The nationalists echoed Robert Burn’s accusation that the 
Scottish Commissioners had been “bought and sold for English gold.”76
 
The corrupt nature of the negotiations leading to the Union of 1707 was another 
important symbol used by the SHRA to justify their proposals for a Scottish 
parliament. They claimed Scots had wanted a commercial union with England in 
1707. The Commissioners who were to negotiate for Scotland had been selected by 
Queen Anne, which according to the SHRA, meant in reality they had been chosen 
by her English advisers; chosen for their known sympathy for Union with England.77
   
…the [Scots] Commissioners were bullied or cajoled into agreeing not only 
to the extinction of the Scottish Parliament but into accepting such a small 
number of representatives to the British Parliament as placed Scotland 
entirely at the mercy of England.78
 
Charles Waddie, honorary secretary of the SHRA, went further claiming the Scots 
were forced to accept the Union: 
 
…the English party yielded nothing; and as they had the army at their back, 
and a larger force on the border, sent at the instance of the English 
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Government, the Treaty, was, as it were, crammed down the throat of the 
nation at the point of the bayonet.79
 
Despite having presented Scotland as a sovereign and independent nation using the 
symbols of Bannockburn and the Wars of Independence, the SHRA, argued the 
Union was a fraud. The negotiations for Union had been carried out under the threat 
of invasion, by commissioners who did not represent the interests of the Scottish 
people. The most famous opponent of Union in 1707, Fletcher of Saltoun, was 
adopted as the symbol of reform of the Union. Fletcher, the SHRA claimed, was the 
original home ruler.80  
 
In arguing that the Union of 1707 was a fraud, the SHRA claimed the right of 
Westminster to legislate for Scotland was also a fraud. Despite the vastly different 
circumstances of the 1880s, the Union of 1707 had not been reformed. The 
legitimacy of the system was based on a corrupt Treaty. The system itself, therefore, 
must be called into question. Scotland had been bullied and cajoled by the English 
into a system of government it had not wanted. The system should be reformed. The 
critique of the British State in the SHRA’s discourse used the historical symbols of 
Scotland to highlight the claims for Scots’ right to self-determination.  
 
The SHRA emphasised the actions of the Scottish people in general and two 
individuals in particular, in the victory over England. The Wars of Independence 
could not have been won had it not been for “Our forefathers [who] died bravely that 
day and to them we owe the place which Scotland holds in the world’s Battle-roll of 
Freedom.”81 Mitchell quoted Sir Walter Scott’s eulogy of William Wallace and 
Robert the Bruce in Tales of a Grandfather. 
 
The nation of Scotland was also raised once more from the situation of a 
distressed and conquered province to that of a free and independent state, 
governed by its own laws and subject to its own princes. They never 
afterwards lost the freedom for which Wallace had laid down his life, and 
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which King Robert had recovered not less by his wisdom than by his 
weapons.82
 
National heroes such as Bruce and Wallace when used in this context, as well as 
being the “touchstone of nationalism”, provide models of conduct and inspiration for 
their oppressed descendants.83 As descendants from these great heroes, Scots were 
seen as wise as well as warriors. But in imagining the nation as historical, and 
therefore, temporal, Scots of the late Victorian era were seen as part of an extended 
family that extended back to the thirteenth and fourteenth centuries.  
 
The Wars of Independence naturally led to the use of the Declaration of Arbroath as 
another symbol of Scotland’s sovereignty. What else was the Declaration but a 
nationalist assertion of the right of the Scottish people to rule themselves? 
 
For so long as a hundred remain alive, we will never in any degree be subject 
to the dominion of the English: since it is not for glory, riches or honour we 
fight but for liberty alone, what no good man loses but with his life.84
 
The use of the Declaration and the Wars of Independence by the SHRA clearly 
marked out the English as the “other” in nationalist discourse. The significant other 
plays a key role in any discourse, nationalist or otherwise. In Discourse Analysis, the 
other is important in identifying the antagonism present within the discourse. The 
symbols chosen by nationalist elites will represent the principle antagonism in their 
discourse. Thus, the SHRA selected symbols relating to conflicts with the English, 
their principle antagonists. This antagonism runs through the discourse of the SHRA. 
The English were seen as tyrants, both historically and in contemporary times. The 
SHRA used history as a means of showing there was a tradition of English tyranny 
that had been fought by patriotic Scots to secure their independence and this hard 
fought independence was now, once again, under threat. The fight therefore should 
be continued by the present generation to regain the use of that hard won 
independence. As Mitchell underlined,  
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We will fight, as our forefathers did “not for glory, riches, or honours, but for 
liberty”- the liberty “to manage our own affairs by ourselves without the 
assistance or counsel of any other.”85
 
The use of these symbols was an attempt by nationalists to articulate their conception 
of Scots national identity, make sense of the political problems they were addressing 
and to raise national consciousness through aids to imagine the nation. The linkage 
of the historical with the modern creates themes that run through the nationalist 
discourse to highlight the extension of the nation into history. For example, the 
theme of struggling against the tyranny and bullying of the English runs through the 
historical discussions and, as we shall see, their analysis of the contemporary 
problem. Bannockburn and the Declaration of Arbroath implicitly showed a 
legitimate form of rule, one where Scots interests were represented and safeguarded. 
The corrupt Union of 1707, however, had swung the balance of power too much in 
favour of the English. The solution was a Scottish Parliament.  
 
Defence of Canadian Territory 
If Scotland had its Bannockburn, Canadians could call upon a multitude of invasions 
by their neighbour, the United States. The War of 181286 and the Fenian invasion of 
1866 were among the most used symbols of the independence of Canada, although 
the Canadian Confederation had not existed at the time of the invasions. But as 
important, particularly for Canada First, was the flight of the United Empire 
Loyalists in the 1780s following the defeat of British Forces in the American Wars of 
Independence. The flight of the Loyalists can be seen as a descent myth for British 
Canada, particularly by Ontarians. As well as being symbolic of the ties and 
sentiment for empire, an issue that will be addressed in the following chapter, the 
Empire Loyalists symbolised Canadians as inherently non-American. The loyalists 
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had explicitly rejected the idea of an independent American Union and thus came to 
symbolise for Canada First the ideal Canadian, “a body of men possessing the purest 
loyalty, men who sacrificed self for principle…” who had been left to the mercy of 
the Revolutionaries and fled to Canada.87
 
As with Scotland the theme of defending Canadian territory against American 
invasion runs through the examples held out by the nationalist elite. The War of 1812 
stands out in particular as a major achievement for Canada. William Foster, one of 
the original members of Canada First, in his Canada First address surveyed the 
events of the war as an example of Canadians defending themselves gloriously 
against a much larger enemy.88 George Denison, however, another of the original 
members of Canada First, chose to see the War, not just as an heroic effort Canadians 
should be proud of, but as an expression of confidence by his ancestors, as 
Canadians, in the future of Canada “the state.” 
 
The War of 1812 has also given us some bright pages in our early history, 
and shown us an example of our political existence being saved to us by the 
confidence possessed by our fathers in themselves and in the state.89
 
This was an interesting way of evaluating the importance of the War. Despite the fact 
that the confederated state of Canada had not even been thought of in 1812, the 
future of the combatants’ offspring, in the view of Denison, was in that confederated 
state formed several decades later.  
 
The use of the War of 1812 and the Fenian Invasion of 1866 as symbols of British 
Canadian identity highlighted two important aspects of the discourse of Canadian 
nationalists. Firstly, it showed the antagonism towards the United States. As we 
discussed in our historical review, the American authorities made no effort to prevent 
the Fenian Invasion. It was therefore taken by Canadians as evidence of American 
hostility. In Canadian nationalist discourse, therefore, the United States took the form 
                                                 
87 Denison Papers MG29 E29 Vol 43 - Denison, G.T., The Duty of Canadians to Canada (1871): 9 
88 Foster, W., Canada First: Or our New Nationality (Toronto, 1888): 8-10 
89 Denison, The Duty of Canadians to Canada: 9 
 111
of the significant other. The War of 1812 and the Fenian Invasion of 1866 also 
demonstrated the right of Canada to determine its own future. 
 
Despite Canada not being in existence at the time of these invasions, the area that 
was to become Canada, British North America, was in existence. In their use of 
history and ancestry as an example of the temporal aspect of the nation, British 
Canadian nationalists made British North America synonymous with Canada. 
Everything achieved by the United Empire Loyalists in 1783, the militia in 1812 and 
in 1866 was done in the name of British North America. Hence, post confederation, 
it was seen to have been done in the name of Canada. There are several important 
aspects to this “invention of tradition.”90 Firstly, it gave the young Canada an air of 
antiquity. It showed the British Canadians of the post Confederation era that they 
belonged to a historic nation of British North Americans (the Canadians) who had 
also struggled and succeeded against threats from the United States. They were not 
alone. Rather they belonged to a temporal nation that had been perpetually struggling 
against American aggression. Secondly, it attempted to unite the disparate provinces 
of the Union, the Maritimes, Quebec and Ontario, each of whom had been affected in 
some way by these incursions. Foster and Denison’s pamphlets being written in 1871 
at a time when the Confederation badly needed something to weld it together, were 
trying, in a historical sense, to find the cement to hold together the founding 
provinces of Canada.  
 
The various border conflicts between Canada and the United States provided 
shorthand symbols by which the audience understood the discourse of British 
Canadian nationalists. The symbols used reflect the difference in the age of the 
Canadian nation when compared with Scotland. The earliest historical reference was 
the flight of the United Empire Loyalists in 1783. The Battle of Bannockburn had 
been fought nearly 500 years earlier. The symbols established the cohesion of the 
nation through the creation of boundaries between Canada and their significant other, 
the United States. Unlike the Scots, however, British Canadians did not share a state 
with their significant other. Rather the perceived aggression and expansionist desires 
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of the United States created the antagonism that runs through British Canadian 
nationalist discourse.  
 
Descent Myths – “The Men of the North” 
As Hobsbawm pointed out, one of the paradoxes of the nation is its actual place in 
modernity against the nationalist’s claim of its place in antiquity.91 One of the classic 
“Invented Traditions” of all nations is the creation myth, or descent myth, placing the 
nation firmly in antiquity. The creation myth is an important element in nationalist 
discourse. Robert Haliburton’s lecture, The Men of the North and their Place in 
history, is one of the best examples of this kind of invented tradition.  
 
Haliburton reviewed the course of the great Empires of history, Egyptian, Assyrian, 
Greek and Roman, arguing that the downfall of each was engineered by a Northern 
race. Northern races, he argued, were “healthy, hardy virtuous, dominant race[s]” 
because of their colder climates. The cold Canadian climate, whilst potentially being 
a problem for business, could create a new northern race in Canada – The Men of the 
North in the New World.92
 
In an attempt to find more than just a climactic basis for the peculiarity of the 
Canadian nation, Haliburton traced the lineage of Canadians back into pre-history. 
Searching for evidence to create a myth of Canadian strength, Haliburton saw the 
answer in the Normans (Norsemen/literally Northmen). The King of the Norsemen, 
Rollo, overran France and held sway over most of North-western Europe. In the 
process he acquired the title the Duke of Normandy. Rollo also claimed to be a 
descendant of the Gods of the North and Forntjotr the old Frost Giant. William the 
Conqueror, who defeated King Harold in 1066, was a Norman and descendant of 
King Rollo. Therefore the monarchy of Britain, with their Norman ancestry, was 
descended from the Norse Gods and the Old Frost Giant.   
 
Here in the new world we, who are sprung from these men of the 
North, are about to form a new dominion in this northern land a 
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worthy home for the Old Frost Giant and a proud domain for his 
Royal Descendant.93
 
By linking Canada to the British Monarchy and the British Monarchy to Normandy, 
through Victoria to William the Conqueror, Haliburton implied that both French and 
English Canadians were of the same origin. This common origin would allow, it was 
hoped, both French and British Canadians to imagine a community linked by ideas 
of kinship, rather than divided by language. It extended the idea of a national 
timeline to mythical history and the Norse Gods, despite the fact that Normandy did 
not provide New France with many colonists. It should be noted that this was 
Canadian nationalism, rather than British Canadian nationalism. A genuine attempt 
was being made to include French Canadians as a part of the Men of the North.  
 
Haliburton was not the only one to attempt to create a foundation for Canadian 
nationality on the basis of their Nordicity. In the early twentieth century, the Group 
of Seven, a group of artists from Ontario, painted the landscape of the Canadian 
north to achieve similar ends through art. The importance of Haliburton is not his 
uniqueness but the context within which he was writing, in the immediate post-
confederation period, with the threat of Nova Scotian secession. By linking 
Canadians to the Norse, Haliburton argued Canadians were one big family and 
should therefore have a sense of responsibility to each other. In other words, given 
the common ancestry of the Quebecois, Ontarians, Nova Scotians and New 
Brunswickians, they should remain in a union with each other. The myth of the 
“Men of the North” symbolised the cohesion of the Canadian nation.  
 
We have seen in this section that nationalist elites assert the right to national self-
determination largely through the use of symbols. These symbols reflect the 
historical experience with the nation’s significant other and as such occupy a central 
place in the nationalist discourse. The symbols distinguish the nation from other 
nations by using unique historical examples. These historical symbols create 
imaginary borders that differentiate the nation from other nations. The creation of a 
significant other showed not only who did not belong to the nation but also who did 
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belong. They clearly highlighted the antagonism central to nationalist discourse and 
thus allowed sense to be made of the contemporary situation. Ultimately the symbols 
attempt to provide the emotive force necessary for support for the nationalist 
discourse to be accepted. 
 
The symbols selected also highlighted the way the two nations had been formed. 
Scottish nationalists were able to draw on a wider range of material from the middle 
ages. Bannockburn was fought nearly 500 years before the War of 1812. The 
creation and maintenance of the boundaries of the territory of the Scottish nation had 
been carried out in the middle ages. The boundaries of the Canadian nation were still 
being created after Confederation in 1867. This is not to say that the Scottish nation 
existed in the middle ages. It merely highlights la longue duree process emphasised 
by ethno-symbolists and perennialists. More importantly, however, they show the use 
of historical materials by nationalist elites. 
 
The power relationship between nation and state is outlined by comparison with 
similar historical examples. As we saw in the previous chapter, misrecognition of 
identity can create notions of inferiority. Nationalist elites will use symbols that 
counteract this inferiority. The success of Scottish forces over the English at 
Bannockburn or the defeat of American forces in the War of 1812, reflect the 
superiority of the national identity over the significant other. In this way the symbols 
reflect the contexts in which they are used. The remainder of this chapter will analyse 
these contexts.  
 
The Politics of Recognition and the significant other 
The recognition of identity and significant others are dominant themes in the 
discourse of nationalist movements. Discourse analysis places emphasis on 
antagonism towards the other. Non-recognition of identity naturally leads to 
antagonism. Identity is negotiated through dialogue with the significant other through 
experience and context. Identity can be negotiated through the significant other in 
two ways. The other can be seen as a contrast or foil. Direct recognition can also be 
sought from the other. Part of this dialogue will inevitably involve the non-
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recognition or mis-recognition of the nation by the other. Either of these reflects back 
to the nation certain notions of oppression and inferiority. These notions of 
inferiority and oppression turn into symbols of superiority and liberty, as we saw 
with Bannockburn and the War of 1812. Non or mis-recognition thus results in the 
articulation of an identity claiming superiority over the significant other. These 
symbols then provide the emotive drive for nationalism. Contemporary problems are 
discussed with reference to the symbols due to the failure to recognise the nation. 
The symbols become the focal point of recognition.  
 
But the contextual element of identity is also important. What is the context in which 
these failures in recognition by the “other” become important? Barth argued that 
ethnic identity is most forcefully expressed when it comes into contact with other 
identities.94 Given the political nature of nationalism it is likely that this contact will 
come in the political arena, especially in multi-national states.  
 
The influence of Irish Home Rule on Scottish Nationalism 
The biggest political issue of the 1880s and 1890s was Irish nationalism. Gladstone’s 
decision to introduce an Irish Home Rule Bill in April 1886 was furiously debated, 
both in the Houses of Parliament and in the outside world. The most contentious 
aspect of the Bill was the lack of provision for the representation of Irish MPs at 
Westminster. With the furore the Bill created, it was little wonder it was defeated in 
the House of Commons in the summer of that year (343 votes against to 313 votes 
for).95 Gladstone introduced a further Irish Home Rule Bill in his next administration 
(1892-4), which included Irish representation at Westminster, but this Bill, although 
carried by the House of Commons, was defeated in the Lords by a massive margin.96
 
Gladstone’s conversion to the cause of Irish Home Rule had numerous consequences 
including the complete fracture of the Liberal Party in Scotland. Several academics 
have argued that the formation of the SHRA was a direct result of the Irish Home 
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Rule Bill being introduced in Parliament.97 There is no doubt that the Bill made 
Home Rule a matter of practical politics and speeded up the formation of a Scottish 
movement. There had, however, been talk of Home Rule for Scotland prior to 1886 
but to no effect.98 The reasons for the formation of the SHRA must be located within 
the immediate context of its formation. 
 
Irish Home Rule formed a key part of the discourse of the SHRA from its inception. 
The campaign for Scottish Home rule was inevitably going to be compared with the 
Irish campaign, in both its good and bad aspects. But the SHRA from the time of its 
formation used the comparison with Ireland to show that Scotland deserved just as 
much attention and recognition as Ireland. The decision to adopt Irish Home Rule as 
policy was seen by Scottish nationalists as creating an illegitimate system of 
governance. In the aftermath of the Reform Act of 1884 and the Redistribution Act 
of 1885, democratic principles would have been at the forefront of nationalists’ 
minds. Democracy creates equal citizens in which everyone’s identity matters. This 
argument also extends to groups and therefore to nations. If within a democratic, 
multi-national state all nations have equality, each must be given equal treatment. As 
Mann argued, failure to institutionalise this equality/democratic principle would lead 
to nationalism.99 This was the key message of the discourse of the Scottish 
nationalists.  
 
The discourse of the SHRA was expressed in terms of the recognition of identity.  
Ireland was given direct recognition by the government of the day. It was this direct 
recognition that Scottish nationalists craved and that led to the formation of the 
SHRA. Thus the United Kingdom state was the other from whom direct recognition 
was sought, despite the fact that through the historical symbols of Scottish identity 
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the SHRA used England as a contrast or foil in the traditional manner of the other. If 
Scotland was to obtain the recognition from the United Kingdom state that the SHRA 
felt it was due, it had to put across the claim that Scotland was just as much a nation 
worthy of recognition as Ireland. Thus from the first publication Scottish Home Rule 
was linked to the Irish movement.  
 
Indeed the very first lines of the first flyer produced by the SHRA referred to the 
Irish Home Rule debate as “the present grave crisis in the political world, when a 
readjustment of the whole legislative machinery of the country is likely to be 
accomplished…”100 This “readjustment,” they argued, must include Home Rule for 
Scotland. In the first petition to the House of Commons in 1886, the SHRA set the 
tone for the discourse that would follow in the next decade or so.  
 
The constitutional changes necessary in the application of this principle, 
require, in the opinion of your Petitioners, to be considered with the utmost 
deliberation, and with reference not only to Ireland, but to each of the United 
Kingdoms…101
 
The decision by Parliament to acknowledge the principle of self-government, which 
it had done with the colonies, but also in the Irish Home Rule Bill debate, led the 
SHRA to argue that Scotland should be given her due recognition. Scotland, they 
argued time and again, was at least equal to Ireland in terms of national status and 
therefore had the right to exercise the right to self-determination through a national 
legislature. The British State was being asked to recognise Scotland’s dignity as a 
nation.  
 
By granting Home Rule to Ireland, the Government was perceived by the SHRA to 
be committing an injustice to the people of Scotland by giving direct recognition of 
the existence of the Irish nation, when not recognising the existence of the Scottish 
nation in similar fashion. Irish Home Rule without a guarantee “that the claim of 
Scotland to a Legislature and Executive Government will be conceded would be 
destructive of the National life of Scotland, an act of treachery towards the Scottish 
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people.”102 The idea that Scotland’s right to self-determination should not be 
recognised when Ireland’s was became inexcusable and called into question the 
legitimacy of the proposed system. The same proposals were described as “an 
injustice to a loyal, industrious, patient and intelligent people”103 and “a most 
monstrous and arrogant assumption.”104
 
Despite the argument above that Scottish Home Rule should be given equality with 
the Irish, the SHRA was not afraid to put across its case in terms which could appear 
to be quite derogatory to the Irish, thus making the Irish a contrast to the Scots. 
Scotland’s claim to nationhood and home rule was presented as being greater than 
that of Ireland’s claim. The historical aspect of the comparison is one clear example 
of this. According to the SHRA, the Irish had never possessed a “real parliament 
which had worked to the satisfaction of the people” unlike Scotland. Instead they 
“enjoyed in Gratton’s far-famed Parliament a Protestant Council, empowered to 
govern a Roman Catholic country.”105 In addition to not having a “real Parliament”, 
Ireland only lost its “fake” Parliament in 1800. By comparison, Scotland had lost 
hers in 1707, a “grievance of the first magnitude.”106 Whilst the SHRA 
acknowledged the Union with Ireland was brought about by “wholesale corruption,” 
they sided with Scotland’s national bard that through the Treaty of Union of 1707, 
Scotland was “bought and sold for English gold.”107 Thus Scotland’s grievances 
against the English were just as great as Ireland’s. 
 
One of the most important aspects of this historical analysis was the assertion that 
Ireland was a conquered province of England, whereas Scotland was “an 
unconquered nation.”108 This is a recurring theme within the SHRA’s discourse, as 
was evident in the use of Bannockburn and the Declaration of Independence as 
historical symbols of national identity. An Ireland brought into Union as a conquered 
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province and Scotland as an independent negotiator in Union was an important 
comparison. Scotland had voluntarily entered the Union and could, therefore, 
withdraw from the British State.  
 
As the two nations entered into a bargain for their mutual advantage as co-
equal partners, they can cancel the agreement whenever it ceases to be of 
advantage to either.109  
  
On all of these counts of national one-up-man-ship, the SHRA argued that if there 
was to be any precedence given by Westminster, then Scotland, on account of having 
endured the indignity of losing a “real” Parliament 100 years before Ireland, should 
be given Home Rule first. But, despite the rhetoric, the discourse of the group was 
consistent from the start. Both Scotland and Ireland were equal nations and home 
rule should be given to each of the four divisions of the United Kingdom. If Ireland 
was to be given direct recognition by the state then so should Scotland.  
 
The financial aspect of home rule was another key theme, and again the comparison 
with Ireland was important. Unlike the pamphlets that dealt with the financial aspect 
alone, however, the comparisons with Ireland were concise. The comparisons 
revolved around taxation and government spending.  
 
Now as to taxation, it is notorious that Ireland contributes to the Imperial 
Exchequer a very much smaller revenue than Scotland does…If then she 
contributes so little in comparison to Scotland, the returns to her ought to be 
correspondingly small. The reverse is the case, however: the returns to 
Scotland are only about one-fifth of what is given to Ireland.110
 
This is the serious side of the nationalism displayed by the SHRA. None of the 
nationalist rhetoric of the moral objections and historic antagonism discussed above. 
Instead we have a genuine financial grievance that could make a real difference to 
the people of Scotland were it to be rectified. But at the root of this grievance was 
still the demand for recognition and the rights of Scotland to be vindicated. Scotland 
was overtaxed compared to Ireland and yet did not benefit from, for example, the 
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same levels of military spending. Due recognition and equality were demanded by 
the SHRA through home rule all round.  
 
An altogether more serious issue was the lack of Parliamentary attention to Scottish 
matters. Whilst this will be discussed at length later in this chapter, the comparison 
with Irish Parliamentary time again highlights the key issue of recognition.  
 
The time given to Scottish business in the House of Commons is a mere 
fraction of what is given to Ireland; in other words, for one hour Scotland 
gets, Ireland gets twelve. The business of Scotland, moreover, being much 
greater than Ireland’s by reason of her varied industries, makes the wrong 
done to Scotland all the greater.111
 
The Scottish nation, for the SHRA, being more diverse, with the implications of 
being more useful, or fruitful, to the British State than Ireland, meant that the failure 
to give parity in home rule was even more of an indignity to the Scottish nation. Irish 
national identity was recognised by the government but Scotland’s was not, thus the 
campaign by the SHRA.  
 
The national campaign for a Secretary for Scotland, conducted in the early part of the 
1880s, had been a similar, and ultimately successful, attempt to gain direct 
recognition for Scotland and the neglect of Scottish business. But again the despair 
of the campaigners in the early days led to comparisons with Ireland. Following 
Gladstone’s rejection of his advice to appoint a Scot to a Junior Lordship of the 
Treasury post, Rosebery wrote to his friend Edward Hamilton, 
 
…I confess I think Scotland is as usual treated abominably. Justice for Ireland 
means everything done for her even to the payment of the natives’ debts. 
Justice to Scotland means insulting neglect. I leave for Scotland next week 
with the view of blowing up a prison or shooting a policeman…112
 
This was of course a reference to the Kilmainham Treaty, the Manchester Martyrs 
and the bombing of Clerkenwell Prison by Fenians in 1867. But with the creation of 
the post of Scottish Secretary in 1885, the situation in Parliament with regards to 
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Scottish legislation had, from the SHRA’s perspective, not improved. Scottish 
nationalists, in contrast to Irish nationalists, had been peaceful in their protests. This 
theme was raised on a number of occasions by the SHRA.  
 
In the 1890s indignation was truly aroused on hearing that Gladstone intended, in his 
second Irish Home Rule bill, for Irish MPs to keep their eighty seats at Westminster. 
In a letter to Gladstone, the SHRA, withdrawing support for the Liberal Leader, 
argued that because of his intention to deal with Ireland alone, “the Irish would 
become masters of the British Parliament.”113 The SHRA, as well as predicting Irish 
mastery at Westminster, told Gladstone of their indignation “at the neglect with 
which, although a Scottish M.P., you are treating Scotland.”114 This led to a review 
of the Scots views of the Irish, some of which we have noted above.  
 
There is undoubtedly a kindly feeling in Scotland towards the Irish …But it 
would require an angelic meekness- to which no Scotsman ever pretended- to 
submit patiently to the provision – now embodied in the Bill, that Ireland is 
not only to have a fully equipped legislature in Dublin for the transaction of 
its own domestic business, but eighty representatives in the House of 
Commons – eight more than Scotland has – who would have the power … to 
dominate the domestic business of Scotland.115
 
Essentially this was an Irish version of the West Lothian Question.116 If Ireland was 
to be given Home Rule what right did Irish MPs at Westminster have to vote on 
matters that were the sole preserve of Scotland (or England and Wales). Likewise, 
however, the removal of Irish MPs from Westminster would result in cries of “no 
taxation without representation.” The legitimacy of the proposed system was not 
only an issue for Scottish nationalists but also for the Irish.  
 
Again, the rational argument is accompanied by language which could be interpreted 
as national petulance, or at least nationalist petulance, but which masks a more 
serious issue: the recognition of Scotland’s right to legislation without interference 
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from, in this case, the Irish. This time the demand for recognition is accompanied by 
the assertion of the right of self-determination of the Scottish nation. Each of these 
examples asserted the superiority of Scots identity over the Irish. The Irish were used 
as the other in the sense of a contrast or foil in which the superiority of Scottish 
identity and therefore Scotland’s claims to a Parliament were clearly highlighted.  
 
Another aspect of this plea for direct recognition was the comparison with the 
colonies, particularly pertinent for this study:  
 
Compared with the colonies Scotland is a gigantic weather-beaten oak, 
having its roots firmly fixed among craggy rocks, and its knotted limbs 
toughened by exposure to ten thousand gales. Yet the colonies, which are but 
saplings of a few years growth, are entrusted with greater privileges in the 
form of self-government than the motherland that planted them, and which is 
the cradle and nursery of brave and free-men – the land that showed to an 
astonished world how a small yet brave race, which had determined to be 
free, could, against the greatest odds, maintain that freedom against one of the 
most powerful and ruthless nations in Christendom.117
 
Again we see the comparison of the treatment of other “nations” by the state being 
used in an attempt by Scottish nationalists to gain direct recognition from the United 
Kingdom state. It was bad enough that Scotland was treated as a province of England 
but to be given less recognition than the colonies of the Empire it helped form and 
maintain was a scandal. The legitimacy of the Empire depended on giving Scottish 
settlers in Canada, Australia, New Zealand and so on, the right to govern their own 
affairs. Since the loss of the American Colonies in the late eighteenth century, one of 
the principles of the British Empire was to devolve power to British settlers wherever 
they may be. The SHRA argued this should also apply to the United Kingdom state 
and used the point to highlight the problems of legitimacy at home. 
 
A final aspect of the recognition argument regarded the perceived non-recognition by 
the English of Scotland as part of Great Britain. In the late 1880s, the SHRA issued a 
Protest against the use of “England” and “English” for “Britain” and “British.” They 
claimed,  
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Of late years a custom has sprung up of applying the names England and 
English not only to Britain, but also to the whole Empire, its Peoples and its 
Institutions – a custom which practically demands that Scotsmen should 
cease to be Scotsmen and consent to be Englishmen, that Scotland should be 
blotted from the map and reappear as the Northern Counties of England and 
that the Articles of the Treaty of Union, which so carefully provided for the 
adoption of the common name “Britain” and “British,” should be 
dishonourably set aside.118
 
The SHRA argued English egotism and inability to consider “the feelings, habits and 
the ideas of others” as well as ignorance of historical fact had led to the incorrect use 
of England for Britain. The name Great Britain, they argued, had been established by 
the Treaty of Union. But continual breach of the Treaty left Scotland as a nation, 
“being robbed the fame of great names, and the memory of brave deeds.”119 Scottish 
nationalists appealed  
  
…to the noble minded to do justice between Scotland and other portions of 
the Empire- refraining from insult and paying the respect due to Treaty rights 
and the dictates of honour.120
 
This discourse, one that was carried on throughout the period under study is 
important in understanding the demand for recognition by the Scottish nationalist 
elite in the late nineteenth century. On the one hand they are demanding equality 
with England in the Union, and on the other they are demanding recognition of 
Scottish distinctiveness and contribution to the Union/Empire. The demands for both 
are made through the rhetoric of dignity and honour. 
 
The campaign for the correct use of nomenclature when Britain was the subject of 
discussion carried on throughout the history of the first Scottish Home Rule 
Association. In 1896 Theodore Napier claimed the misuse of English instead of 
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British rendered the Treaty of Union ipso facto defunct.121 Indeed it was more than a 
breach of a contract. Both Napier and John Romans argued it was a slur on the 
honour of Scots.122 In 1898, Napier organised a petition containing over a hundred 
thousand signatures which was sent to Queen Victoria, complaining against the 
misuse of the National names. Lord Balfour of Burleigh, the then Conservative 
Scottish Secretary, sent the official reply advising that Her Majesty would pay no 
heed to the matter. Napier’s response clearly showed his anger and irritation. 
 
The cumbrous title “Great Britain & Ireland”, though quite correct in official 
documents, is not suitable for ordinary discourse; but I submit “Britain” and 
“British” are; and nothing but a hypercritical spirit would object to the words, 
which to the ordinary subjects of Her Majesty, applies to the whole Empire. 
Whether this be so or not, certainly “England” and “English” do not convey 
the same meaning and are only used to gratify the intolerable arrogance of the 
English people. 123
  
On the face of it, this may seem like a petty grievance compared to the decision to 
give Ireland Home Rule but not Scotland. As David McCrone claims, however, we 
have noted the “power of/in language” in relation to gender relations.124 The power 
of/in language when discussing nations can also be important. The relevance of the 
nomenclature issue can be gauged from the continued interest in the modern day. In 
fact it lies at the heart of the recognition argument. Taylor argued that identities are 
developed in response to a loss of dignity.125 Failure to recognise the important role 
Scotland played within the Union and the Empire was a clear insult to Scottish 
dignity and honour. The response to this breach of dignity was the creation of a 
nationalist discourse using symbols of Scottish identity that emphasised Scotland’s 
superiority vis-à-vis the English.  
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The formation of the SHRA was a cry for recognition of the Scottish nation by a 
nationalist elite, in terms of the recognition of Irish national identity had been given 
by the government of the day. This desire for recognition was articulated through 
historical comparison of Scotland and Ireland and the symbols of Scottish national 
identity. But the drive for the creation of the SHRA was a political act by the 
Gladstone government, the Irish Home Rule bill. The bill proposed to give back to 
Ireland some of the powers it had lost in 1801. In doing so it made it politically 
acceptable for a Scottish Home Rule Association to be formed. It also created a 
situation where the legitimacy of the proposals was called into question on 
democratic grounds. The SHRA claimed equality of Scotland and Ireland hence there 
should be equal treatment regarding Home Rule. Here then we have a situation 
where a political act by the state was the trigger that sparked nationalism. 
 
What was unusual about the formation of the SHRA was the action of the state. 
Gladstone’s first Irish Home Rule Bill would have had no direct impact upon the 
governance of the Scottish nation. Indeed it had been argued that solution of the Irish 
problem was the answer to the problem of Scottish legislative blockages.126 This 
then leads us back to the argument that the formation of a nationalist group, whilst a 
response to the action of the state, was at the same time a direct request for equal 
recognition by the other.   
 
The Influence of the United States on British Canadian Nationalism 
National identity, as we have seen, is usually expressed in terms of what we are not. 
Significant others act as a foil or contrast, as we saw in the use of the Wars of 
Independence in Scotland. But in other cases the other is someone from whom direct 
recognition is requested. The “other” will generally have been an enemy of past 
conflicts and indeed may have invaded the nation’s territory, but given the continued 
existence of the nation, the “other” will always have been repelled and this will 
become a matter of pride for the nation, in many cases the specific battles will 
become cultural symbols of the nation’s independence and sovereignty, as we saw in 
the opening section of this chapter, Scotland and Bannockburn being one example. 
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These cultural symbols are called upon in times of national trouble in order to rouse 
the nation in readiness for the next fight.  
 
Canada’s significant other was, and still is, the United States of America. Given the 
length of their contiguous border, the economic success of the United States, and 
their common colonial origin, it would be surprising indeed if there had not been a 
few disputes along the way. America’s belief in its manifest destiny and the war with 
Mexico in the mid nineteenth century127 would have been enough to worry Canadian 
nationalists had there not already been a history of invasions from south of the 
Border. These invasions, the fleeing of the United Empire Loyalists in the 1780s, the 
War of 1812 and the Fenian raids of 1866, were constantly quoted by British 
Canadian nationalists as critical junctures in Canadian history.  
 
The battles with the United States, however, were not the only concern that British 
Canadian nationalists had regarding their southern neighbour. Nor was it the only 
way in which the United States was portrayed as an enemy, contrast or foil. The 
campaign over the direction of Canada’s trade in the late 1880s was seen as an 
attempt to entice Canada into a political union with the United States and was 
resisted by a nationalist campaign. The battles that had been fought in the late 
eighteenth and early nineteenth century across the border were oft quoted to show 
that the Commercial Union movement was just a sneaky attempt to achieve the same 
goal, the annexation of Canada. George Denison, in his speech at the inaugural 
meeting of the Toronto branch of the Imperial Federation League in Canada (IFLC), 
cited the flight of the United Empire Loyalists, the War of 1812 and the Fenian raid 
of 1866 as examples of the United States being “an aggressive and grasping 
country.”128 Describing the leaders of the Commercial Union movement as 
“traitors”, Denison argued that the United States  
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…wanted to make Canadians believe that an extended market would benefit 
them. Their real desire, however, was to make Canada a slaughter market for 
their goods, and by crippling Canadian industries eventually drive the people 
of the Dominion into such a condition that they would be glad to accept 
annexation as an alternative to absolute ruin.129
 
As well as being aggressors then, the United States is portrayed here by Denison as 
underhand and sneaky. But Denison, the British Canadian nationalist, was wise to 
their ways and fought tooth and nail to ensure the Canadian public knew what Uncle 
Sam was about.  
 
Denison was not the only British Canadian nationalist to follow this line. J. Hague, in 
a pamphlet written in response to a continental union speech given in Boston, put 
forward the argument that the Commercial union movement was a United States 
conspiracy “to destroy our hopes of national development, and to compel us by force 
of arms to serve as “hewers of wood and drawers of water” to our conquerors.”130 
Hague saw the reasons for the conspiracy in a slightly different light, however.   
 
The arrogance shown in the present demand that a foreign power shall control 
our destinies is one result of the subjugation of the south by the North in the 
late war…131
 
The trade debate will be analysed in more depth in later chapters, but it is important 
to note here that the debate was not simply about trade with a neighbour. The 
nationalist response was framed in the rhetoric of the aggressive “other” using 
underhand methods to wrestle sovereignty away from the Canadian nation. The 
response was couched in terms that asked the United States for reasonable trade, 
whilst at the same time demanding recognition for the existence of another nation on 
the North American continent, Canada. Again we have the “other” being used in two 
different ways. In the first instance the United States are portrayed as a contrast to 
the Canadians, disloyal to the crown, weak, and politically unstable, followed by an 
articulation of an identity that shows the strength, loyalty and stability of the 
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Canadian nation. It was for this strong, loyal, stable nation that British Canadian 
nationalists sought the recognition of the United States.  
 
The theme of American aggression had been around from the early days of Canada 
First. Indeed the Campaign for the North West was in large part an attempt to ensure 
the Americans did not occupy the territory first. Manifest Destiny, whilst with 
hindsight probably never really threatened Canada, was at the time a perceived threat 
to the survival of the Dominion and was used as a propaganda tool by Canada First. 
Westward expansion through the prairies without the admission of Manitoba into the 
Dominion would have been impossible. Canada First saw the “revolt” at Red River, 
with the advertised support it had from the United States (through the newspaper of 
the provisional government), as a massive threat to the future integrity of Canada.132 
Add the interference at Red River to the catalogue of border incursions since the 
Declaration of Independence and the concerns of British Canadian nationalists were 
justifiable.  
 
But there were some calls for a mediation of the concerns. William Canniff, writing 
in 1875, argued 
 
…the United States would not attempt to force Canada into the Union. [But] 
it is true the attitude that nation has always maintained towards Canada has 
been uniformly unfriendly, often actually hostile. Indeed the history of the 
United States is prominently characterised by unswerving efforts to obtain 
possession of British America….in a multitude of ways, efforts have been put 
forth to control the destiny of this country by indoctrinating Canadians with 
the theory of Manifest Destiny.133
 
Canniff, then, argued that there was no real military threat from the south, despite 
almost constant historical efforts on the part of the United States to invade Canada. 
Yet, Canniff still portrayed the constant efforts of the United States to annex Canada 
in terms of the non-recognition of the Canadian nation by the United States. In 
articulating a picture of a young Canada defending itself against aggression, Canniff 
used the images of defence from past conflict to instil a belief that Canada had before 
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and could again defend itself from the aggressive neighbour, thus protecting its 
sovereignty.  
 
One key difference between Canada and the United States, according to the Canada 
First nationalists, was their geographical position on the American continent. 
Canadians were a Northern people, “the true outcrop of human nature, more manly, 
more real, than the weak marrow bones superstition of an effeminate south.”134 This 
was, of course, a reference to Haliburton’s Men of the North creation myth. Whilst 
the invention of tradition is an important feature of all nationalist discourse, its 
significance goes beyond the creation myth in this case. In specifically seeing 
Canada as a northern country, it just as specifically excluded Americans. In arguing 
that Northern races were strong, hardy and virtuous, the myth implied their southern 
neighbours were weak, fragile and immoral. Here then we have a classic example of 
the “other” being used as a contrast with the nation, allowing the nation to be seen in 
its best possible light.  
 
On a more practical level, the United States was also used to show what was best in 
the Canadian political system. James Young, one of the few Canadian nationalists to 
advocate independence, argued that the Canadian political system combined the 
federal system of the United States, with the “fully matured principles of British 
Parliamentary government and I know none under which people enjoy truer liberty 
or so directly control the actions of their representatives.”135 But Young continues, 
using the failure of the 1890 election in the States as an example. The Republicans, 
had been defeated, ostensibly due to the McKinley Tariff, a range of protectionist 
measures which restricted imports and increased prices, and yet the change over in 
Congress, which continued to legislate, did not take place for four months.  
 
When the 52nd Congress meets, the Executive and the Senate will be at war 
with the House of Representatives, the former Republican and the latter 
democratic, and even the McKinley bill, against which the nation so loudly 
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protested, will most likely be kept on the statute book in defiance of the 
overwhelming vote of the people against it.136
 
But of course nothing so tyrannical or absurd could happen in Canada, the land of the 
virtuous and free. In 1878, the Liberals were defeated at the polls, Alexander 
McKenzie resigned and John A. Macdonald was asked to form a government “and 
thus within thirty days the will of the Canadian people as expressed at the polls 
became the policy of the country.”137
 
Here again we have a classic use of the “other” as a negative contrast to the positive 
aspects of the nation, in this case the political system. This is a recurring theme 
throughout the pamphlet literature of the British Canadian nationalists, and was used 
as a way of instilling pride in Canadian institutions, particularly when measured 
against a nation as powerful as the United States.  
 
We have seen so far that the other can be used in different ways in a nationalist 
discourse. In one sense the United States is used antagonistically, the symbols of 
previous wars clearly marking them out as the other to be concerned about. On the 
other hand the use of those same symbols where Canada had overcome invasions and 
border incursions by the United States highlighted the superiority of the Canadian 
character. The contrasts between the morals, politics and legal system of the United 
States and Canada showed the use of the United States as a foil to show the 
superiority of Canadian identity.  
 
Canada also used the British Empire as a significant other, claiming direct 
recognition of Canada as a key part of the Empire, not just a colony. As with Scottish 
grievances against the use of English instead of British, the Canadians loathed the 
use of the “colony” when Canada was being discussed. William Foster and the 
Canada First movement claimed “Peculiar notions are suggested by the word 
‘colony’ so that it requires no great dexterity in intention to use it as an efficient term 
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of reproach”138 It is hardly surprising that the term colony was used in such 
disparaging tones, claimed Foster, when the motherland sends all her criminals, 
impoverished and religious zealots. 
 
A young country is peculiarly sensitive to outside criticism. A very few 
words spoken in our favour by a stranger give us pleasure; and a very few 
malicious words uttered to our detriment irritate sorely.139
Although less vociferous in their protests than the Scots, there is still a clear sense 
that Canada’s dignity was being attacked by the use of the term colony. In this case it 
was, in Taylor’s terms, a matter of mis-recognition rather than non-recognition.140 
An identity was being projected onto Canadians as Colonists, one that nationalists 
felt had notions of inferiority and oppression. The nationalists identified this assault 
on their dignity and responded to it through the use of symbols of identity and 
invented tradition, in this case by seeking a basis for national sentiment. The 
invented traditions of loyalty to the state, that Foster contended, would help imagine 
the social cohesion of the nation, and identify Canada’s status as a sovereign nation.  
Canadian nationalists’ ire was clearly directed against the metropolis. Both Denison 
and Foster argued elsewhere in their speeches that Canada was a senior member of 
the Empire.141 As William Canniff, a member of the Canada First Committee and of 
the Canadian National Association, argued in 1875, British Canadian nationalists 
would “no longer tolerate imported supercilious mediocrity” as a colony. “They will 
be satisfied with nothing less than equality with the people of Great Britain.142 
Dominion status, with the associated responsibility of self-government mattered a 
great deal to Canadians and to be called a colony and equated with an African colony 
irritated sorely. 
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But despite these protestations of the 1870s, the situation had not really changed by 
the following decade. J.D. Edgar, another member of Canada First and an MP in the 
Federal Parliament, complained in 1885  
 
…that the good people of England know little and care less about 
Canada. They know all about the United States, all about its 
institutions and its history, and honor its citizens. Not one in a 
hundred has any knowledge of our history or institutions. We are 
received, very properly as colonists, and are welcomed by John Bull 
with patronizing politeness, not unmingled with genuine surprise that 
we know how to behave ourselves at all.143
 
This is an interesting example of the general trend regarding the nomenclature of 
Canada by the metropolis. Here we have the introduction of the United States as the 
“other”, in much the same manner as Ireland was used by the SHRA. The direct 
recognition given the United States as a nation by the British was seen as the 
benchmark level of recognition. British Canadian nationalists wanted Britain to give 
Canada the same level of recognition given to her Southern neighbour. The slight 
was all the greater when the United States played the traditional role of the other in 
the British Canadian nationalist’s discourse.   
 
The nature of the nation’s relationship with its significant other is vitally important in 
any nationalist discourse. National identity is generated from experience of 
significant others or in dialogue with or against them. Significant others are used as 
symbols to establish boundaries that signify who belongs and who does not belong to 
the nation. All discussions that follow the use of these symbols are based on the 
understanding of the relationship between the nation and the other. The identity 
expressed by the SHRA emerged from their experience of being neglected by the 
United Kingdom state in contrast to Ireland. The nationalist response was to demand 
due recognition of Scottish national identity from the United Kingdom state on the 
basis that Scotland’s historical position was stronger than Ireland’s, having entered 
the Union as a partner, not a conquered province. Thus the context of the experience 
led to the specific formulation of the nationalist discourse. Notions of inferiority and 
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oppression were compared to differential treatment of others by the state. These 
notions were converted into historical symbols, Bannockburn, strong Parliaments and 
healthy nations. An identity was articulated that contended Scotland was anything 
but inferior or oppressed.  
 
The Canadian reaction to the other was slightly different as Canada and the United 
States had no formal political relationship. In this case, British Canadian nationalists 
articulated an identity that used the United States as a contrast, with a poor political 
system, disloyal to the Crown, and an inherently weak and effeminate population on 
account of their position in the south of the continent. The experience of repeated 
invasions, the legacy of the United Empire Loyalists and fact of confederation as a 
defence against United States expansion led to the articulation of an identity 
antithetical to American values. The notions of inferiority and oppression in relation 
to the United States led to the use of symbols to express a superior identity.   
 
Nationalism and Political Legitimacy – Governance and nationality 
Nationalism is ultimately a political discussion about the relationship between the 
nation and the state. Nationalists want to alter that political relationship in some way, 
whether through devolution or through complete separation from the existing state. 
But nationalism does not happen spontaneously. There must be some form of 
mechanism that sparks the formation of a nationalist movement. Part of this 
mechanism is the desire for recognition. This is important in two respects. Firstly, as 
we have seen above, the recognition of identity gives a sense of self worth to an 
individual or the nation. But more importantly, when an identity is recognised by the 
state the interests of that particular group are more likely to be represented 
effectively. Thus recognition of a national identity will lead to effective governance 
of the nation by the existing state. If the governmental needs of the nation are not 
satisfied, the legitimacy of the system will be called into question and a nationalist 
reaction will result. The degree of satisfaction with the existing arrangements needed 
to prevent a nationalist reaction will depend on context, the historical relations 
between the nation and state, the issues of the day and so on. The differences 
between Scotland and Canada highlight the problems states and empires can face 
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when dealing with nations. For Scotland, the problem was neglect by the state when 
there were issues to be dealt with. In Canada the issue was too much interference 
from the Imperial state without taking into account the interests of the Canadian 
nation. In both instances the failure of the nation/state relationship through neglect or 
an action of the state prompted the nationalist response.  
 
Neglect and Mismanagement of Scottish Affairs  
The key grievance of the SHRA was the neglect and mismanagement of Scottish 
business at Westminster. Whilst it was noted above that the campaign for Scottish 
Home Rule was about recognition, this particular aspect of the nationalist discourse 
revolved around the issue of political power, i.e., who should have control of purely 
Scottish affairs. The crux of the argument was that Scotland, as an unconquered 
country, freely negotiated and ceded sovereignty to a British, not English, 
Parliament. The failure of this Parliament to legislate for Scotland’s needs raised 
doubts about the legitimacy of the system. Scottish affairs, they claimed, had to be 
returned to a Scottish national legislature where there would be sufficient 
representation of Scottish national interests. The dominance of English and Irish 
MPs meant Scottish business was both neglected and mismanaged at Westminster.  
 
According to Charles Waddie, honorary secretary of the SHRA, by the late 
nineteenth century, Parliament looked after the affairs of the Empire and India, all 
the outlying dependencies, watched over our army and navy, foreign affairs, and the 
domestic affairs of England, Scotland, Ireland and Wales. 
 
Need it be wondered at that the whole machinery has broken down 
hopelessly in the attempt to grapple with such a mass of work.144
 
William Mitchell, in much the same vein, blamed Ireland, the Empire and the 
increasing work of the modern bureaucratic state for the impossibility of 
Westminster to undertake the work required.145 But Scotland was not the only nation 
to lose; English and Welsh legislation also suffered.  
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This point was acknowledged with the call for Home Rule, not just for Scotland but 
for each of the four nations of the United Kingdom. The neglect of Scottish business, 
however, had led, in part, to the formation of the SHRA. Scottish business, not 
English, was “delayed until past midnight and received little attention when it was 
reached.”146 In a letter from Mitchell to his electoral candidate in 1886, he asked 
why Scots should accept,    
 
…as I suppose you would ask us to do with gratitude – the fag ends of odd 
nights for Scottish business, in which it gets no assistance but occasional 
obstruction and many a jeer, from English and Irish members? You must 
know, as I do well, that Scottish legislation conducted in such hugger-mugger 
fashion is anything but satisfactory.147
 
The neglect of Scottish business was clear to see for the SHRA. As a result some 
serious questions had not been addressed despite them having been keenly debated 
in Scotland. According to one pamphlet, “Land, Law, and Licensing Reform; Game 
Laws; Police Bill; the Church Question; Educational Improvement…” were all 
matters in urgent need of attention.148 All were purely Scottish matters. Indeed the 
Church question was particularly important for the Scottish nationalists, being one of 
the Trinity of Scottish institutions supposedly protected by the Treaty of Union.  
 
The disestablishment of the Church of Scotland had been debated among religious 
groups since the late 1860s, but had only really taken the form of a national and 
political debate on the election of the Liberals in 1880. Public rallies were held and 
Dick Peddie, the member for Kilmarnock, raised motions in the House of Commons 
for the disestablishment of the Kirk.149 Despite the motions being defeated, they led 
to the formation of the Church Interests Committee, a Tory pressure group led by 
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Lord Balfour of Burleigh.150 The Scottish Liberal organisation had split over the 
issue and the 1885 election saw the question become a test case as in thirteen of 
Scotland’s constituencies, Church Liberals stood against disestablishers from the 
radical wing of the Liberal Party. In these cases, the Tory candidate would often 
stand aside.151 But the Liberals were unable to form a government in 1885 and 
handed power to the Tories. Further motions for disestablishment were raised in the 
Commons in 1890 and 1892, this time with the support of Gladstone. Despite the 
fact that the 1892 motion was defeated by the Commons, it had been supported by 
47 of the 72 Scots MPs.152  
 
But for the SHRA, Westminster was not competent to disestablish the Church, even 
had any legislation been passed. There was no doubt from the strength of feeling that 
a full debate was required, but the SHRA argued such a debate should be held in a 
Scottish parliament. The Church had been established by the Scottish Parliament 
prior to the Treaty of Union, and had been protected as the Established national 
church by that Treaty. The only body, therefore, competent to disestablish the Kirk 
was a Scottish legislature.153 Despite this, however, the United Kingdom state had 
interfered with the governance of the Church by passing the Patronage Act in 1712, 
which allowed the Patron of the Parish to select the next minister, an act church rules 
stated was the province of the Council of Elders in conjunction with the Presbytery. 
This had led to the first schism in the Kirk, with the formation of the Secession 
Church, but the SHRA argued the Patronage Act ultimately led to the Disruption of 
1843 and the formation of the Free Presbyterian Church. 154 This treatment of the 
Church by the United Kingdom state had, according to the SHRA, “lamentable 
effects on the religious and family life of the country…”155
 
The Church is Scotland’s own property: she owes nothing to England for it. 
Then why should Englishmen have a finger in her Kirk pie? No, let 
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Disestablishment, if it does come, be carried out by Scotland’s ain 
bairns…We do not argue that the State Church of Scotland should be above 
the power and control of the Scottish People, but with the solemn Treaty of 
Union before us, we hold most decidedly that no Englishman or Irishman has 
the shadow of a right to touch it.156
 
The disestablishment campaign, whilst one of the key national issues in the late 
nineteenth century, was important for the SHRA as an example of an issue that was 
purely Scottish but was being neglected by Westminster, whilst paradoxically 
arguing that the only competent authority to deal with the issue under the terms of 
the Treaty of Union was a Scottish legislature.  
 
Here we have a failure by the state to act, despite vigorous debate in Scotland on the 
matter. This failure to act, not just on one issue, but on a range of issues led the 
SHRA to call into question the legitimacy of the existing system of government. The 
United Kingdom state in failing to represent Scottish interests, had created an 
illegitimate state. Guibernau has argued that illegitimate states tend to have a 
dominant nation and the state will attempt to homogenise the nations within their 
territory.157 But illegitimacy in a multi-national state can also stem not from attempts 
to homogenise but by a simple failure to recognise each national identity and enact 
legislation that the nation desires. The lack of a legitimate system of government, 
combined with the cultural argument regarding recognition of Scottish identity, thus 
provided the trigger for a Scottish nationalist discourse.  In other words, the failure 
of the United Kingdom state to recognise Scottish national identity led to the failure 
to represent Scottish political interests. Thus, political context and the failure of 
recognition led to the articulation of a nationalist discourse critical of the state. 
 
The disestablishment issue is typical of the discourse of the SHRA regarding the 
neglect of the sovereign duties at Westminster. But more important than 
Westminster neglect was the implementation of legislation against the wishes of 
Scots MPs. The Patronage Act of 1712 mentioned above was seen as misuse of 
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power by Westminster. But the SHRA was quick to point to further misdemeanours 
by the United Kingdom state.  
 
The main theme of their complaint was the manner in which Scots MPs were 
outnumbered at Westminster. This was noted in the section on Irish Home Rule. If 
the Government wanted to vote down a motion on a Scottish matter it could 
generally count on the English MPs to do the job. John Romans outlined the position 
clearly, 
 
It matters not whether the question is in connection with our Fishing 
industry, our Mining, our Land, our Church, Education or our Laws, all must 
be made to conform to the pre-conceived notions of John Bull, whose 
Parliament is so overburdened with work that he has no time to spare for 
Scotland. He counts upon a division vote – 465 to Scotland’s 72 – hence we 
are always at the mercy of our Southern Partner – a position which our heroic 
ancestors never contemplated, and would only have submitted to when 
prostrate in death.158
 
We have already seen that English MPs voted down a motion supported by a 
majority of Scots MPs to disestablish the Kirk, but this was not the only occasion 
when the English majority overruled Scots MPs on Scottish matters. In 1890, the 
Local Government Bill was introduced. Some clauses of the bill relating to Police, 
licensing, rights of way and land use, to name but a few, were supported by a 
majority of the Scots MPs but opposed by a majority of the House of Commons.159 
This majority was composed of  
 
…Englishmen who neither understood the question nor will listen to the 
discussion of the Scottish members who do, but on division without hearing 
the debate, crowd in and outvote them.160
 
The SHRA claimed this position was untenable. They argued the effect of being 
outnumbered by the English in a joint assembly was to relegate Scotland to a county 
of England. It meant the “subjection of Scotland to England, and of Scottish rights 
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and interests, as well as honour, to that of England…”161 But to some in the SHRA it 
meant even worse. Scotland, they claimed, was “in her religious, educational, social, 
and political life, as entirely under the domination of English opinion as if she were a 
conquered province.”162
 
Here we have a different but related political context from the issue of the 
disestablishment of the Kirk. The important issue here is not the neglect of Scottish 
business but the interference in purely Scottish business. The resultant political 
nationalism is the same, but the political action of the state, the context, is different. 
Again, the interference is linked with notions of dignity and recognition: Scotland’s 
authenticity was at stake unless the United Kingdom state, with its English majority, 
recognised Scotland’s national identity. Failure to recognise Scottish identity led to a 
further failure to represent Scotland’s interests effectively. Failure to recognise 
Scottish identity led to a breakdown in state legitimacy.  
 
As a result of this breakdown in legitimacy, the SHRA asserted Scotland’s right to 
national self-determintation. Representatives of the Scottish people had decided on a 
course of action. According to the principles of democracy and self-determination 
there should have been no interference from any other nation. But English and Irish 
MPs ignored the wishes of the majority of Scots MPs. This illustrates the dominance 
of one nation in a multi-national state mentioned by Guibernau. Not only did 
England have dominance in numerical terms but in using that dominance to force 
measures through that Scots did not want, they displayed the lack of recognition of 
identity that only dominance can bring.  
 
The problem for the SHRA led to the obvious solution of Home Rule, but also led to 
some theorising by, for example, Waddie on the nature of unions between two or 
more nations. Particular emphasis was made on the notion of equality and 
sovereignty.  
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When States enter into a Federation, they surrender a portion of their natural 
rights, but all must surrender alike, for if one has a preponderating voice in 
the assembly, the others become her vassals.163  
 
This was clearly a reference to the problem of Scotland being outnumbered in the 
Imperial Parliament. The solution of Home Rule all round and an imperial 
federation, as favoured by the SHRA, would show much greater equality in the 
Imperial parliament between the four home nations and the Dominions of the 
Empire.   
 
The presumption on the part of the English that they could ignore and abuse the 
sovereignty of the Scottish members of Parliament who acted for the Scottish nation 
in the joint parliament was seen as completely unacceptable. Again the idea that 
Scotland had not been forced into the Union, but had negotiated her way into the 
bargain and therefore remained unconquered, became an important symbol of 
Scottish sovereignty. This symbol, along with the other cultural markers of Scottish 
independence was constantly referred to in pamphlets discussing the failure of 
Westminster to listen to the representatives of the Scottish people. Bannockburn in 
particular was frequently referred to in the fight for Home Rule.  
 
Now let Scotsmen of this generation pause and consider if they are doing 
their duty to their country, and are they prepared to transmit this priceless 
boon of public liberty to their children. Are Scotsmen as free now as they 
were in 1314 to direct the destinies of their country…To be more particular, 
can Scotsmen pass laws for themselves, or must they submit all their 
measures to the approval of Englishmen?164
 
The above historical discussion has highlighted the specific political grievances of 
the SHRA. We have shown why they believed the system of government in the 
United Kingdom was no longer legitimate, at least for Scotland. This aspect of the 
discourse relates to who has the power to legislate for Scotland. The state, as the 
sovereign entity in a territory, must maintain legitimate rule to prevent the possibility 
of insurrection, rebellion or revolution. The source of this sovereignty is the people, 
or in the modern world, the nation. Representatives are elected by the nation to a 
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parliament and they must act in the interests of the nation. Failure to do so will result 
in the representatives being voted out at the next election. But when the nation is in a 
union with another nation, in our case England, and the power and authority of the 
Scottish representatives is overridden by another nation or nations the legitimacy of 
the system has been lost. Multi-national states are not necessarily illegitimate. Rather 
the importance of the concept lies in their potential for illegitimacy. The dominance 
by one nation over the other in performing the functions of the state will create the 
illegitimacy of the system. It is at this point that nationalism will arise. 
 
Nationalism, therefore, is not about the congruity of nation and state but rather the 
ability of a sovereign nation to obtain legitimate government by a state. If the state 
carries out the wishes of the nation in the majority of cases, and does not neglect the 
legislative and administrative needs of the nation then there is no problem. But no 
other nation should be able to have a controlling voice in matters that affect Scotland 
alone and Scottish matters should not be neglected. These two different, but related, 
political contexts were both articulated by the SHRA in the late nineteenth century. 
The Scottish nation was sovereign. Evidence for this had been provided in the form 
of the Wars of Independence and the Declaration of 1320. In addition Scotland 
elected representatives, only 72, to represent Scottish interests, both domestic and 
foreign at Westminster. These representatives, however,  were vastly outnumbered, 
administration of the state had expanded, the Empire had become more complex and 
so, the domestic legislative needs of Scotland had been neglected, as well as 
mismanaged, and the voice of the Scottish representatives had been ignored. Failure 
to recognise Scottish national identity meant Scottish interests were not represented 
effectively. Thus the legitimacy of the system was called into question. The 
sovereignty of the Scottish nation could no longer be entrusted to the United 
Kingdom state, hence the call for Home Rule for Scotland. 
 
Interference in Canadian Foreign Affairs 
Under the Canadian Constitution, embodied in the British North America Act, 
foreign affairs, including commercial treaties, remained the specific reserve of the 
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Imperial Parliament at Westminster.165 Within the space of a couple of years 
following Confederation, the wisdom of Canadians not having a say in their own 
foreign affairs was being questioned. In 1871, the Treaty of Washington between the 
United States and Great Britain was negotiated and signed. The Treaty, according to 
British Canadian nationalists, showed the low opinion with which British statesmen 
regarded Canadian interests. Even the Canadian Prime Minister of the time, John A. 
Macdonald, who had been invited as a British delegate to represent Canadian 
interests, argued that the British Commissioners seemed “to have only one thing on 
their minds, that is, to go home to England with a treaty in their pockets, settling 
everything, no matter at what cost to Canada.”166  
 
In 1871, the British and Americans met to discuss some outstanding sources of 
tension between the two countries, some involving Canada, such as the boundary line 
between Vancouver Island and the United States, others relating to the American 
Civil War. In particular, the United States wanted compensation for damage inflicted 
by Confederate gunboats, such as the Alabama, that had been built by Britain. 
Canada wanted above all a renegotiation of the reciprocal trade treaty that lapsed in 
1866 and compensation for the Fenian raids of 1866 and 1870, which the United 
States government had done little to prevent. The negotiations were tense, but the 
Americans were seen by many as the winners. The Treaty of Washington granted 
rights of navigation and carriage on the St. Lawrence and the Great Lakes, access to 
inshore fisheries for both sides and the settlement of the Juan de Fuca boundary 
dispute.167 The reaction to the Treaty by British Canadian nationalists is the key to 
understanding British Canadian nationalism.  
 
One of the first reactions to the Treaty came from Robert Haliburton, an original 
member of Canada First, although at the time of writing the article he was resident in 
London. He argued that whilst the British government and people believed the 
“Alabama Treaty”, as he called the Treaty of Washington, was acceptable, 
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…the fact that it sacrificed the rights of Englishmen abroad, and ignored the 
minor consideration of national honour was far more likely to be expressed 
by Canadians, who knew that, as far as they were concerned, it was both a 
humiliation and an injustice.168
 
In essence, the whole tone of Haliburton’s argument, and Macdonald’s quote noted 
above, was that Britain had trampled over Canada’s interests in order to obtain a 
solid and lasting peace with the United States. What other conclusion could there be 
when Britain compensated the United States for the St Albans incident,  
 
an outrage committed within the United States, in time of war, by American 
citizens, while repeated Fenian raids, invasions of British territory by 
American subjects in times of peace, were passed over in silence.169
 
But Haliburton was not really surprised and set the Treaty in the context of a century 
of mis-management and neglect, especially with regard to Canada’s relations with 
the United States. The Imperial connection was portrayed as wholly one sided, the 
colonies providing the raw materials and then the market for a mercantilist empire, 
and then turning into a burden when free trade became the economic policy of 
Britain. What else could Canadians expect but for their interests to be ignored for the 
benefit of the mother country? After all “it was only Colonists who suffered.”170  
 
Without any voice in Parliament, or a representative in the Colonial Office, 
which is merely a useful training-school for young statesmen, where they can 
try their “prentice hand” occasionally on Colonial subjects, experimentum in 
corpore vili, we have no power even to complain with any chance of being 
heard.171
 
Again we have a political action by the state that sparked a nationalist reaction. The 
political context is different but the theme the same as portrayed by the SHRA. The 
state, in the form of the Empire, was interfering in Canadian affairs. There is no 
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doubt here that the Empire used or, as far as the nationalists are concerned, abused 
the right of the Canadian nation to have its interests taken into account. The political 
context of interference in national affairs triggered a nationalist reaction. Failure to 
recognise British Canadian identity meant a failure to recognise the political interests 
of Canada. This time, however, to make matters worse, the beneficiary of the 
Empire’s action was Canada’s significant other, the United States. The Americans 
were perceived as coveting Canadian territory and the nationalists saw the gains in 
the Treaty of Washington in this light.  
 
Other reactions to the Treaty were similar to Haliburton’s. Denison, in an unusual 
foray into electoral politics, told the electorate of Algoma, where he was a candidate 
for the Federal Parliament, that the Treaty of Washington,  
 
…was a sacrifice of the material interests of Canada, sacrificed not from any 
high sense of Imperial necessity but huckstered away in a disgraceful and 
humiliating manner without adequate equivalent.172
 
Again we have overtones of a failure to pay due honour to the Canadian nation in the 
“huckstering” away of material interests. The rhetoric of the politics of recognition is 
found in abundance throughout the pamphlets of Haliburton and Denison. Had due 
attention been paid to Canadian interests and concessions won from the Americans 
then Canadian honour would have been maintained and the legitimacy of the existing 
system of imperial relations would have remained unscathed. But the rhetoric 
implies, and the evidence suggests, there was no attempt even made to pay lip 
service to Canadian interests. The honour and dignity of Canada had been slighted by 
the Imperial government’s failure to recognise Canadian interests, and the only 
remedy would be to have a voice in foreign affairs. But when you look past the 
rhetoric, the trigger for the nationalist response remains the political context.  
 
Even Edward Blake, historically associated with the Canada First network, 
commented upon the Treaty in his famous Aurora speech. 
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Matters cannot drift much longer as they have drifted hitherto. The Treaty of 
Washington produced a very profound impression throughout this country. It 
produced a feeling that at no distant period the people of Canada would desire 
that they should have some greater share of control than they now have in the 
management of foreign affairs… with reference to local and domestic matters 
… you rule yourselves as fully as any people in the world, while in your 
foreign affairs… you have no more voice than the people of Japan.173  
  
Blake’s solution, like Haliburton’s, was for Canada to have some form of 
representation at the Imperial level, basically an Imperial federation. Whilst the 
details of such a scheme were missing, the general idea put forward by Blake, and 
later by the Imperial Federation League, was that Canada could not claim her full 
rights and privileges as a nation without having some control over her foreign 
affairs. In other words, Canada had the right to self determination in all matters not 
just domestic. Canada had to have input into her affairs with other nations.174
 
But the desire for power, or at least some input, into Canadian foreign affairs had 
another aspect. A key aspect of Canada First’s work in the immediate post-
confederation period was the creation of a Canadian national feeling. They were 
attempting to instil a national sentiment among fellow Canadians. There were 
different views on what form this sentiment was to take. William Foster and James 
Edgar, independently, saw the political machinery of the state as the vehicle that 
would unite the nation.175 In the same way that Anderson saw the colonial 
administrations of the units of the Spanish Empire in South America uniting the 
Creole nations,176 it was hoped that the federal government of Canada, as a focus for 
national interests, would become the source of national consciousness. Shared 
experience of federal government attending to national problems would instil a 
national sentiment amongst the provinces. Blake took these ideas one step further 
and argued that it was a specific role of the state, foreign affairs, that would create 
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unity and a national sentiment. Blake argued that it “is impossible to foster a national 
spirit unless you have national interests to attend to…”177  
 
These national interests, in focusing the attention of the Canadian public on what was 
important for Canada as a collection of united provinces, rather than what was 
important for each individual province, would bind together the nation. The Latin 
American experience of colonial administration had created nations in Bolivia, Peru 
and Mexico. In a similar manner, the provinces of Canada had experienced self-
government prior to confederation and had strong provincial identities. In order for 
the idea to take root that the Canadian nation had the right to self-determination, and 
not the Ontarian people, national sentiment had to take root. For Blake this was to be 
done by attending to foreign affairs through Imperial Federation. Common Canadian 
experiences would then overshadow “petty” provincial and domestic matters.  
  
In 1874, fresh trade negotiations were opened between the United States and Canada, 
although once again Imperial commissioners carried out the negotiations on behalf of 
Canada. Again Canada was allowed a representative to voice Canadian interests, 
although this time the representative was George Brown, editor of the Toronto Globe 
newspaper and the leading voice of the Reform movement in Canada. Once again, 
however, the issue of Canada’s right to carry on her own negotiations were brought 
to the fore, particularly when the negotiations were ostensibly to provide 
compensation for the Fishery rights given to the United States in the Treaty of 
Washington.178
 
The leading nationalist voice at this time was The Nation, a newspaper generally 
accepted by contemporaries and historians as the mouthpiece of the Canada First 
movement.179 The paper argued that the “real objection was that in the negotiation of 
the Treaty [of Washington] Canada had no voice.” The same mistake was being 
made with the negotiations for a trade treaty.  
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The negotiation of a new treaty, which concerns Canada alone, is being 
conducted by Imperial negotiation; for though one of the negotiators is 
Canadian, he is not the agent of Canada but of England. On general principles 
negotiators must act in the interest of those from whom they receive their 
appointment: to do otherwise is to violate the trust reposed in them. Ought 
Canada to be content to remain in this position?180  
 
The answer for The Nation was no; Canada must “have a direct voice in the making 
of Treaties by which her interests are affected.”181 This was also an important plank 
of the Canadian National Association.182 This is a clear example of the relationship 
between representation of national interests and the legitimacy of rule. Once again, a 
nationalist response is articulated against undue interference by the state, the British 
Empire. Canada had no power over negotiations with her southern neighbour. The 
legitimacy and competency of the Imperial Government to negotiate on Canada’s 
behalf was at the forefront of Canadian nationalist discourse. Who had the right to 
attend to the affairs of Canada? The representatives elected by the Canadian public or 
imperial officials who had not been elected by Canadians. The clear argument from 
British Canadian nationalists over this issue was that because the British did not 
recognise Canadian identity they could not represent Canadian interests. The 
Canadian government, therefore, should be given the powers by the Canadian nation. 
This is not to claim British Canadian nationalists were anti-colonial in the traditional 
sense. Rather they wanted to reform the imperial relationship to the benefit of 
Canada. Representatives of the Canadian nation would have an input into Canadian 
foreign affairs in a federation of the Empire, as well as having a say in general 
matters of the Empire. This was the solution British Canadian nationalists proposed 
to resolve the legitimacy issue. 
 
The issue of foreign affairs continued to rumble on throughout the period under 
question. Principal Grant, in a speech to the Canadian Club in New York in 1887, 
argued that “The symptoms of restlessness, on account of our position being merely 
colonial…shows that we are nearing that point in our history when we must assume 
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the full responsibilities of nationhood…”183 Those responsibilities were foreign 
affairs and like Blake before him, Grant advocated an imperial federation. 
Demanding independence in foreign affairs, through an imperial federation, Grant 
saw Canada gaining “something without which a country is poor in the present and a 
butt for the world’s scorn in the future…national self-respect!”184  
 
Once again the issue comes back to the dignity and honour of the nation. But this 
time it is put in terms of recognition on the world stage. Without the ability to carry 
out Canada’s own foreign affairs, the nation can never have the recognition of other 
nations in the world. Without this recognition, which was being denied Canada by 
the Empire, the Canadian nation would lose its dignity.  
 
In similar terms to the SHRA, we have actions of the state which, whilst they did not 
cause the formation of a national movement, certainly sparked nationalist responses 
which were articulated in the rhetoric of recognition, dignity and the right of self-
determination. Not only did Canada want recognition of the right of its people to 
determine their future in the realm of foreign affairs, which in turn would unite the 
people of Canada as a common interest, but they also desired the recognition of the 
world community, that would be gained through involvement in foreign affairs. The 
Empire, as a multi-national entity, became the source of illegitimate government. 
Dominance by one nation, however, was not the issue. As with Scotland, failure to 
properly recognise British Canadian identity led to a failure to take into account 
Canadian interests in foreign affairs. Failure to recognise identity causes illegitimate 
government. The solution proposed by British Canadian imperial nationalists was 
Imperial federation rather than complete independence. This will be examined in the 
following chapters. For the moment the important point to note is that Canada would 
have had a direct say, not only in Canadian foreign affairs through Imperial 
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Conclusion  
The importance of recognition has been clearly seen in this chapter. Failure to 
recognise identity reflects back notions of oppression and lack of self worth. As a 
consequence, an identity is articulated expressing superiority over the other who has 
failed to recognise their identity. In both Scotland and Canada, historical symbols 
were chosen to show their superiority over the other involved in their discourse. 
These symbols provided quick shorthand to understanding the discourse being 
articulated. They encompassed an expression of antagonism towards the other as 
well as establishing the transformation of the power relationship between the two 
nations. These symbols also created boundaries that differentiated the nation from 
other nations by using the significant other to identify who belonged to the nation 
and who did not.  
 
We noted in the previous chapter that ideas of legitimacy, democracy, representation 
and recognition are all important in nationalism. Nationalism is caused by 
illegitimate states. Multi-national states such as the United Kingdom generally have a 
dominant nation. This creates the potential for illegitimacy. The trigger, however, for 
illegitimate government is the failure to institutionalise democracy. Non-recognition 
of identity leads to a failure to represent interests, which causes a breakdown in the 
legitimacy of the state. This in turn allows nationalists to claim the right of self 
determination. Nationalism thus has its roots in problems of democracy in multi-
national states. The nature of the nationalism displayed in both Scotland and Canada 
clearly reflects the important of these concepts. The failure of Gladstone to include 
Scotland in any scheme of home rule was a failure to recognise Scotland’s perceived 
democratic right of equality with Ireland. This failure of recognition combined with 
other failures, such as using England when Britain was being spoken of, led to the 
neglect of Scottish affairs and the lack of attention devoted to Scottish business. 
Indeed in some cases the wishes of a majority of Scotland’s representatives in 
Parliament were clearly overridden by English MPs. Thus the failure to recognise 
Scottish identity led to a failure to represent Scottish interests. The additional failure 
to democratise the Irish Home Rule Bill was the final straw for Scottish nationalists 
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who articulated a discourse highlighting these failures and asserted Scotland’s right 
of self-determination. 
 
Nationalism in Canada displayed similar characteristics. Failure to recognise British 
Canadian identity meant Canada’s interests were not represented effectively in treaty 
negotiations between Britain and the United States. The fact that Canadians had 
control over domestic policy but lacked any control over foreign relations was seen 
as a paradox in need of resolution. The current system where Canada was not 
represented at the Imperial level was seen as undemocratic. The failure to 
institutionalise democracy was another failure of recognition. The reaction to the 
Treaty of Washington by Haliburton, Denison and Blake clearly highlighted all these 
issues. Denison and Haliburton emphasised the rhetoric of recognition, exclaiming 
their indignation in terms of betrayal. The continued problems in negotiating trade 
treaties with the United States meant the issue was at the forefront of British 
Canadian nationalist discourse.  
 
The chapter has also highlighted the extent to which nationalism is a matter of 
political legitimacy, and not about independent statehood. The critique of state and 
imperial governance was not followed by calls for an independent Scotland or 
Canada, yet the rhetoric of both the SHRA and Canada First was clearly nationalist. 
These groups articulated both a nationalist and an imperialist discourse. For the 
SHRA, the formation of a Scottish Parliament would not mean independence from 
the Empire. Rather the SHRA wanted a Scottish Parliament that was subordinate to a 
reformed Imperial Parliament at Westminster. The importance of the Empire to 
Scottish nationalism and of Scotland to the Empire will be seen in the next chapter. 
For now the important point is that Empire and maintenance of the Union with 
England were central features of the discourse of the SHRA.  
 
Likewise in Canada there were never any serious suggestions by British Canadian 
nationalists that the imperial connection should be broken. Rather the solution to the 
problem was Canadian representation in London in some form of imperial 
federation. The importance of the British Imperial connection to Canada will be seen 
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in the next chapter. Defence against perceived United States aggression formed a 
major part of British Canadian nationalist discourse and the maintenance of the 




Imperialist Discourse in Scotland and British Canada 
 
The key aim of this chapter is to examine what was imperialist about the discourse of 
nationalist groups in Scotland and British Canada. Imperialism concerns the pursuit, 
maintenance and defence of empire. A relationship of dominance by one state over 
another territory or state characterises empire. We have noted in previous chapters 
that Canada First, the Imperial Federation League in Canada and the Scottish Home 
Rule Association all advocated reform of the imperial structure through the inclusion 
of representation for the white settler dominions in Canada, New Zealand, Australia 
and South Africa. The motives for reform in Scotland and British Canada of imperial 
governance shared similarities but were distinct in both groups. Both Scots and 
British Canadian nationalists saw imperial federation as a strengthening of weak 
structural bonds that existed between Britain and her self-governing dominions. By 
strengthening these bonds the Empire would be able to meet the challenges posed by 
the newly united German Empire, the United States and Russia. The various schemes 
for imperial unity proposed by these nationalist groups contain the imperialist 
element of the groups’ discourse and will form the basis of analysis for this chapter.  
 
The contexts in which these schemes were proposed were very different. It should be 
noted here that Scottish nationalists were less explicit in their imperialism than 
British Canadians. The perceived threat of immediate American aggression lent 
urgency to the demands of British Canadian nationalists for federation of the Empire. 
The SHRA seemed to take the Empire as a non-negotiable given. Home Rule all 
round was their priority and as such imperial issues were rarely mentioned. They 
consistently argued, however, that one important result of Home Rule all round 
would be reform of the Imperial Parliament to include representatives from the self-
governing colonies. This was seen as beneficial for the whole Empire. In this sense 
they were imperialists.  
 
In some instances the views of the SHRA have been inferred from their support for 
the Imperial Federation League in Scotland. Despite the evident hostility toward the 
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SHRA by the editors of the League’s Journal Imperial Federation,1 there was no 
inherent incompatibility between the ideas of home rule and imperial federation. 
Indeed, several influential members of the IFL, such as Lord Reay, Lord Rosebery 
and RC Munro Ferguson, were clearly in favour of home rule.2 Thomas McNaught, 
the Honorary Colonial Secretary of the SHRA, was also a member of the IFL.3 The 
views of this group of Scottish Home Rulers within the IFL combined with those of 
the SHRA are the focus of the Scottish material in this chapter.   
 
The chapter will be split into four sections. The first section will examine the 
historical context necessary for an understanding of the threats and challenges to the 
British Empire. A theoretical discussion of international relations will be followed by 
a brief discussion of the decline of the Concert of Europe and its effect on British 
imperialism. The second section will examine Scotland and Canada’s place in the 
Empire, in particular the nature of the imperial relationship between Canada and 
Britain and the relationship between Scotland and Westminster. The third section 
will examine the proposals for reform of imperial government. The aim of these was 
to strengthen the weak bonds that characterised the imperial relationship with the 
self-governing colonies. This will set the context for the central argument of this 
chapter, the existence of a Greater British identity. This identity will be examined in 
the final section arguing that the levels of British emigration to Canada and the white 
self-governing dominions meant a British identity was spread around the Empire that 
formed the main link between the dominions and London.  
 
Historical Context 
Being a maritime empire, as well as an island, meant Britain relied to a remarkable 
degree on her naval power. Not only was the Navy vital for the defence of the British 
Isles, but in the context of the Empire, the Navy had to ensure the sea-lanes remained 
open for trade, commerce and communication. Lord Castlereagh, foreign secretary 
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during the Napoleonic Wars, used the two-power standard, Britain’s navy had to be 
at least the size of the next two largest navies combined, to ensure British supremacy 
on water.4 The efforts to retain communication lines open between the metropolis 
and the far-flung colonies brought the Empire into conflict with a number of 
European powers. The Russian empire posed a threat to India through Afghanistan. 
The attempts to keep the Suez Canal from falling into unfriendly hands brought 
diplomatic conflict with France. The Scramble for Africa, initiated by the German 
Empire, brought competition to the world of European imperialism and forced an 
alteration in British Imperial strategy in Africa. Against this geopolitical backdrop, 
the Imperial Federation League and the Scottish Home Rule Association were 
formed. It would, therefore, be surprising if the discourse of these groups did not 
address these imperial problems.   
 
Max Weber argued that political structures (states) “vary in the extent to which they 
are turned outward,”5 i.e., in their attitude toward other states. Weber claimed that all 
political structures strive for prestige in order to gain status in the society of states.6 
In other words, there is a hierarchy of states which is important to inter-state 
relations. According to Weber, “big political communities are the natural exponents 
of such pretensions to prestige.”7 In practice this prestige of power means “the glory 
of power over other communities; it means the expansion of power…”8  
 
But as every big political community has the potential for prestige it will always be 
endangered by other states who also want to pursue the prestige of power. In this 
‘dynamic of power,’ claims to prestige are seen as “challenges and calls forth the 
competition of all other possible bearers of prestige.”9 This competition and the 
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power dynamics it creates leads to the Great Powers being “expansive powers.”10 
One result of the competition for prestige is imperialism.  
 
Weber’s geopolitical analysis of imperialism emphasises political aspects of 
imperialism rather than the economistic view put forward by Radical Liberals such 
as Hobson and some Marxists who argued that the British Empire resulted from 
excess profit generated from industrialisation.11 Economics was undoubtedly a factor 
in acquiring Empire but as we shall see prestige, security and power were all 
important factors in the discourse of imperialists in the late nineteenth century.  
 
In a similar vein to Weber, Reynolds argued that the “only major constraint on states 
and their freedom to pursue their own interests is the countervailing force of rival 
capacities for exercising violence.”12 The world, therefore, exists as a system of 
sovereign states responsible for their own security (the preservation of the state and 
maintenance of territorial integrity). But providing for the defence of the state 
provides the conditions for aggression. “The condition of security only exists when 
the state possesses the capacity to fight successful wars against any potential 
aggressor…”13 Security becomes a relative matter. The more powerful another state 
is perceived to be the greater the need to increase capacity for defence. The result is a 
competition between states in the form of arms races, alliances for defence or 
security and the orientation of the state towards foreign affairs. States need to control 
the environments in which they operate. This pursuit of power leads to states having 
rival spheres of influence as they attempt to control other states, hegemonically or 
directly, in the pursuit of their own security. Once again, “Imperialism is thus a direct 
consequence of the security dilemma.”14  
 
Mann extends both Weber’s and Reynolds’ ideas by claiming that there are five 
determinants of geopolitical power: economic power, ideological power, military 
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power, political power and leadership.15 Each of these must be geopolitically 
relevant for it to be effective. Economic power, therefore, must be important 
globally, military power must be relevant to the task in hand (there is no point in 
using tanks for gunboat diplomacy) and the regime and the administration of a state 
must supply resources necessary for the quest for geopolitical power.16 Hegemony in 
the late nineteenth century, according to these principles, lay with the Western world 
in general. “Domination [of the world] was Western, Christian and White…”17 
Britain led this hegemony as the leading power in Europe but, according to Mann, 
could only fix “transnational rules in negotiation with other powers.”18 In other 
words, Britain was not an outright hegemon.  
 
The Collapse of the Concert of Europe 
For much of the nineteenth century relations between European states were 
maintained through a “diplomatically negotiated Concert of Powers” that prevented a 
major continental war.19 The diplomatic agreements over Belgium, the Low Country 
boundaries, Hungarian revolts, Greek independence and the Russian incursions into 
the Ottoman Empire were all meant to achieve two objectives: “to prevent any single 
power becoming hegemonic in any region of Europe and to preserve order.”20 The 
rise of the new German state under Prussian leadership, and Russian expansionism in 
the East, however, both disrupted the carefully balanced accord, creating fears they 
would become hegemonic in their respective regions of Europe.21
 
According to Thomson, the legacy of the wars leading to German unification was 
“recurrent international tensions…” 
 
With uneasy relations prevailing between the six great powers of Europe, the 
whole nature of the balance of power underwent a transformation. It became 
a fluid conception, a system of diplomacy conceived as a self-adjusting 
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mechanism whereby an equilibrium was constantly re-established by fresh 
governmental manoeuvres and agreements…22
 
Britain had a new rival power in Europe, although according to Mann, Britain had 
negotiated her near hegemony of the rest of the world with the other European 
powers. Britain ruled the waves while Europe remained without a leader.23 
Bismarck’s decision to pursue imperial ambitions in Africa, however, altered 
Britain’s negotiated hegemony, as did Russian expansionism in the East. From the 
early 1880s onward, Britain was no longer able to maintain the informal imperial 
relationships that had been developed with other states under its influence. In the 
face of competition from Germany, Russia and France, the British Empire became 
more formal. The remainder of this section will outline the nature of these challenges 
to Britain’s imperial hegemony.  In 1884 the Imperial Federation League was formed 
with the intention of ensuring the Empire would be able to deal with these 
international challenges to the Empire.  
 
India and the threat from the Russian Empire 
The jewel in the Imperial crown in the late nineteenth century was undoubtedly 
India. There were two routes British merchants and the Navy could take to India. 
One route followed the coast of Africa and rounded the Cape into the Indian Ocean. 
Another route was through the Mediterranean to the Suez Canal and the Red Sea. 
The route round the Cape was both long and dangerous therefore the Suez Canal 
formed an important strategic route not only to India, but also to the Australasian 
colonies. The maintenance of access to the Mediterranean and the Suez was therefore 
an important plank of British foreign policy. The importance of the British Navy in 
defending the Empire was clear. There were only two areas where the Empire could 
be attacked overland, the Canadian border with the United States and the Indian 
frontier with Afghanistan.24 To the north of Afghanistan was the powerful Russian 
empire. Russian expansionism posed a threat to the British Empire’s ability to 
maintain India on two fronts. The first of these was through Afghanistan.  
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During the 1860s and 1870s Russia gradually gained control of the territory to the 
North of Afghanistan. The possibility of a plot to use the Afghans in an attack 
against India became an increasing concern.25 In 1878, following a botched and 
unauthorised attempt to invade Afghanistan by Lord Lytton, the Indian Viceroy, 
Disraeli was forced into declaring war on Afghanistan. Although Gladstone 
withdrew British forces from the area on his accession to Prime Minister in 1880, 
Afghanistan became a British protectorate with control over Kabul’s foreign policy. 
But the Afghans remained a threat. As the historian Bernard Porter claimed, 
“ultimately there could be no guarantee that if Russia made it worth their while the 
Afghans would not still renege and help her invade India.”26  
 
Trouble continued in the region in the 1880s, with a Russian defeat of Afghan forces 
in Penjdeh in 1885. Britain proceeded to create further buffers along the northern 
Indian border, bringing various countries under imperial control, for example Upper 
Burma. Along the Indian border British influence and control increased and the loose 
alliances that had been maintained along the northern border turned into formal 
imperial relationships.27
 
The second threat from Russian expansionism focussed on the decaying Ottoman 
Empire. The latter contained a large number of Slavs who looked to Russia for 
support. The Russians saw the Turks as their national enemy. Revolts in Bosnia and 
Herzegovina in 1875 led to a diplomatic crisis which saw Russia, Germany and 
Austria, the Dreikaiserbund, sending an ultimatum to Constantinople. Disraeli 
supported the Turks in their rejection of the ultimatum gaining an important 
diplomatic victory. But the Turkish reprisals against the Slavs led to atrocities in 
Christian Bulgaria. The British Cabinet was split over its response and there were 
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massive protests against continued support for the Ottoman Empire.28 Russia 
declared War on Turkey in 1877.29
 
The Ottoman Empire was an important strategic buffer separating Russia from the 
Mediterranean. It also presented an alternative land route to the Persian Gulf and 
thereby to India. British foreign policy therefore supported the fast decaying Empire 
for strategic reasons. The Russian invasion of the Ottoman Empire in 1877 created a 
problem for Britain. Queen Victoria was furious over Disraeli’s inaction.. “It is not a 
question of upholding Turkey;” she claimed, “it is a question of Russian or British 
supremacy in the world.”30 But the Prime Minister’s hands were tied by public 
opinion, a divided cabinet and a neutrality agreement with Austria. Russian victory 
brought further diplomatic manoeuvrings. The Treaty forced on the Turks by Russia 
was totally unacceptable to British interests in the region. Troops were sent to 
Turkey and the fleet sent to Constantinople. The Treaty was renegotiated peacefully 
between Austria, Russia and Britain which the Turks had no choice but to accept. 
This was one example of the workings of the concert of Europe.  
 
Egypt and the Suez 
To avoid the need to use the land route through the Ottoman Empire to the Persian 
Gulf, Britain had to maintain access to the Suez Canal. This meant ensuring the 
stability of Egypt. North Africa, however, was seen by the French as being within 
their sphere of influence. When Egypt declared bankruptcy in the late 1870s French 
creditors stepped in to resolve the situation. Reluctant to leave Egypt in the hands of 
the French, potentially threatening access to the Suez, Britain also agreed to help. A 
new leader was installed and reforms put in place to resolve the financial situation. 
But in 1881 Egyptian nationalists rebelled against the stringent reforms. France 
invaded to quash the rebellion and was quickly followed by the British. But a change 
of French government and an escalation of the invasion resulted in a French 
withdrawal leaving Britain as the sole occupying force. By the end of 1882, 
                                                 
28 Shannon, The Crisis of Imperialism 1865-1915 (London, Hart-Davis, MacGibbon: 1974): 124 
29 Pearce, M., & Stewart, G., British Political History 1875-1995: Democracy and Decline (London, 
Routledge: 1996): 152-3 
30 Cited in Ibid: 153 
 160
following defeat of the rebels at Tel-el-Kebir, Egypt became a British protectorate. 
The extent of British investment, trading and strategic interest in Egypt made it 
extremely difficult to withdraw.  
 
The occupation of Egypt led to involvement in other North African affairs, thus 
further antagonising the French. Sudan was under the influence of the Egyptian 
Khedive. Rebellion in Sudan in 1883 led to Gladstone sending General Gordon to 
evacuate the Egyptian Force installed at Khartoum. Gordon, however, was a 
Christian zealot and popular hero. He tried to quash the rebellion and save Khartoum. 
Unfortunately for Gladstone, his General failed and the Prime Minister was forced by 
public pressure to send another force to extricate Gordon from his predicament. The 
rescue force under General Wolesley arrived too late and found Gordon had been 
slain. Gordon’s death led to him being hailed as a martyr and hero of the Empire, 
meshing together British religious identity and militarism.31 Popular opinion turned 
on Gladstone, who had delayed sending the rescue force, claiming he was 
responsible for Gordon’s murder. France remained hostile to Britain’s actions in 
North Africa throughout the period. 32
 
Mention should be made here of the different approaches to Empire taken by 
Gladstone and Disraeli. In principle, Gladstone took a moralistic approach to Empire. 
During the crisis that developed from the Turkish atrocities in Bulgaria, Gladstone 
published a pamphlet that highlighted his moral outrage against continued British 
support for the Ottomans, despite his belief that the territorial integrity of the 
Ottoman Empire should guide British policy.33 Disraeli, on the other hand, was 
largely unaffected by the massive protests that took place around the country. 
Disraeli believed the national interest, rather than moral questions, should guide 
imperial policy.34 His defeat in the 1880 election, following Gladstone’s moral 
crusade during the Midlothian Campaign, would indicate this view was not shared by 
                                                 
31 Pearce, M., & Stewart, G., British Political History 1875-1995: 160; for a contemporary view see 
Marquis of Lorne, Imperial Federation (London, 1885): 101 
32 This section draws heavily on Pearce and Stewart, British Political History: 159-161 and Porter, 
The Lions Share: 90-94 
33 Shannon,  The Crisis of Imperialism: 127-8 
34 Pearce and Stewart, British Political History: 152 
 161
the electorate. Of course, Gladstone, when in office, was forced into policy decisions 
he would rather not have made. General Gordon’s decision to save Khartoum is a 
good example.  
 
The Scramble for Africa 
The newly formed German empire spearheaded the challenges to the British Empire 
in the mid 1880s. In 1884, the Germans made a bid for empire in Southern Africa, 
successfully taking control of South West Africa.35 Between 1884 and 1886 
Germany annexed Cameroon, Togoland and Tanganyika in Tropical Africa. 36 The 
impetus for the Scramble had come from the Berlin conference of 1884 organised by 
the German Chancellor, Otto Von Bismarck. The conference had been called to 
resolve the status of the African Congo following European anger at Britain and 
Portugal’s bilateral agreement over the navigation of the River Congo in Western 
Africa. The Belgian King, Leopold II, who had dreamed of a colonial empire since 
the 1860s, came away with the spoils. Germany, however, also encouraged the 
French to expand their interests in West Africa. British interests in Africa, therefore, 
quickly came under pressure from France and Germany. Whereas previously British 
imperialism in Africa would have been conducted on an informal basis, now, under 
pressure from other European powers, formal colonisation was required to ensure 
British territory was retained.37 The result of this ‘Scramble’ was that by 1898, the 
majority of Africa had been formally divided between the major European powers.38 
The competition faced by the British Empire in this period is a key point in 
understanding the imperialism of nationalists in this period. At no other point in the 
history of the Empire had competition from rival powers been as intense or 
diplomatic tension so great.  
 
Against this background the Imperial Federation League held its first conference in 
July 1884 when it was resolved that “In order to secure the permanent unity of the 
Empire, some form of federation is essential.”39 At the first meeting, W.E. Forster 
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argued that the loss of the colonies would mean the weakening of Britain and “the 
increased probability of war amongst Christian nations…”40 In claiming that Britons 
throughout the Empire should have a say in imperial affairs, the Earl of Rosebery 
raised the issue of the Suez Canal and hegemony in Egypt, claiming Australians had 
just as much right to a say in who should be paramount on the banks of the Suez as 
the Scots and English.41 Later sections of this chapter will highlight the importance 
of the historical information presented here to the schemes for imperial unity that 
were proposed by members of the IFL in Britain and Canada and by the SHRA.  
 
The discourse of both Scots and British Canadian nationalists claimed the links 
between the various parts of the Empire were weak. The Empire, therefore, was ill-
equipped to deal with the changing geo-political order noted above. In order to meet 
these new challenges and threats and to carry on the mission of the Pax Britannica, 
imperial bonds had to be strengthened. The bonds that existed were largely symbolic 
and sentimental. They existed in the form of a Greater British identity. Strengthening 
the bonds of Empire involved providing Britannia, Greater Britain, with a federal 
state, altering the nature of the imperial relationship between Westminster and the 
self-governing colonies. This imperial federation would unite the British settler 
colonies and dominions. Unity meant strength. By uniting Britons throughout the 
Empire in a federation the challenges posed by other European powers could be met 
more easily. The following sections will present this discourse as articulated by 
nationalists in Scotland and British Canada, arguing that their attempts to consolidate 
the Empire were a response to the threats posed by the changing nature of European 
diplomacy and politics. 
 
The Nature of Imperial Governance in Scotland and Canada 
The nature of Imperial government varied across the Empire. In some cases, such as 
Egypt or Afghanistan, the Empire played an informal role as protectorate. In other 
cases, such as India, the Empire ruled directly with the assistance and collaboration 
of local elites. But in the case of the colonies where British settlement had taken 
place, the lessons learned from the loss of the thirteen colonies of the United States 
                                                 
40 Ibid: 6 
41 Ibid: 6 
 163
had been put in place. Almost complete control over domestic policy was given to 
Canada, Cape Colony, the Australian colonies and New Zealand. The relationship 
between the self-governing colonies and London was much like that of modern day 
Scotland or Quebec with substantial autonomy over domestic affairs but little control 
of foreign policy. J.S. Mill described it as the “slightest kind of federal union.”42 
With this relative autonomy, the ties binding the self governing colonies and Canada 
to London were relatively weak. Conversely the ties between Scotland and London 
were very strong.  
 
Scotland and the Empire 
Scotland held a privileged relationship with the Empire. Scottish representation in 
Parliament, 60 MPs rising to 72 in 1885, gave Scotland a voice in the running of the 
Empire. Scots in the Cabinet were in more influential positions. Scots could, when 
compared with Canadians at least, claim real political influence over imperial affairs. 
Scottish Parliamentary business was generally left in the hands of the Lord Advocate, 
who reported to the Home Secretary. This arrangement, however, became 
increasingly unsatisfactory. The campaign for a Scottish Secretary challenged this 
situation, finally claiming success in 1885. The post of Scottish secretary created an 
institutional post for Scots within the government, although it did not become a 
cabinet post until the twentieth century. The post did not alter the legislative position 
of Scotland in the United Kingdom. The Scottish Secretary was an administrator with 
responsibility for overseeing the work of the administrative boards. Scots had a voice 
in both domestic and foreign affairs but this voice, according to the SHRA, was 
rarely heard due to the numerical dominance of the English in the House of 
Commons, hence the calls for a Scottish Parliament. Although a Scottish Parliament 
would not have increased Scotland’s voice in foreign and imperial affairs, the SHRA 
believed it was a stepping stone to reform of the imperial system of government. This 
reform would, they had hoped, lead to a more balanced representation.43
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Perhaps more important in the running of the Empire was the number of Scots who 
conquered and administered new territories. Michael Fry has tempered arguments 
about the level of influence Scotland had on the Empire, claiming Scots were too few 
to determine its course. Yet his impressive work on The Scottish Empire reveals the 
extent to which Scots were important in the creation and direction of the Empire.44 
Tom Devine is less circumspect, arguing that the “relentless penetration of Empire 
by Scottish educators, doctors, plantation overseers, army officers, government 
officials, merchants and clerics” was more important than the Highland emigrants.45 
Scot’s did have an important influence on the Empire. Scots merchants, Scots 
soldiers, Scots missionaries and above all Scots emigrants were all important in the 
creation and maintenance of the Empire.46 Scotland was at the least a partner in 
Empire with England. As Linda Colley has forcefully argued, Britain, and therefore 
the Empire, was forged by the common experience of Scots and English fighting 
Catholic France in the colonial wars of the mid and late eighteenth century.47
 
Others have seen Scotland in a different light. Michael Hechter, for example, has 
argued that Scotland was an internal colony within Britain.48 Using an economic 
argument based on the dependency theories of Gonzalez Casanova, Hechter argued 
colonies were condemned to an instrumental economic role by the metropolis, 
providing raw materials for the core.49 This produced a cultural division of labour 
where cultural distinctions were superimposed along class lines.50 In Scotland, 
therefore, Hechter claimed that Scots contribution to the United Kingdom was as a 
producer of raw materials. The heavy industries of West and Central Scotland are 
certainly supportive of this thesis. But the importance of the Clyde to the Empire was 
also clear and tied Scotland irrevocably to the Empire. Hechter’s thesis has been 
widely criticised. The cultural division of labour just did not exist in Scotland. There 
was no evidence that nationalists gained support from the lower classes or from 
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classes whose jobs depended on institutions guaranteed by the Union, such as 
lawyers and Church Ministers.51 In addition, Scotland was one of the first nations in 
Europe to industrialise and shared a vast foreign market with England.52 Scotland’s 
position in the Empire was not colonial: it was privileged. 
 
Despite this relatively privileged position within the Empire, Scottish nationalists 
wanted to reform Imperial Government. In the previous chapter we noted that 
Scottish nationalists wanted to reform the United Kingdom government because 
obstructionism by Irish nationalists and the volume of domestic and imperial 
business the Imperial Parliament had to deal with had led to legislative deadlock. 
Scottish domestic legislation rarely received the consideration it deserved and in 
many cases was not even introduced.  
 
Scottish imperialists used much the same sort of argument when arguing for reform 
of imperial government. William Mitchell, treasurer of the SHRA, argued in 1889 
that “the British Empire, which Englishmen, Irishmen and Scotsmen have all done 
their best to extend and replenish, has now outgrown the machinery of 
Government.”53 In July 1890, a petition was delivered to Parliament by Gladstone on 
behalf of his Midlothian electors claiming that “the world-wide interests of the 
British Empire…demand that the Imperial Parliament should be relieved of domestic 
legislation.”54 In their Prospectus, of 1892, the SHRA claimed that Scots had the 
interests of the Empire in mind when advocating Imperial Federation. “Parliament is 
no longer able to overtake the business of the Empire…”55 Imperial Federation was 
the answer and the “only means of preventing the disintegration of the Empire.56 The 
situation had still not improved in 1893. William Mitchell, Treasurer of the SHRA, 
claimed Imperial interests were “treated with a neglect so great as to endanger the 
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integrity of the British Empire.”57 In 1895, Charles Waddie, secretary of the SHRA, 
argued that the increase in imperial matters had stalled the machinery of government. 
“Need it be wondered,” he asked, “that the whole machinery has broken down 
hopelessly in the attempt to grapple with such a mass of work?”58
 
According to the SHRA, the Imperial Parliament could no longer effectively manage, 
not only Scotland, as we saw in the previous chapter, but also the Empire. Imperial 
affairs were not receiving the attention they required. This in turn led to a fear that 
the Empire would dissolve unless action could be taken to remedy the situation. For 
the SHRA, at least, the answer lay in reform of both UK and Imperial Government. 
Home Rule all round would free the Imperial Parliament of the domestic affairs of 
the home nations and leave it free to manage the British Empire, allowing 
representatives from the white dominions and colonies to sit in a federal Imperial 
Parliament. The maintenance of the Empire was clearly important to Scottish 
nationalists. It is therefore worthy of a brief analysis.  
 
In many ways nationalists could rightly claim the Empire was Scottish. Charles 
Dilke, in his analysis of the British settler Empire, Greater Britain, summed up the 
importance of the Empire for Scots. 
  
… the fact remains, that wherever abroad you come across a Scotchman, you 
usually find him prosperous and respected….The Scotch emigrant is a man 
who leaves Scotland because he wishes to rise faster and higher than he can 
at home…59
 
The lack of government posts in Scotland following the Union meant that alternative 
employment opportunities had to be found for the middle and upper classes. The 
Empire provided that alternative source. As William Mitchell, the SHRA treasurer 
claimed, the lack of interest in politics caused by the removal of the Scots Parliament 
“naturally led to the exodus of the more talented and spirited of the Scottish 
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youth…”60 This exodus proved rather successful. Scots abroad rose to prominent 
positions in many British colonies. Michael Fry’s epic work on The Scottish Empire 
shows the extent to which Scots were important “men on the spot” extending and 
consolidating the Empire around the world.61 Scotland provided missionaries, 
entrepreneurs, merchants, military personnel and settlers for the Empire. To take 
Canada as just one example, ten Scots to every twelve Englishmen arrived in Canada 
between 1815 and 1905 at a time when the ratio of Scots to English in Great Britain 
was one to seven. The undue influence Scots had in the Empire was recognised by 
Scottish nationalists. In 1892, for example, William Mitchell commented, “For its 
size, Scotland has perhaps a larger and more influential connection with the colonies 
than any of the other home countries.”62  
 
One reason the Scots were successful was sheer weight of numbers. But the Earl of 
Rosebery, President of the Imperial Federation League in Britain, believed there 
were other reasons for Scots being so influential in the Empire. 
  
Wherever a colony is growing or wherever men were wanted for colonial 
enterprise, it is Scotsmen that are mainly called for. They happen to have that 
colonial spirit and those colonising capacities which are the backbone of an 
Imperial race.63
 
The education of Scots was important to their success. In his rectorial address at 
Aberdeen University in 1880, Rosebery told his new charges the burdens of the 
Empire were increasing and “a share of that Empire must devolve upon you.”64  
 
Scots were not only important in the formation and administration of the Empire but 
they benefited through emigration and the possibilities the Empire provided. The 
Presbyterian paternalism of middle class Scots extended to their view of themselves 
as the natural rulers of the Empire.65 Scots were hugely influential in the formative 
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years of the Canadian confederation. John A. Macdonald, born in Glasgow, was a 
key figure in Confederation and was the first Prime Minister of the Confederation. 
He went on to serve from the 1870s to his death in 1891.66 George Brown, leader of 
the Canadian Reform Movement and born in Alloa, was also a Father of 
Confederation and was editor of the Toronto Globe until his death in 188067. 
Alexander Mackenzie, born in Logierait, near Dunkeld, was the first Liberal Prime 
Minister of the Confederation.68 In Canada at least, Scots were to a large extent 
responsible for the direction the Confederation took in its formative years. 
  
Canada and the Empire 
Canada’s relationship with the Empire was imperial but also quasi-federal, as Mill 
pointed out. Institutionally speaking, the British North America (BNA) Act of 1867 
that established the Canadian Confederation left three key institutions in place that 
asserted and symbolised British rule over Canada: the Governor General, the Judicial 
Committee of the Privy Council (JCPC) and Westminster. Each of these had powers 
that could, theoretically, strongly influence the course of Canadian affairs. For 
example the Governor General, the symbol of the Imperial relationship in Canada, 
could refer bills of the Canadian Government to London for approval.69 In fact, the 
Governor General had the power to control decision making in Canada. Yet despite 
the enormous opportunities given to the Governor-General to meddle in Canadian 
affairs, the posts’ holders rarely did so, displaying “considerable caution and self-
restraint…”70
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The JCPC had existed since the early days of the Empire. It provided British subjects 
living abroad the opportunity to “appeal for justice to the foot of the throne.”71 
Following Confederation in 1867, the legal position of Canada in the Empire was 
that of a colony. The Imperial Parliament was sovereign and colonial laws were 
interpreted as “local government edicts and were treated as either intra or ultra 
ires.”72 The JCPC acted like an Imperial Supreme court judging whether or not the 
he remainder of the nineteenth century and much of the twentieth 
entury. Through this power alone the imperial relationship was established. The 
rt Act of 1875. A more self 
onfident Canada also began to assert herself in foreign affairs in the decades that 
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Dominion or Provincial legislatures were acting beyond the powers given to them by 
the Act of the Imperial Parliament. 
 
The power of the Westminster Parliament, however, was the most important. As 
Westminster passed the British North America Act and Parliament was the supreme 
power in the Empire, only Westminster could revoke or alter the Act. This remained 
the case for t
c
post of Governor-General and the role of the JCPC were largely symbolic by 
comparison.  
 
The above powers over Canada constituted a relationship of dominance by the 
British state and the relationship was therefore imperial. Westminster had the ability 
to control Canadian decision-making in the domestic sphere not just in foreign 
affairs. In practice, however, these powers were rarely used. The Governor General 
acted as an advisor. His suggestions were either taken on board or ignored. The 
JCPC acted like a court of appeal where the delineation of powers between the 
provinces and the federal government were being defined. Only one act in the thirty 
years following Confederation was declared ultra vires by the JCPC.73 The idea that 
the British government impinged on Canadian autonomy is unsustainable. If 
anything Canadian autonomy was extended, particularly following the successful 
negotiations over allowance of the Supreme Cou
c
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followed. Despite this growing confidence and relative autonomy, British Canadian 
nationalists wanted to reform imperial government.  
 
We noted in the previous chapter a growing desire among British Canadian 
nationalists for involvement in Canadian affairs with the United States and in 
imperial affairs more generally. In order to achieve this, Canadian nationalists 
advocated not independence from the Empire, as the Spanish colonies had done in 
the early nineteenth century. Canadian nationalists proposed closer institutional ties 
ithin the Empire, whether a defence council or a formal federation. In part the 
ed by 1885, the year the Imperial 
ederation League in Canada was formed, the potential for American involvement in 
da remaining uninterested in imperial and foreign 
ffairs abortive. The only solution for British Canadian nationalists was a federation 
w
choice of closer imperial ties was due to the structural position of Canada. This point 
is worth exploring further. 
 
Canada, only having been formed in 1867, was a young nation with borders and 
territory not yet fully settled and dependent upon Britain for military purposes, 
particularly naval defence. Not only would independence have meant Canada would, 
overnight, have to create its own diplomatic service, foreign affairs departments, 
navy, army and so on but it would also have to finance these changes. Although 
Canadian territory had been largely secur
F
internal disputes had once again been raised during the North-West Rebellion during 
which Louis Riel made a brief reappearance.  
 
Canada’s reliance on British capital, military and diplomatic support meant 
independence was not an option. The increasing self-confidence of the young nation, 
however, made the case for Cana
a
of the Empire in which Canada would have a say in imperial affairs, including 
relations with the United States.  
 
The latter issue was the most important for British Canadians in the late nineteenth 
century. The trade disputes between Canada and the United States will be examined 
in detail in the next chapter. But the perceived aggression and hostility of the United 
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States throughout the trade debate, during the Fenian invasions and in relation to the 
North West were all seen as a threat to Canada as part of the Empire. There were 
many reasons for the creation of the Canadian Confederation in 1867 but one of the 
most important was to protect against American aggression. The Trent Affair of 
1861, in which the British steamship the Trent was boarded and confederate envoys 
detained, and the St Alban’s incident of 1864, had stretched British and American 
relations close to breaking point. British support for southern confederates during the 
American Civil war angered the North. The success of the Northern States in the war 
led to fears of an invasion of British North America in reprisal. The likelihood of any 
American invasion was small but perception guides policy and actions as much as 
reality, therefore the perception of American aggression was vitally important in the 
reation of a Canadian Confederation. The Fenian invasion of 1866, to which the 
 threat to the 
mpire. Canada had to remain within the Empire to protect against this potential 
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United States government turned a blind eye, was taken as further evidence of 
American unfriendliness toward Canada and the British Empire.74
 
Canada was a central part of the Empire. From Halifax in the East to Vancouver 
Island in the West, Britain had excellent naval facilities from which it could patrol 
the North Atlantic and the Pacific Ocean. Completion of the Canadian Pacific 
Railway in the 1880s opened up a fast overland route to the Pacific and thereby to 
the Australasian colonies. This greatly increased the speed of imperial 
communications with the southern colonies. Canada could rightly claim to be the 
keystone of the British Empire. Any threat to Canada, therefore, was a
E
threat. Canadian imperialists argued that without the resources of the Empire, Canada 
could not survive and this would have been a fatal blow to the Empire.  
 
Scotland and Canada had very different relationships with Imperial Government. 
Scotland was, to an extent, a partner in that government with representation in 
Parliament and the cabinet where real political influence could be used. The 
dominance of England in the relationship watered down this influence but it was still 
important. The economic and military influence of Scots on the Empire was much 
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greater. Canada, by contrast, had few ties to Westminster and those ties that existed 
were weak. The Governor General rarely used his powers and over time became 
ore of a symbolic figure. Westminster did not become involved in domestic affairs 
 the British Empire. They answered in the negative. In 
rder to deal with the challenges faced by the Empire, mentioned at the beginning of 
form of imperial government that would 
self-government.75 As has been mentioned, Victorian attitudes to non-
hites precluded them from self-government. If they were seen as incapable of 
 these broad categories there were minor 
oints of difference but each of the schemes give some clues as to why imperial unity 
                                                
m
and the JCPC acted as a supreme court on interpretation of powers given to the 
Dominion and the Provinces under the BNA Act.  
 
This weak relationship between the self-governing colonies, in our case Canada, and 
the Imperial state caused concern among nationalists in Scotland and Canada. The 
crux of the matter was whether a relationship based on sentiment would be sufficient 
to ensure the maintenance of
o
this chapter, there had to be a fundamental re
include the settler colonies.  
 
The Schemes for Imperial Federation 
Both the speeches and pamphlets issued by nationalists in Scotland and British 
Canada contained various schemes to unite and strengthen the Empire. It should be 
mentioned here that only the white self-governing dominions were included. India, 
the jewel in the crown of the Empire, was specifically excluded on the grounds that it 
did not have 
w
governing themselves there could be no expectation of a share in the governance of 
the Empire.  
 
The schemes put forward for imperial unity were varied but fall into three broad 
categories: a union for defence, an imperial zollverein and a full political federation. 
Schemes for an Imperial Zollverein, or free trade zone, can be largely dismissed. A 
debate over the direction of British tariff policy was conducted towards the end of 
the nineteenth century but there was little chance of the British Government moving 
away from its policy of free trade. Within
p
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was desired and why a Greater British identity was articulated. A brief review of the 
he Empire. It was an extension of the Pax Britannica symbol 
nd as such was appropriated and expanded from the existing imperial discourse. 
 the IFL, outlined 




may or may not be 
identical; but one thing is quite certain – that whatever they may be, they will 
e subject to the same regulations for 
iscipline and drill. They would combine for action in time of war. This of course 
 
                                                
main points to each scheme will be made.  
 
Lord Reay’s Union for Imperial Defence  
The idea of a union of Britain and the colonies for defence was a common theme 
among the articles and speeches in the pages of the IFL’s journal. The peace of the 
world was seen as a mission capable of attainment through united efforts by the 
white dominions of t
a
This mission had at is heart Britannia’s supremacy and recognition as the world 
power by her rivals.  
 
In 1892, Lord Reay, a Scottish home rule supporter and member of
h
tead Branch of the IFL. Reay argued, “What the league desires in the first 
 the cohesiveness of the Empire for defensive purposes.”76  
The dangers which threaten us, and threaten the colonies 
become more threatening if we cannot rely on our united strength. What is 
the meaning of a united German, a united Italian Empire? That the various 
States felt that unity was the best safeguard against attack.77
 
Reay proposed that the colonies themselves establish and pay for their own army and 
navy contingents. This was an idea Charles Waddie of the SHRA also proposed in 
1895. He argued the entire male population of the Empire should be trained to arms 
at school and then as part of their apprenticeship.78 For Reay, these forces would be 
overseen by British admirals and generals and b
d
was the sticking point for the colonies. There must be some acceptance of the voice 
of the Dominions in any decision to go to war.  
 
76 Imperial Federation, 1 June 1892: 141 
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To appease this view, Reay advocated the formation of an Imperial Defence Council, 
a “council of the Empire with representatives of all its constituent parts to discuss the 
international relations of the Empire…”79 The decisions of the council would not be 
binding but its advice would be given serious consideration by the Foreign office 
prior to any decisions being made. The council would thus have achieved three 
things: it would have given the dominions a voice; prevented unilateral action by a 
ominion against the general interests of the Empire and strengthened the hand of the 
 under strain following British 
volvement in Egypt and the Sudan. As R.C. Munro-Ferguson, a supporter of 
Scottis
 
 present time the elements of unrest and 
insecurity were extraordinarily rife. They heard of alliances in favour of 
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Foreign Secretary in his negotiations with foreign powers.80
 
This proposal for a loose union of the Empire for defence and offence with an 
advisory body at its head was intended to meet the threats to the Empire mentioned 
in the introduction to this chapter. Europe at the end of the nineteenth century was a 
system of competing states finely balanced through diplomacy and alliance. German 
unification in the 1870s had altered the precarious balance of power that had been 
maintained in Europe and the new state was beginning to be seen as a threat to the 
Empire, especially following the Berlin Conference of 1884. The threat of the 
Russian Empire was evident from Queen Victoria’s reaction to the invasion of the 
Ottoman Empire in the late 1870s. The invasion was seen in terms of a competition 
between British and Russian supremacy in the world. The Australian colonies were 
threatened by Russia in any potential war between Britain and the Eastern State.81 
Diplomatic relations with the French were constantly
in
h Home rule and a member of the IFL argued, 
Upon the continent of Europe at the
peace, and while everyone talked of peace they found countries making the 
most lively preparations for war.82  
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Rosebery had expressed similar sentiments in 1889. “Every day, every month, every 
year, those great organisations which we call the military powers of Europe are 
producing fresh inventions of offence and defence…”83 The need for the cooperation 
and support of the Dominions through an Imperial Defence council was clear. By 
supporting British imperial actions in Africa and elsewhere, the Empire was 
resenting a united front to the rest of the world, one that demanded recognition of 
e used the Quebec 
onference of the British North American colonies prior to Canadian confederation 
as an e
 
tes has done, from European politics and 
devote all her energies to the development of her immense resources and the 
ave danger. British forces on their own would be 
                                                
p
British power in the world. 
 
The ultimate sign of confidence in the Empire’s supremacy in the world would have 
been withdrawal from the politics of European diplomacy altogether. This would 
allow Britons to focus attention on their mission to civilise Africa and Asia. William 
Mitchell, treasurer of the SHRA, had proposed home rule all round in the United 
Kingdom with the Imperial Parliament receiving representatives from the 
Dominions. Westminster, relieved of local business, could regulate the finances of 
the Empire to help pay for defences.84 Interestingly, Mitchell argued that the impetus 
for the federation of the Empire should come from the colonies. H
c
xample. For Mitchell, a federation of the settler colonies,  
So consolidated, and defended by a navy of overwhelming strength, Britannia 
might withdraw, as the United Sta
prosperity and happiness of her people, becoming a powerful and peaceful 
factor in the history of the world. 85
 
But by pursuing the imperial mission in Africa and Asia, the British Empire would 
come into contact and potential conflict with the other European imperial powers, 
such as France and Germany. Withdrawal from European diplomacy was not, 
therefore, an option. Seen in this light, the need to unite the Empire was all the more 
important. Without the moral and logistical support of the self-governing colonies 
the Empire would be in gr
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insufficient to cope with all possible threats. The need to unite the Empire for 
portant to Canadians. In 1886, even New Brunswick 
lergymen were advocating Imperial Federation as a way of protecting and defending 
the Em
 
struggle between Russia and Great Britain. France looks 
coldly upon England and there was not much faith to be put in Germany, and 
he empire “whose territory, the numbers of whose people, the 
trength of whose armaments would bring almost certain guarantee for the security 
d taken place, he proposed a treaty between 
ustralia, Canada, the Cape and Britain for mutual defence, “the maintenance of the 
empire
 
In this we should have a guarantee of the peace of the Empire and of the 
World. There is no nation so strong that she would not hesitate to embark on 
                                                
defence, therefore, was vital. 
 
Sir John A. Macdonald’s Imperial Defence Treaty 
As early as 1886, the Canadian Prime Minister, Sir John A. Macdonald, a member of 
the IFL and defender of Canadian autonomy, had argued for an imperial treaty in 
order to provide for better defence of the Empire. The threat to Canada and the rest 
of the Empire was clearly im
c
pire. 
The days of war were not yet over. The Eastern Question can never be settled 
without a gigantic 
the only guarantee of peace was a confederation of all the colonies and the 
Mother Country.86
 
The sheer size and extent of the Empire meant that any form of cooperation should 
lead to increased security. The union of the Empire for the purposes of defence 
would strengthen t
s
and peace of all.”87
 
In an interview published in Imperial Federation, Sir John proposed the federation of 
the Australian Colonies and Cape Colonies as a prelude to closer ties with Britain. 
Once the federation of these colonies ha
A
 and the flag of Great Britain.”88  
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a war with England, for she would not be fighting one nation, but three or 
four. The British race would become the police of the world.89
 
Macdonald’s scheme was less formal and lacked the detail of Lord Reay’s proposal 
but the principle was the same. In order to protect the Empire, the settler colonies and 
the metropolis must stand united against the threats of other powers.  
 
Relative Security – A response to threats to the Empire 
Theoretically the defence of the Empire is relatively easy to account for. One of the 
overriding factors for any imperial power must be the maintenance of empire.90 
Empire establishes trading relationships beneficial to merchants in the metropolis. In 
addition, imperial possessions are seen as a source of power and prestige in 
international relations. The radical liberal J.A. Hobson argued that the British Empire 
was sustained by excess capital gained from profitable trade and business at home.91 
Success at home led to imperial activities generating more excess profit. Empire thus 
drove success and was caused by success. So, despite the liberal rhetoric of the 
Manchester School of Cobden, Bright and Goldwin Smith of the mid-nineteenth 
century,92 there was no serious attempt by the British State to dispose of its colonial 
possessions. The reaction to the Indian Mutiny of 1857 provides ample evidence.93 
Rather than withdrawing from the region the East India Company was wound up and 
a Viceroy appointed thus symbolically strengthening political control in India.  
 
But according to Reynolds, the “only major constraint on states and their freedom to 
pursue their own interests is the countervailing force of rival capacities for exercising 
violence.”94 Security becomes a relative matter. The more powerful another state is 
perceived to be the greater the need to increase capacity for defence. This pursuit of 
power leads to states having rival spheres of influence as they attempt to control 
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other states, hegemonically or directly, in the pursuit of their own security. 
“Imperialism is thus a direct consequence of the security dilemma.”95  
 
But it has been widely recognised by political theorists that Federations can also be a 
consequence of the security dilemma. In situations where a group of states are 
incapable of defending themselves against potential aggressors they can combine for 
mutual defence.96 We have argued that Canadian confederation was partly a union of 
defence against the United States. The calls for a federation of the Empire were 
articulated in this way. Defence of the Empire, and peace in the world, could only be 
secured by the Federation of the Empire with Britannia at its head.  
 
This is exactly the situation Britain and the British Dominions found themselves at 
the end of the nineteenth century. Lord Reay himself argued that “no nation can feel 
a sense of security unless it knows that its armaments are of such a nature that it will 
not be molested by a neighbour.”97 In the late Victorian era the need to defend 
British economic interests abroad and to secure the Dominions was great. The 
increasing power of Germany following reunification, the power of Russia, the 
United States, as well as the French, all threatened the existence of the empire, as 
well as British influence in Europe. The sheer scale of the Empire and its far-flung 
lands brought the British state into potential conflict with any number of aggressors. 
The solution to this “security-dilemma” lay in a formal union for defence/offence in 
the form laid out by Lord Reay and other imperialists.  
 
In securing peace and security for imperial possessions, a federated British Empire 
would have gained the recognition of the rest of the world as the world power. There 
was a real sense among nationalists that, not only should the Empire be defensively 
secure, but that it should be recognised as the great force in the world. “Germany, 
France, the United States, and Russia among the most formidable of her rivals, are 
struggling hard for the winning post- the palm of international sovereignty.”98 But 
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with a federation “united in the one common cause they would be the greatest power 
on the face of the earth.”99  
 
In this sense the nationalist rhetoric becomes the Politics of Recognition. Societies 
see themselves being rated against other societies on the world stage.100 The aim of 
communities or nations is to be at the top of this rating. Weber called this the 
Prestige of Power, “the glory of power over other communities.”101 Challenges to the 
British Empire from the powers mentioned are perceived as attempts to displace the 
British Empire as the foremost power in the world. In the face of this challenge 
nationalists proposed the formation of some form of federal structure for the white 
dominions creating a powerful force in the world. The creation of this structure with 
the support of Britons across the world would result in a platform from which they 
could pursue world peace, no-one would be strong enough to challenge the Empire, 
and pursue the national mission of civilisation and liberty. This would bring 
recognition of the Empire as the world power.  
 
The Scottish Nationalists’ View of Imperial Federation 
The first flyer of the SHRA contained the objects of the movement. The first of these 
objects was “To maintain the integrity of the Empire, and secure that the voice of 
Scotland shall be heard in the Imperial Parliament as fully as at present when 
discussing Imperial Affairs.” 102 This reflected both the privileged position Scotland 
had within the Empire and the SHRA’s strong desire that Scotland should remain 
within the Empire. As was mentioned at the beginning of this chapter, the SHRA 
believed imperial affairs were not receiving the attention they were due. Augustine 
Birrell, the Liberal MP for West Fife and member of the SHRA, in seconding the 
motion for Scottish Home Rule in 1894, claimed constituents “sent them to 
Westminster, in the first place to look after the affairs of Westminster, and in the 
second place to pass laws for Scotland. As a matter of fact they had little time to do 
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either.”103 One part of the answer was to relieve Westminster of domestic legislation 
and create a national parliament for Scotland. Yet the SHRA provided little detail on  
how the Empire should be maintained. Consistently, however, they claimed that 
home rule would allow representatives of the home nations and the dominions to 
meet “upon an equal footing in the Imperial Parliament for the management of such 
affairs as are common to all or Imperial in their nature.”104 Apart from Charles 
Waddie, very few in the SHRA gave an imperial federation scheme more than a 
passing mention. A scheme of political federation can be discerned, however, among 
the writings of Mitchell and Waddie, the key pamphleteers in the movement. 
 
In 1895 Charles Waddie, secretary of the SHRA, published a pamphlet entitled The 
Federation of Greater Britain. The pamphlet contained a detailed discussion of the 
form imperial federation would take. As the SHRA had maintained for a number of 
years the prelude to the federation of the Empire was home rule all round. Only when 
the home nations managed their own national affairs in the same way as the 
dominions could a “true British Parliament…be open to receive the concentrated 
wisdom of the whole British World.”105  
 
This “true British Parliament” would be responsible for the greater functions of the 
state. It would manage the Empire as a whole and deal with foreign and imperial 
relations. The new British Parliament would have exclusive control of the army and 
navy, of diplomatic relations and of peace and war. It would be guardian of the 
whole interests of the Dominions and regulate commercial interstate relations. The 
British Parliament, however, already did all these things. The problem was that 
imperial affairs were neglected106and did not take into account the interests of the 
Dominions. With representation for the Dominions in the Westminster Parliament, 
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the legitimacy of Imperial Rule would be established. Only one problem would 
remain: the dominance of English MPs.  
 
 If ever such a system as we have sketched out is to work harmoniously, the 
perfect equality of all the states represented in the British Parliament must be 
recognised. When States enter into a Federation, they must surrender a 
portion of their natural rights, but all must surrender alike, for if one has a 
preponderating voice in the assembly the others become her vassals.107
 
Waddie was concerned that English MPs would overwhelm any Imperial Parliament 
with their numbers. This issue returns to the nationalist element of the SHRA’s 
discourse. Imperial federation would create a multi-national, and therefore 
potentially illegitimate, state. In order to eradicate this potential illegitimacy, Waddie 
argued that the principle of equality of nations should apply. Equal representation 
meant equal recognition of interests and identity. But democracy is also about 
numbers. The English were by far the most populous of all the potential nations in a 
proposed federation. 
 
With representation, however, comes responsibility. Waddie claimed that if “taxation 
without representation is contrary to the first principles of liberty…then it must be 
held that representation without taxation is equally unjust.”108 The services provided 
by the Imperial Parliament had to be paid for. If the Dominions wanted a say in 
running the Empire, they would have to contribute to its costs, including the Navy 
and the diplomatic service.  
  
In order to maintain relations between the various parts of the Empire, Waddie 
proposed a common customs Union, something like the European common market. 
“There could be no cordial relations between the members of the Federation, no 
homogenous state, if a war of tariffs was indulged in between them.”109 There had to 
be free trade within the Empire and a system of protection against foreign goods. 
Whilst it may have been unreasonable to ask the free traders to relinquish their dream 
there were at least some benefits.  
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If, then, there was absolute Free Trade in the whole British Dominions, - so 
vast and so varied is the climate and territory that every product under the sun 
can be produced on our own estate. We are thus rendered independent of all 
the world; we are self confined.110
 
The institution of an Imperial Zollverein (free trade within the empire) would assist 
in uniting the British Federation, which could then turn to the cultivation of the 
Empire.  
 
With an Imperial Federation of the type advocated by Waddie, the “British Empire 
would ere long attain a cohesion like that under which the United States have made 
such marvellous progress and become like them an important factor in preserving the 
peace of the world.”111 For Waddie, imperial federation would create a state, but not 
just any state. “It would create the most powerful state the world ever saw, no foreign 
power or combination of rivals could ever hope to wage a successful war against 
us.”112 The recognition of the Empire as the pre-eminent force in the world was vital 
for the maintenance of Greater British identity.  
 
The British Canadian Nationalists’ View of Imperial Federation 
British Canadian nationalists were generally more circumspect in making detailed 
proposals. The main aim was to generate support for the general principle of imperial 
unity and federation. One of the most in depth analyses of imperial federation, 
however, was made by a member of the executive committee of the Imperial 
Federation League in Canada. In a series of articles published in Imperial 
Federation, Jehu Matthews outlined a complete plan of a possible federal system for 
the management of the empire. Matthews argued that the Empire was to all intents 
and purposes a federation but lacked the corporate entity demanded of a federation. 
“In other words the Empire now imposes on itself the risks and responsibilities of 
Federalism whilst eschewing the increased strength to meet them which complete 
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union must confer.”113  He therefore argued that for federation to be accomplished 
throughout the Empire a federal authority must be formed. The key power of this 
authority must be in the realm of foreign affairs. “Since all communications with 
foreign powers occurs through diplomacy, the authority which is to regulate all 
relations with them must control it.”114 Because armaments must back diplomacy the 
federal authority must also have control of the armed forces. Of course this would 
have cost money. Matthews argued that the most effective way to pay for this would 
be through federal taxation and that customs revenue is the most effective revenue 
raiser.115 The conclusion therefore would be that,  
 
…the Federal authority must at least control diplomacy, armaments, finance 
and commerce, and that it must be a composite-State Government acting on 
individuals, I think we may safely conclude that neither at home nor in the 
Colonies would people be disposed to entrust these prerogatives to any other 
than a representative Government…116
 
A complete political union of Great Britain and the Dominions was proposed in 
which each would elect representatives to attend a federal assembly/parliament that 
would deal with foreign affairs, defence, finance and commerce. This is very similar 
in style to the federation envisaged by Waddie above and by Alexander Galt, one 
time Canadian High Commissioner. Galt saw Dominion representatives being sent to 
Westminster and the Imperial Parliament as serving similar functions to those 
outlined by Matthews.117
 
Like Waddie, Matthews was aware of the potential illegitimacy such a federation 
would create. Matthews, however, took the solution in a different direction and 
argued that population should be used as the basis for representation in the federal 
authority.118 Although English MPs would by far make up the majority, Matthews 
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argued that the federated imperial state would not be legislating for nations within 
the Empire but for the entire imperial community itself. The idea of a Greater British 
community, Britannia, as the focus for Imperial Governance was thus made. The 
newly constituted legislative body would, in concert with a reformed House of 
Lords, legislate on purely imperial matters on behalf of the Greater British nation. 
The interests of the Britannia would be represented, not those of Scotland, England, 
Canada or the Cape.   
 
The settler nature of the Empire ensured the principles of democratic government, 
the right to a say in affairs affecting your interests, were exported to the Empire. The 
extension of responsible and representative government to Canada in the 1840s 
illustrates this point. By extending democratic government to the colonies, the 
Imperial Government conceded the right of Britons abroad to a say in affairs 
affecting their interests. Initially domestic affairs were the focus of these powers. But 
this extension of powers also laid the basis for Britons across the Empire claiming 
Imperial Governance of their affairs with other states was illegitimate. There claims 
of illegitimacy could be presented as a declaration of the right to self-determination. 
The symbols and ties that bound Canada and Scotland to the Empire meant Britannia 
and not Scotland or Canada was the object of self-determination.  
 
There was, however, one other problem: customs duties. Given the British 
government’s adherence to free trade principles there seemed little likelihood they 
would start to impose customs tariffs on imports. Likewise, the dominions relied 
heavily on income generated from their customs duties. Since fifty per cent of their 
imports were from the British Isles it was unlikely that they would adopt free trade. 
According to Matthews, the only answer was to leave the imposition of customs 
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Extending and Reinforcing the Imperial State 
Political federation would go further than a defence union in terms of the 
representation offered to the Dominions. It is clear, at least from Waddie’s quote, 
that the same motives were present in these proposals. Recognition of the political 
federation as “the most powerful state the world ever saw” was vital if Britain was to 
maintain its pre-eminent position in the world. Securing the Empire through union 
with the Dominions would ensure no other state ventured to attack any part of the 
Empire so solving the “security dilemma.” 
 
The schemes described above were intended to alter the machinery of the Empire and 
give the white dominions of Canada, Australia, New Zealand and South Africa a 
voice in the management of the Empire. The relationship of dominance would be 
removed and Britons overseas no longer viewed as mere colonists but as Britons 
participating in the imperial project. It would create a ruling body, a state, to which 
all the white dominions were eligible to participate. There were several assumptions 
that underpinned these proposed reforms. Firstly, there was a view that Canada had 
outgrown its status as a colony and was now ready to be an equal or at least junior 
partner in the empire. Secondly, that Britons regardless of where they lived had a 
right to a voice in their own affairs. Finally, that neither Britain nor the Dominions 
were prepared to give up or leave the Empire. 
 
There was also an underlying assumption of the existence of a white British 
community that existed beyond the extent of the British Isles. In claiming that “Self-
government is the inherent right of the British people, no matter where they might 
pitch their tents” as Principal Grant did in the 1890s, nationalists were actually 
calling for recognition of Britannia through the representation of all its members in a 
reformed imperial government.120 In other words, regardless of which territory of the 
empire Britons lived they had the same rights to voice in all affairs that affected the 
common welfare of Britons everywhere. British Canadians had the same rights to 
representation in the foreign affairs of the Empire as the Scots because they belonged 
to the Britannia.  
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In this sense nationalists saw Britannia as having two roles. Firstly they used the 
British imperial community to provide legitimacy for their schemes of imperial 
unity. Britannia existed therefore it needed a state of its own. The state would be 
strengthened and its actions legitimated by the existence of Britannia. In other ways, 
however, they saw the role of the imperial state to increase the sense of unity within 
Greater British community. Without the state Britannia would disappear. The state 
institutions would instil a greater sense of identity by allowing Britons across the 
world a say in the running of the Empire. The interests of Britons overseas would be 
recognised, therefore removing, or at least reducing the likelihood of a schism in 
Britannia.   
 
The Concept of a Greater British Identity - Britannia 
Both Scotland and Canada were tied into a wider British community with which they 
identified and that led the nationalists to build a discourse that maintained the 
imperial relationship. A feeling of community existed between the home nations and 
the white dominions, largely based on the existence of large numbers of British 
migrants in Canada and the other self-governing colonies. According to Hyam, 
around 10 million emigrants left the United Kingdom for the Empire between 1815 
and 1912.121 Scotland’s population in this period peaked at just over 4 million.122 In 
this sense, it may be more appropriate to consider Canada as a peripheral society of 
Great Britain and to see a Greater Britain, or Britannia, as a separate imperial 
community encompassing the British settler colonies and the British mainland.   
 
A distinction was made between self-governing colonies, such as Canada and 
bureaucratic colonies such as India. This distinction was based on the racial 
principles of social Darwinism.123 Coloured people, according to this contention, 
were incapable of governing themselves. White Europeans on the other hand were 
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capable of governing themselves. But the distinction went further than this. The self-
governing dominions had been largely peopled by British immigrants who, as 
subjects of Her Majesty abroad, had the same rights of self-government as those 
living in the British Isles.124 These ready made collaborators with the Empire are 
vital to understanding the position taken by nationalists in the late nineteenth century. 
The myths of the British Diaspora, as articulated by nationalists, provide evidence 
for the existence of Britannia, a community distinct from, but linked to, the British 
Empire. It existed within the Empire but did not constitute the whole Empire. 
Britannia’s mission was to spread civilisation and liberty to the rest of the world.  
 
The importance of Empire in uniting Britain 
The nature of British-ness is not a straightforward concept. One of the most 
comprehensive treatments of the concept of a British nation comes from Linda 
Colley. In her historical review from the Treaty of Union to the coronation of Queen 
Victoria, Colley argues that the commitment to a common Protestant religion and its 
defence against the Catholic French in a succession of wars culminating in the 
Napoleonic Wars united the English, Scots and Welsh into a British nation.125 Of 
course there were differences in the nature of Protestantism within Britain, from the 
Presbyterian Scots, to the Episcopalian English and Non-Conformist Welsh. 
Nevertheless the common experience of the Protestant mission against France would 
have been important in uniting these disparate branches. In addition, the Empire 
acquired as a result of the victories over the French in the Seven Years War provided 
opportunities for the non-English Britons to become part of the British ruling class 
both at home and abroad as the need for imperial administrators grew.126 The Empire 
heightened the sense that in some way Britain’s destiny was providential. “God had 
entrusted Britons with Empire, they believed, so as to further the worldwide spread 
of the Gospel, and as testimony to their status as the Protestant Israel.”127 Colley 
acknowledged the existence of Scots, English and Welsh identities but saw the new 
British identity as superimposed over them.128
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In this sense Colley saw identity as layered. Scottishness sat beneath a layer of 
Britishness. This is not to say that she saw British identity as more important than a 
sense of Scottishness. Rather in geographical terms it was a broader concept. We can 
relate this to the model outlined in our theoretical framework. Dual or multiple 
identities exist like concentric rings in which each outer ring relies on the existence 
of the inner ring. Since the inner ring, our local identity, is the only culturally 
experienced identity, each outer identity becomes more simplistic and less 
representative of individuals129. Colley’s idea that British identity was superimposed 
over a Scottish identity is compatible with this model.    
 
Colley focused very much on the experiential element of identity formation. The 
experience of fighting a common enemy and sharing a common religion created 
British identity. There are problems with this thesis, although they are perhaps more 
definitional rather than substantial. Morton has argued that Colley’s thesis implied 
the existence of a united British civil society as well as a united British state. Since 
this civil society did not exist, rather there were separate civil societies for Scotland 
and England at least, there could not have existed an overarching British nation.130 
Of course, the central aspect of Morton’s argument is that Scots national identity 
used civil society rather than the state as its outlet. This does not mean, however, that 
all identities only find their expression through civil society or are happy to express 
themselves through civil society. If a state exists that coincides with a given 
community then the state will attempt to build a “nation” within its boundaries in 
order to provide the actions of the state with legitimacy. Guibernau argued for a 
distinction to be made between legitimate and illegitimate states in this sense. 
Illegitmate states, those containing more than one nation, attempt to homogenise the 
population within its territory and thus create a new nation.131 The focus of that 
nation’s loyalty as a result would be the state not civil society.   
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Bernard Crick claimed that Colley had mistaken the British phenomenon as 
nationalism when in fact she had observed a British patriotism, or loyalty to the 
state.132 There may be some merit in his critique. Wars are generally fought for the 
state, although the rhetoric of nationalism (or religion) will often be used to justify 
them. But other academics, notably Tom Nairn and James Mitchell have argued that 
the Monarchy (Nairn) and the Crown in Parliament (Mitchell) have been important 
in developing a sense of British national identity.133 But in both these arguments the 
monarchy and parliament are both aspects of the state, if by state we mean a 
sovereign power. Parliament, symbolically at least, makes decisions in the name of 
the Queen.  
 
Here we are entering the realm of distinctions between nationalism and patriotism, 
where the latter is portrayed as loyalty to the state. But states mobilise and represent 
nations for their own ends and nation use states to ensure representation of their 
identity. The distinction between patriotism and nationalism seems unnecessary and 
unhelpful, certainly in this case. Both these concepts have communities that identify 
with certain symbols. Whether these symbols are created, or adopted, by the state or 
the nation is not really the point. Identity, after all, is experiential. Both states and 
nationalist elites promote nationalism. Where there is a potential for illegitimacy, as 
in multi-national states, the attempts to promote nationalism may conflict with an 
existing nation. If that state fails to co-opt this nation into its project then 
nationalism, as a political force, is likely.  
 
There can be no doubt that Parliament and the Monarchy are symbols of a British 
identity. Both represented the people of Great Britain in domestic and foreign affairs. 
The experience of living under a common Monarchy and a common Parliament 
would have been instrumental in creating a British identity, in the same way that 
Canada First and others tried to use the existence of the federal governmental 
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machinery to instil a sense of Canadian identity. The religious wars with France and 
sharing a common religion and economy would have added to the sense of British 
identity. But the biggest factor for the formation of a British identity by the time of 
the confederation of Canada was the imperial experience.  
 
As Robbins has claimed, for Britons, Empire “was their ‘common work’ and as such, 
held a foremost place in forging the national unity of Britain itself.”134 Others have 
claimed that as the Empire was only really acquired in the post 1707 period it formed 
a more important part of a British identity than it did a Scots, Welsh or English 
identity.135 Of course, the argument of this thesis is that nations and nationalism are 
modern phenomena. The Union of 1707 would not have created a British identity 
over night. The experience of the Jacobite Rebellions and the subsequent inclusion of 
the Highlanders in the British Army were important in including Scotland in the 
British project. The success of the Highland Regiments in New France and India also 
helped instil a British identity among Scots. But British identity only took on great 
importance during the Napoleonic Wars. As Devine argued, during this time the 
martial tradition of the Scottish Highlands began to play an important part in a 
rejuvenated Scottish identity that saw itself on equal terms with the English in the 
Union and therefore the Empire.136 The contribution of the Highland regiments in the 
Napoleonic Wars allowed Scots to see themselves as contributing to the British 
project. Empire, therefore, could only become an important factor in British national 
identity in the nineteenth century following the defeat of the French. The important 
point is that the Empire gave the British (Protestant) nation a mission to spread its 
religion, liberty and civilisation to the “savages” of Africa and Asia., As Niall 
Ferguson has argued, in many ways missionaries like Dr Livingstone were the heroes 
of the age.137 It was their goal to convert the heathen and bring them civilisation, the 
rule of law and liberal government. This national mission was as vital in forging a 
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British national identity as were the common experiences of monarchy, Parliament 
and war. 
 
We can take this idea further. The high levels of emigration from Britain to Canada, 
to take one example, meant British identity was transported to new lands within the 
Empire. Indeed the unity of the Empire was to be found in the sentiments of 
Britishness held by those living in the metropolis and the white settlers of the self-
governing dominions. Robbins has argued that in many respects the white settlers 
were more truly British “because there the various peoples of Britain lived more 
closely alongside each other than they did at home.”138 The British connection, he 
claimed, was a, “unifying response in an environment which was still fraught with 
uncertainty, not least concerning relationships either with indigenous peoples or with 
French- speakers…”139 There can be little doubt that the common connection the 
British experience gave immigrants would have been vital in unifying the new 
settlements. The pomp and ceremony of imperial occasions, the institutions of 
government, the symbol of the Governor-General and his Lieutenant Governors and 
above all the symbolism of the Monarchy helped to maintain a British identity. In the 
new world, this British identity would be transformed to take account of the new 
circumstances, thus altering British identity into a British Canadian identity.  
 
This shared British identity existed in both the metropolis and the dominions. We 
can, therefore, begin to talk of the existence of a Greater British community, 
Britannia. The extent of that community and its far removal from the national 
identities of its members meant symbols, such as the monarchy, were vitally 
important in the imagining Britannia.  
 
Symbols and invented traditions are vital elements of any identity. They establish 
membership of a group by establishing symbols that differentiate those within the 
group from those outside the group. They create boundaries between groups that aid 
in imagining the psychological bond between members of the nation. Only those who 
identify with the symbols and the manner in which they are expressed can understand 
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themselves as belonging to the group. Symbols also establish relations of power and 
inculcate beliefs and value systems.140 Both the monarchy and the Protestant mission 
were important in establishing who belonged to Britannia and the values important to 
Greater Britain.  
 
The Monarchy as a symbol of British-ness 
The power of the Monarchy in the Victorian era is difficult to understand in the 
modern era when its role is now wholly symbolic and even its symbolic significance 
has been eroded. It is inconceivable that today’s Parliament would debate the motion 
“that the influence of the Crown has increased, is increasing and ought to be 
diminished” as it did in the 1870s.141 The diminished power of the monarchy 
following the Reform Acts, however, meant the symbolic role of the Monarchy grew 
in importance.142 Increasing international pressure on Britain’s position in world, 
which had been virtually non-existent since the defeat of Napoleon in 1815, allowed 
the monarchy to become a symbol of the British community.143 In the late nineteenth 
century, with Victoria approaching her Golden Jubilee, the Monarchy’s symbolic 
role was vital to the maintenance of Britannia. Although the supremacy of Parliament 
or, to be more accurate, the Crown in Parliament, had been established, the 
Monarchy, as Head of State, remained important as a symbol of Great Britain. But 
the Monarchy was also a symbol of the Empire. As the Canadian High 
Commissioner claimed in his speech to the Annual meeting of the IFL in London, the 
Queen was recognised as the “tie that unites us to the Mother Country.”144  As there 
were few political links to London, the Queen, through her Royal Officer the 
Governor-General, embodied the connection between Canada and the Empire. She 
commanded the navy and army. It was Victoria’s name on foreign treaties.145
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The Queen commanded loyalty, not just as the monarch of Great Britain, but as head 
of the Empire. In an analysis of the source of sovereignty, James Edgar, a member of 
Canada First and Liberal MP, argued, that, “Canadians are loyal, just as Englishmen 
to Queen and Parliament, and that Parliament is the one which makes our laws, the 
Parliament of Canada.”146 Here then we have the acknowledgement of the principle 
of the Crown in Parliament. Canadians were loyal to the sovereign law making body: 
the Canadian Parliament in Ottawa. But Edgar takes this further. Victoria was Queen 
of Canada and as such commanded the loyalty of Canadians. “In executive and 
administrative matters she represents the power and dignity of the Dominion. Her 
name is the symbol under which our people govern themselves. We are therefore 
loyal to it.”147 In essence Edgar’s argument was a nationalist one. Canadian’s did not 
owe loyalty to the Westminster Parliament but to Ottawa. But there was no 
discussion of Canada becoming a Republic, as her neighbour to the south had done. 
In maintaining allegiance to the symbolism of the Crown, Edgar was confirming his 
allegiance to something bigger than Canada: Britannia.  
 
The monarchy was often used in this sense, as Queen not of Britain but of Canada. 
Grant exclaimed in an address to the first meeting of the IFLC, “We are Britons. We 
are the Canadian subjects of Her Majesty!”148 At the same meeting Edgar Crow 
Baker, MP, an ex-navy man, claimed that “…wherever the British flag floated there 
was a strong feeling of loyalty to our Queen and the old Country…”149 Thus the 
monarch was seen as neither Canadian, English nor Scots. The Monarchy 
represented Britannia, Greater Britain. 
 
The tradition of visiting Balmoral, on Royal Deeside in Scotland, every autumn 
raised the profile of the Monarchy, particularly Queen Victoria, North of the English 
border. The annual visits gave the Crown a Scottish tinge. The tradition began in 
1848 and continues to the present day. Highland newspapers, such as the Inverness 
Courier and The Northern Courier, carried news of the Queen’s ascent of mountains 
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in the Cairngorm and Grampian mountains near Balmoral. In the late nineteenth 
century it was common for Prime Ministers and politicians to visit the Queen at 
Balmoral on official business. The Queen’s obvious affection for Scotland, 
particularly after the death of Prince Albert who had acquired the estate, certainly 
developed the Romantic Jacobite and Kailyard myths of Scottish identity. Scottish 
tourism boomed as a result and the Highlands became a romantic symbol of 
Scotland.150 But Queen Victoria’s presence also emphasised the importance of 
British identity in Scotland. It reminded Scots that their Monarch was also the Head 
of the British State, the British Empire and, therefore of Greater Britain. Scottish 
nationalists were well aware that the cohesion of the British Empire rested on the 
“Golden link of the Crown…”151
 
As a symbol of Britannia, the Monarchy united Britons across the Empire, thus 
providing some cement for the cohesion of Greater Britain. The Crown differentiated 
Britons from other nations, some of which may have been republics or had their own 
monarchy. Only those identifying with the Monarchy would have understood 
themselves as belonging to the imagined community that was Britannia. Yet it is 
clear from the above discussion that the Monarchy meant something different in 
Scotland and Canada. The Monarchy was seen not only as British and Imperial but 
also as Scottish and Canadian. Victoria’s annual presence at Balmoral allowed Scots 
to understand the Monarchy as their own. The Governor General performed a similar 
function in Canada. In this way the Monarchy as an Imperial symbol was seen 
through local eyes. The symbolic boundaries of Imperial identity were mediated 
through Scottish and British Canadian identity. The Empire was firmly placed in its 
local context. 
 
The Protestant Mission as a symbol of British-ness 
We have already noted above the importance of the Protestant religion to British 
identity, especially its defence against Catholic France. But Protestantism was 
important in the context of the British Empire for different reasons. The 
Enlightenment and nineteenth century liberalism both found their origins in the 
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Protestant tradition.152 The rationalism of this tradition laid the way for progress. The 
benefits of free government and prosperity flowed from these various traditions. The 
mission of Britannia to spread the benefits of Protestantism, and therefore liberty, 
progress and prosperity, to inferior races, became a core symbol of Greater British 
identity.  
 
In reality of course the mission was as much to bring peace to areas considered 
economically viable as sources of raw materials or trading partners.153 This is not the 
important point. By stabilising the region through trade and good government the 
area became economically viable. Although motives for empire may have been 
economic, the rhetoric of the mission was to bring peace and Christianity (in its 
Protestant form) to Africa and Asia.  
 
For example, Frederick Young in the mid 1870s, prior to the formation of the IFL, 
claimed that it was,  
 
…the mission of Great Britain to be, by the Providence of God, the principle 
colonising country of the world. With sublime courage and most devoted 
zeal, her noble army of missionaries are ever going forth with the bible in 
their hands, penetrating into new regions at the peril of their lives, to preach 
the gospel of their Divine Master to the heathen, and spread the knowledge of 
Christian civilization…”154
 
Even in the 1870s, twenty years after the publication of Dr. Livingston’s celebrated 
Missionary Travels and Researches in South Africa, missionaries were being 
venerated as “Victorian Supermen”155 But Young’s words convey something more 
than just converting the “heathen” to Christianity. Christian civilisation meant the 
Victorian view of civilisation: the rule of law, scientific and moral progress, as well 
as the diffusion of Christianity.156  
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In the 1890s this sense of mission had not abated. Baillie Macpherson chairing a 
meeting of the Edinburgh and East of Scotland branch of the IFL claimed that, “God 
in his providence had entrusted to the British nation, and to the Anglo Saxon race, 
the privilege of carrying the torch of civilization and Christianity to the greater part 
of the known and habitable globe.”157 There was no sense of civilisation and 
Christianity being separated. The two were inextricably entwined. To be Christian 
was to be civilised and open to the benefits of liberty and progress. To be civilised 
was to be open to Christianity and moral progress. The evolutionary theories of 
Darwin led to the view that White Christians were at the pinnacle of human 
evolution. Social Darwinism, with the backing of Protestantism, gave the traders and 
financiers an excuse, if one were needed, to exploit African and Asian territory.  
 
Yet the scepticism of the motives of the late Victorians in their support for Empire 
may be misplaced. The likes of Principal Grant, a Canadian educator and the man 
behind the unification of the Canadian Presbyterian Churches, saw in the Empire 
something grander than capitalist gain. The Empire did not bother itself with the 
trifling problems of a state.  
 
The work that the British Empire has in hand is far grander than the 
comparatively parochial duties with which states are content to deal. Its 
problems are wider and more inspiring; yet at the same time, the white race 
that alone, so far has proved itself first for self-government, lives by 
itself…Already our sons are taking part in introducing civilization into 
Africa, under the aegis of the flag, and in preserving the Pax Britannica 
among the teeming millions of India and South-Eastern Asia…158
 
Not only did Grant implicitly split the empire into Britons (the white race) and the 
rest, thus confirming that at the head of the Empire was a Greater British nation. He 
also saw the mission of the empire to bring peace to warring tribes. The Pax 
Britannica, for Grant, was not just a slogan. In Africa, for example, millions of 
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square miles “formerly the prey of incessant rapine and war- are now open to the 
highest forms of colonisation and civilization.”159 The extension of British rule had 
brought relative peace to the region. This was the beneficial results of Britannia’s 
mission. 
 
Grant believed the unity of Britannia through the creation of a federal state was vital 
for the Christian mission. The “great underlying force” of Britannia, and therefore 
the Empire, was the cause of humanity and God.160 The collapse of the Empire 
would mean the end and failure of this cause. To prevent the collapse of the Empire, 
Britannia had to be united through an imperial federation. 
 
As a symbol of Britannia and the Empire, the Protestant mission achieved one 
important result. It established the symbolic boundary between “them” and “us” by 
differentiating British Protestants from the rest of the world, particularly Africans 
and Asians. It also established the power relationship between the two. By 
establishing Britannia’s mission as bringing civilisation to the dark corners of the 
world, this symbol clearly demarcated Britons as superior to, at the very least, non-
Europeans. This assumed superiority allowed Britannia to support the right to rule 
inferior races throughout Asia and Africa. The assumption of superiority and the 
right to rule those incapable of liberal rule thus created the conditions for imperial 
conquest. This view was prevalent in the discourse of nationalists in both Scotland 
and British Canada.  
 
The British Diaspora and Britannia 
One of the most important aspects of the British Empire was the massive level of 
emigration to the colonies. Around 10 million emigrants left the United Kingdom for 
the Empire in the nineteenth century thus legitimising British rule in the white 
dominions. It was this central fact that allowed politicians in the late nineteenth 
century to argue that British “emigrants have been engaged in the more arduous task 
of extending the influence, commerce and civilisation of Great Britain in Canada, 
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Australia, [and] South Africa…”161 These emigrants were not only working in their 
own self interest but were working for Great Britain. The nature of the population 
and their institutions of government meant these areas were seen as “extensions of 
the old country”162 There was no sense of there being an imperial purpose. How 
could there be when Canada had imposed a protective duty on imports of British 
goods? Rather it was for the benefit of a Greater Britain. This myth of a British 
Diaspora is the key to arguing the existence of Britannia. 
 
Before analysing some of the rhetoric that surrounded this myth of the British 
Diaspora and its nature, there is one problem that must be addressed. When a review 
of nationalist literature is undertaken a definitional problem quickly becomes 
apparent. The following phrases are all used when discussing what we have 
described as the British Diaspora: “the Anglo-Saxon race”, “the English people”, 
“the British race”, “the English nationality” and “Britons”. This is not an exhaustive 
list but merely serves to indicate an important methodological problem faced by any 
student of nationalism when looking at this time period. This study aims to deal with 
the problem by accepting all of these phrases as indicating those who inhabit the 
British Isles or have migrated from the British Isles or are descendants of those who 
emigrated from the British Isles for the settler colonies. None of the phrases will be 
taken as indicative of there being a nation. Indeed there will be no assumption that 
any of these relate to any conceptual category that social and political scientists 
would use today. Rather the metaphors used by various writers to indicate the nature 
of the relationship between migrant and home based Britons will be analysed. It is 
from these metaphors that the existence of a Greater Britain can be discerned.  
 
The speeches and pamphlet literature of the SHRA and the Imperial Federation 
League on both sides of the Atlantic are littered with references to this idea of the 
British Diaspora.  At the initial meeting of the League in Canada, George Foster, an 
M.P. for New Brunswick, echoed the feelings held by most of those attending,  
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…our patriotism reaches further [than Canada] and across three thousand 
miles of billowing wave embraces the grand old motherland from whose loins 
we sprang, whose historic past is our heritage, whose present cannot cease to 
deeply interest us…Canada is not the limit of our patria; it extends to every 
shore and land over which the British flag waves and British soldiers keep 
watch.163
 
Here is a clear example of the definitional problems faced when using historical 
cases. In the modern day patriotism equates with loyalty to the state, its institutions 
and its territory. But it is clear from Foster’s address that he strongly identifies not 
just with Canada but with the wider British Empire. This is not just loyalty to the 
state but evidence of something much deeper: a Greater British identity. Foster 
identified with the British heritage and saw the territory of Britannia as the full extent 
of the Empire. He also outlined the imperial relationship of dominance over this 
territory where “British soldiers keep watch.”  
 
The Marquis of Lorne, a former Governor-General and secretary to a cabinet 
minister, claimed it was this Greater British identity that held the Empire together.   
 
We have dislocated the central power so much that it is only by a greater 
balance of moral and physical strength that any central authority can be said 
to exist at all, and then only by the free assumption to it on the part of the 
colonies, of the power it retains.164
 
The Empire, at least the self-governing parts of the settler empire, was held together 
by sentiment, not a relationship of power. The self-governing colonies accepted the 
central authority of Westminster because they shared a British heritage based around 
Parliamentary institutions, the monarchy and the Protestant mission. The focus of 
this identity was the relationship between the self-governing dominions and the 
“motherland.”  
 
Ernest Renan argued that nations have souls comprising “the possession in common 
of a rich legacy of remembrances” and “the actual consent, the desire to live 
                                                 
163 IFL, Imperial Federation League in Canada - Report of the First Meeting: 41 
164 Marquis of Lorne, Imperial Federation: 13 
 200
together, the will to continue to value the heritage all hold in common.”165 The 
members of a nation have a history of living together and want to continue living 
together because they value the benefits of having lived together in the past. This was 
the type of language used by George Foster in his address to the first meeting of the 
IFLC. Britons, those who came from Britain or were descendants of British 
emigrants, valued the heritage of living together and wanted to continue living 
together. In other words the history of the British Isles also belonged to British 
emigrants in Canada, Australia, New Zealand and so on. George Cockburn claimed 
at the first meeting of the IFLC, that “We are sharers in the great glories of her 
[Britain’s] inheritance in literature, science and art…”166  
 
The IFL claimed that the dominions still wanted to live with each other not just under 
the umbrella of the British Empire, but as a Greater British nation, sharing the 
inheritances of the past and the visions for the future. The Scottish Tory Sir Charles 
Pearson argued at a meeting of the Edinburgh and East of Scotland Branch of the 
IFL, that they “should see to it that the nationality of Britain was not only spread 
over the globe, but the state should follow the nationality and be coextensive with 
it.”167 In other words nationalists wanted to ensure all members of Britannia were 
represented in their own state, a federated state that ruled over the rest of the Empire. 
By gaining representation for Britons in Canada, the Cape and Australia, the 
relationship of dominance by Westminster would have been broken. By breaking the 
metropolis/colony relationship recognition of Britannia would have been achieved. 
The interests of the Empire would no longer be the narrow interests of merchants or 
the Colonial Office in the British Isles. Britons across the world, those most affected 
by Colonial policy, would have a say in running the greatest Empire in the world. As 
Charles Waddie, Secretary of the SHRA claimed, a true Imperial Parliament would 
“embrace the concentrated wisdom of the whole British World.”168 The sentiment 
holding together the Empire was the sentiment of belonging to Britannia. 
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This idea has its roots in the right of national self-determination and the extension of 
democracy. The imperial relationship is inherently undemocratic, involving as it does 
subjection, domination and control. But the settler nature of parts of the British 
Empire meant the ideas of democracy would have spread from the metropolis to 
Britons across the globe. Once responsible government had been given to these 
areas, the rights of Britons abroad to a say in matters that affected them had been 
established. Nationalists were asserting the right of all Britons within the Empire to a 
say in all matters affecting their interests. They were asserting the right of self-
determination for Britannia.  
 
James Edgar, another Canadian M.P. and former Canada First member, took the idea 
of the Diaspora further. Speaking of “the motherland”, he introduced the idea of race 
and blood. “One with her in blood and language, one in the civilization of today and 
in the traditions of her storied past” Britain and Canada share, “the warlike instincts 
of our race.”169 Although race and blood provide apt imagery to assist the imagining 
of the nation they are even more problematic concepts than those of state and nation. 
These ideas, whilst problematic, stretch the invented tradition of Britannia to a new 
dimension, that of ethnicity.  
 
Anthony Smith defined an ethnic nation as “first and foremost a community of 
common descent,” including elements of genealogy, presumed descent ties and 
customs and traditions.170 These notions were introduced into the conception 
Britannia, not just by Edgar, but by numerous other nationalists. The theme was 
extended to the metaphor of a family relationship between Britain and the dominions. 
The basic idea of the British Isles as the mother country and the white dominions as 
her children was a common one. This has two aspects to it. Firstly it was used to 
justify the use of both nationalist and imperialist rhetoric in nationalist literature. 
This will be explored in more depth in the following chapter. But it was also used to 
extend the concept of the ethnic nation. The white dominions were descendants of 
Britain. Charles Waddie, for example, argued,  
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…hitherto the mother country has treated her children with consideration and 
indulgence while they have been set up for themselves, she has freed them 
from burdens that fall to all self-governing states, their prosperity and welfare 
being very dear to her.171
 
The President of the IFLC, D’Alton McCarthy, argued that with “the consummation 
of the federation of the Empire would dawn the brightest day in Canadian history 
when the sons and daughters of the motherland would be united.”172
 
Again, the imagery conjured up by this type of language can only have one aim: to 
aid the imagining of what it meant to belong to Britannia. Like all invented traditions 
the myth of the British Diaspora and the use of the mother/child relationship 
established cohesion among the members of Britannia and differentiated them from 
other groups. It united the white dominions with the metropolis. Canadians were 
Britons living abroad. But it also united the white dominions with each other. They 
were brothers and sisters who shared the family heritage handed down from the 
motherland. This was equally as important as the union with the motherland as 
without the unity of the white dominions, a federated empire would be much less 
powerful in the world.  
 
By uniting Britannia through this myth of the British Diaspora and the mother/child 
metaphor, nationalists created a symbolic boundary of the family that clearly 
differentiated Britons from all other nationalities. It firmly categorised Britannia as 
an ethnic nation. As Smith argued the importance of genealogy and origin myths to 
an ethnie is crucial. In the mother/child metaphor it was not only clear where the 
colonies had come from but the relationship was set to continue.  
 
In the eighteenth century the French Economist A.R.J. Turgot referred to colonies as 
fruit, “which cling to the tree only til they ripen.”173 Professor Schurman of 
Dalhousie University in Halifax, Nova Scotia, speaking at the First meeting of the 
IFLC in Montreal, took this metaphor further.  
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…when the fruit drops, do not seeds strike roots into the soil, and in time, 
surround the venerable parent stem with a forest of younger growth, whose 
congregated trunks, and high overarching and interlacing branches, gaining 
strength by their union, form a massive whole, which is able to defy the 
winds and blasts of time and circumstance.174
 
This is a variation on the theme of the mother/child nature of the relationship 
between Britain and the white dominions. The key point to be taken from this 
metaphor is the idea that when united the family/empire is more capable of defending 
itself “against the winds and blasts of time” than they would be individually. But 
again the imagery of the metaphor conjures ideas of blood lines and descent clearly 
marking Britannia as an ethnic nation. The white dominions were given the essence 
of Britishness through the fruit of the mother country. They share common 
characteristics because they share this essence.  
 
At the heart of these metaphors lies the conceptual distinction between civic and 
ethnic nations.175 Ethnic nations are based on ties of blood, genealogy, customs and 
traditions. Civic nations are based more on ideas of citizenship, although customs 
and traditions are also important. The best distinction is to think of ethnic nations and 
civic nations as “a sense of tribe” and “a sense of place” respectively.176 Unlike 
ethnic nationalism people are relatively able to chose a civic identity, however liberal 
or illiberal that identity may be. McCrone argues modern Scotland displays a civic 
nationalism. This is easy to understand. There is a definite landscape that is Scottish. 
There are clearly marked geographical boundaries. Anyone living within these 
boundaries can claim to be Scottish. The same could not be said for the nineteenth 
century Empire, nor perhaps with nineteenth century Scotland. In some cases 
imperial boundaries had yet to be fixed. The sheer extent of the Empire was difficult 
to comprehend in an age when transportation was only just beginning to make the 
world smaller, in the figurative sense. Above all, admitting that anyone within the 
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boundaries of the Empire could claim to be a Briton would be to abandon the 
legitimacy of Britannia’s mission and reject the claims of social Darwinism. It would 
have been completely unacceptable for African tribes to claim membership of 
Britannia. The only way to conceive of a nation of Britons was to use ethnic and 
organic metaphors that established membership of the group on racial and 
genealogical terms.  
 
In trying to provide a theoretical basis of the nation from the metaphors used by 
nationalists one has to be careful not to impose modern concepts or inappropriate 
metaphors. There was clearly, however, a sense of a Greater British imperial 
community among Scottish and British Canadian nationalists. In using organic 
metaphors in the Herderian sense they clearly chose to establish Britishness based on 
“a sense of tribe” rather than place. There are obvious geographical, philosophical 
and religious reasons why this would have been the case. But equally with the benefit 
of historical hindsight there was no basis for an ethnically homogenous Britannia. 
Within the British Isles themselves there was a wide mix of ethnic groups. Even 
within Scotland there was no homogenous ethnic nation. Scottish identity has always 
been, and still is “firmly embedded in ‘a sense of place…’”177 The conceptions of 
Britishness that have been put forward by historians are generally based on state 
identity.178 Any attempts to symbolically align a wider Britannic community on the 
basis of a British ethnicity are clearly “invented traditions.” The question then must 
be what purpose did this “invented tradition” serve? 
 
The “invented tradition” of Britannia based on an ethnic conception of Britishness 
enabled the nation to be imagined and allowed the IFL to frame its arguments in 
terms of the whole white settler empire, rather than just the British Isles. To 
paraphrase Walker Connor, it allowed Britons to imagine the psychological bond that 
joined them and differentiated them in their subconscious.179 The organic and ethnic 
symbolism of the mother/child and tree/fruit metaphors provided a basis for 
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understanding the empire and the relationship between the dominions and the 
homeland. Herder claimed that the nation was as “natural a plant as a family only 
with more branches.”180 In using similar metaphors the nationalists were clearly 
attempting to highlight the existence of a community of Britons in the Empire. 
Nations, in the primordialist tradition, are a natural unit of human organisation.181 
The nature metaphors used by nationalists put them in the same category.  
 
The organic conception of Britannia achieved several important things. Firstly, 
organic societies can grow and adapt to their environment, just like trees and plants. 
Secondly the offshoots of organic societies gain the attributes of the mother society 
and adapt them to the new environment. Using these metaphors, nationalists argued 
that Britannia could grow and adapt to its environment. There was nothing, therefore, 
to prevent this nation creating a federal state of its own at the head of the Empire. 
They also claimed that Canadians, Australians and South Africans were Britons 
adapting British principles and culture to a new environment. Having inherited 
British culture, blood and history from the motherland these new societies deserved 
to have a say in the running of the Empire. If British-ness could be adapted to 
Canada then it could be used as the basis for a new federal state. By creating the 
federal basis for the Empire the relationship of dominance by Westminster would 
have been altered and British settlers would gain recognition as Britons, not just 
colonists.  
 
Identity is both contextual and experiential. The articulation of a Greater British 
identity has to be explained contextually and experientially. The experience of a 
common Monarch, a common religion and being ruled from Westminster was 
undoubtedly necessary for the existence of Britannia. The Diaspora and its 
descendants were also vitally important. British identity was already instilled in 
Canadians and Scots. Drawing on Michael Bilig’s insights we can argue that the 
everyday experience of Britishness, whether in the shape of the Governor General, 
(the monarch’s representative in Canada), the Union Flag, religious behaviour and so 
                                                 
180 Barnard, F., J.G Herder on Social and Political Culture (Cambridge, Cambridge University Press: 
1969): 324 
181 Ozkirimli, U., Theories of Nationalism: A Critical Introduction (Basingstoke, Palgrave: 2000): 66 
 206
on instilled a “Banal Nationalism” that made Britannic identity a way of life in both 
Scotland and British Canada.182
 
For this latent British identity to be articulated meant the context must have changed. 
The historical review at the beginning of this chapter noted the changing European 
and World situation. The creation of a powerful and assertive German state, the 
increasing advance of the Russian Empire south and west towards the Ottoman 
Empire, perceived American hostility across the Atlantic and continuing diplomatic 
tensions with France all combined to produce a tense atmosphere in which the 
articulation of a Greater British identity instilled a greater feeling of security across 
Britannia. The knowledge that Britons in Scotland, Canada, Australia, New Zealand 
and South Africa shared a common threat and that those Britons would fight for the 
honour of Britannia and the Empire was important in reducing the apparent size of 
the threat. In the same way that the articulation of a superior identity in Scotland 
justified Scots nationalists claims for recognition, the articulation of a superior 
Greater British identity laid the basis for claims for recognition of Britannia and the 
British Empire by politicians in Britain and by Britannia’s ‘others.’ The articulation 
of this identity accompanied various plans for reform of Imperial government.  
 
But the most important aspect of Britannia was its expression as justification for 
closer governmental ties and cooperation between Britain and the Colonies. In 
arguing the existence of Britannia, nationalists were laying the foundations for a 
federal imperial state that would be better able to defend the whole empire against 
potential aggressors across the world. The mission of bringing peace to the world 
was used rhetorically as an argument for the formation of a defence league or a 
political federation. In both cases the existence of a Greater British nation was used 
to provide legitimacy for the claims for closer political integration. In this way the 
rhetoric of nationalists can be compared to the rhetoric of Italian or German 
unification. The existence of the nation would provide democratic legitimacy for the 
formation of an imperial federation. In turn the state would reinforce Greater British 
identity by providing a role for all Britons in the running of the empire. 
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Representation of all Britons would have entailed the recognition of the existence 
and importance of Britannia. The discourse therefore returns to the concepts of 
recognition, representation and the right of self determination. In this case it was the 
right of Britannia to determine the future of all Britons, not just those living in the 
British Isles. The relationship of dominance by Britons living in the British Isles over 
Britons overseas had the potential to cause a rift in the Greater British nation and 
could have adversely affected the future of Britannia and the Empire. The creation of 
a federal empire would remove the imperial relationship and secure the future of 
Britannia and therefore the Empire. The coincidence of Britannia and a federal state 
at the head of the Empire would strengthen both, thus ensuring the pre-eminent 
position of the imperial state as the world super-power, securing both its safety from 
and recognition by the rest of the world. 
 
Conclusion  
The aim of this chapter has been to examine the extent to which the discourse of 
nationalist groups in Scotland and British Canada was imperialist. As in the previous 
chapter the concepts of recognition, representation and democracy were important. 
Recognition of the supremacy of the British Empire on the world stage meant the 
bonds of the Empire had to be strengthened. The clearest way to achieve this was to 
ensure Britons across the world were represented at Westminster, thus ensuring there 
would be no schism in the Empire. The key issue, however, has been the relationship 
between empire and nation.  
 
The focus of this chapter has been on the existence of Britannia, a Greater British 
nation formed by the emigration of millions of Britons to various parts of the British 
Empire. We argued that these emigrants took with them their British heritage, British 
institutions and British identity, and established these in their new colonial settings. 
This British identity meant Empire could be maintained through these ready made 
collaborators in the British Imperial project. The Empire not only created Britannia 
but used Britannia to legitimise its activities.  
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Britannia was conceived by imperialists on a purely ethnic basis. Perennialists argue 
that nations develop over “la longue duree” creating and adopting various symbols 
along the way. Canada, however, for one, was relatively new in the history of 
nations. Britannia, although also a relatively new nation, could adopt the symbols of 
an older British identity. The use of various natural metaphors, including the 
mother/child relationship of the colonies and the British Isles, naturally led to the use 
of the monarchy and the British imperial mission as symbols of a Greater British 
nation. The importance of Britannia to the discourse of imperial nationalists in both 
Scotland and British Canada can be seen in their proposals for the federation of the 
empire.  
 
Britannia was used by both Scottish and British Canadian nationalists to symbolise 
the unity of the Empire. The threats posed to the Empire from across Europe and 
from the United States laid bare the fragility of the Empire and the weak bonds that 
linked the self-governing colonies with Westminster. Britannia provided the existing 
bonds but failure to recognise the existence of Britons abroad by ending the 
relationship of dominance by Britons at home risked a split in the Greater British 
nation. By not recognising the interests of Britons abroad the collapse of the Empire 
and, therefore, of the supremacy of the Britain on the world stage was at risk. The 
use of Britannia was therefore an instinctive form of imperialism aimed at 
consolidating, maintaining and expanding the Empire.  
 
Having been created in the process of extending and consolidating the Empire, 
Britannia became the focus for the defence and maintenance of the Empire in the 
face of a multitude of perceived threats. The various schemes for reforming the 
governance of the Empire all had the existence of Britannia and the right of Britons 
across the Empire to representation in an Imperial Parliament as their basis. The 
relationship between the nation and the empire becomes clear from this analysis. 
This imperialism may not have been focussed on the extension and acquisition of 
Empire in the traditional sense but there is no doubt that imperialists used Britannia 
to argue for the maintenance and consolidation of the British Empire. 
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Chapter Six
Reconciling National and Imperial Identities 
 
The key aim of this chapter is to examine the way Scottish and British nationalists 
reconciled the national and imperial identities we examined in the previous two 
chapters. To the extent that Scottish and British Canadian groups expressed both a 
nationalist and imperialist identity we can begin to refer to them as imperial 
nationalists. The interaction of dual or multiple identities is a complex matter. In 
presenting the theoretical framework for this thesis we argued that identity is both 
experiential and contextual. In other words, local experience creates local identities. 
Identities are then expressed in reaction to a given context. The academic debate 
surrounds the extent to which local identities inform “greater” identities such as 
national or imperial ones. The visual model of concentric rings was introduced by 
Anthony Smith. Each ring is dependent on (informed by) the inner ring for its 
existence. In this way we argued that local identities mediate national identity, or as 
Morton argued local identity reinforces national identity.1 If this is indeed the case, 
we would expect to find that a Scottish or British Canadian identity mediates the 
imperial identity. In terms of practical politics, we would expect solutions to the 
imperial problem to also solve a national problem. We would expect national 
circumstances to be important in the imperial identity expressed in imperial 
nationalist discourse.  
 
If identity is contextual, as we have argued, then multiple identities should be the 
result of multiple contexts. The cause of the expression of imperial and national 
identity by nationalists may just have been the result of a coincidental collision of 
national and imperial contexts. Alternatively, one context may involve both national 
and imperial concerns. The aim of this chapter is to analyse these theoretical issues 
through an investigation of late nineteenth century imperial nationalism in Scotland 
and British Canada.  
                                                 
1 Smith, A.D., National Identity (London, Penguin Books Ltd: 1991): 24 ; Cohen, A., “Belonging: The 
Experience of Culture” in Cohen, A., (ed) Belonging: Identity and Social Organisation in British 
Rural Cultures (Manchester, Manchester University Press: 1982):13 ; Morton, G., Unionist 
Nationalism: Governing Urban Scotland 1830-1860 (East Linton, Tuckwell Press: 1999): 77 
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An important argument of this chapter, one mentioned in previous chapters, is that 
Scots were implicit imperial nationalists, whereas British Canadians were explicit 
imperial nationalists. For the Scottish groups being studied here the Empire was 
taken as a non-negotiable aspect of the United Kingdom. There was never any 
question that Scotland would leave the Empire. The focus of their discourse, 
however, was the national question, how to accommodate Scotland’s legislative 
needs within the Imperial framework. For the Canadian groups the opposite was the 
case. The focus of their discourse was the imperial connection and how to maintain 
the imperial connection in the face of perceived threats from the United States. These 
issues will be explored in more depth later in the chapter.  
 
The chapter will be organised around the themes of reconciling imperial and national 
identities, looking separately at the Scottish and British Canadian cases in order to 
highlight their differences. The first section will briefly provide some historical 
background necessary for an understanding of some of the issues to be investigated. 
The following section will examine the Scottish case arguing that Irish Home Rule 
set the context for Scottish imperial nationalism. The importance of the Empire and 
therefore the Union, to Scotland will be highlighted, as will Scotland’s influence in 
return. The third section will investigate the British Canadian case. It will be argued 
that the influence of the United States in the history of Canada was vital to the 
discourse of imperial nationalists. This history will be examined in the context of the 
trade debates carried on in Canada in the 1880s and 1890s. These debates surrounded 
the issue of Commercial Union with the United States or the pursuit of a preferential 
imperial tariff. The final section of the chapter will compare the two cases. The 
different approaches of imperial nationalists in Scotland and British Canada will be 









The Threat of Irish Separation  
The strategic importance of Ireland to the defence of Great Britain was highlighted 
by the support given by the French to an Irish rebellion at the close of the eighteenth 
century. The uprising of United Irishmen was supported by a small force of French 
troops. The uprising was unsuccessful being quashed by superior British forces. But 
such an event in the Empire’s backyard could not be allowed to happen again. The 
uprising provided the impetus for the Union of Ireland and Great Britain in 1801.2 
But the Union did not prevent Irish rebellions or uprising, although when they 
occurred they were quickly suppressed. Brief risings in 1848 and the Fenian revolt of 
1867 were poorly organised and quickly put down. A more serious threat was the 
continued outrages in the countryside. A question, however, the British government 
never had to answer, was what would happen if support for an Irish rebellion came 
from one of Britain’s European rivals? The Fenians in the United States had made an 
abortive attack on Canada in the hope that this would turn the eyes of the British 
government and allow a full scale Irish revolt.3 If the Irish could attempt this a 
European power could use Ireland to turn Britain’s attention away from other parts of 
the world.   
 
There was no shortage of potential enemies capable of giving such support to the 
Irish either. Britain’s interest in various regions of the world brought her into contact 
with a whole host of potential foes. Four powers in particular stand out as having 
posed the greatest potential threat to Britain and the Empire, Russia, France, 
Germany and the United States. These threats have been examined in detail in 
previous chapters. A brief review will suffice here. In order to maintain 
communications, and therefore rule, in India, Britain had to maintain access to the 
Mediterranean and the Suez Canal. This brought strained relations with the French 
who intervened following Egyptian bankruptcy in the late 1870s. Russian 
expansionism threatened India’s northern border and British naval interests in the 
                                                 
2 Judd, D., Empire: The British Imperial Experience from 1756 to the Present (London, Fontana 
Press: 1995): 40 
3 Lyons, F.S.L., Ireland Since the Famine (London, Fontana Press: 1973): 135 
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Mediterranean. German imperial designs, particularly in Africa, were clear following 
the Berlin Conference of 1884. German success in establishing a colony in South 
West Africa had been met with British indifference. But the Berlin Conference 
sanctioned what became known as the Scramble for Africa in which the European 
powers formally colonised large swathes of Africa. Suddenly, after being the only 
super-power for the last half century, the British Empire had competition.4 The 
informal nature of much of the British Empire had to change in order to maintain 
British interests in Africa.  
 
It is clear from the above that European powers posed a direct threat/challenge to the 
British Empire. In particular, there was a real fear that Irish nationalism could be 
used by one of these powers in an effort to undermine the British Empire. After all, 
Fenian groups in the United States had already used this idea with their abortive 
invasion of Canada. The hope that this would distract Britain from a rebellion in 
Ireland was a vain one. But with more powerful backing from a European power the 
potential threat of using Ireland was perceived by imperialists and nationalists to be 
very real. By viewing Ireland in this way it made the problem of Ireland both a 
nationalist issue and an imperialist one. The context of Irish Home Rule was, 
therefore, vital to an understanding of the articulation of both imperial and national 
identity by the groups under study. This will be examined in more detail below.  
 
Trade Relations between Canada and the United States of America 
The reciprocity treaty (mutually beneficial trade agreement) that had been signed in 
the 1850s between the British North American colonies and the United States was 
abrogated by the latter in 1866.5 The abrogation of the treaty hurt the British colonies 
who, with practically no manufacturing industry, saw the United States as both a 
source and an outlet for manufactures and Canadian raw materials respectively. 
Several unsuccessful attempts were made by Canada to negotiate a new treaty 
following Confederation in 1867. One of the complaints of British Canadian imperial 
                                                 
4 Porter, B., The Lions Share: A Short History of British Imperialism 1850-1995 3rd Edition (Harlow, 
Pearson Education: 1996):85-103 and Pearce, M., & Stewart, G., British Political History 1875-1995: 
Democracy and Decline (London, Routledge: 1996):148-162 
5 Careless, J.M.S., Canada: The Story of Challenge (Toronto, Stoddart: 1970): 240-1 
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nationalists was the failure of Canadians to secure an independent voice in these 
discussions. When John A. Macdonald was returned as Prime Minister in 1878, one 
of his first actions was to introduce a protective tariff policy, the National Policy. Yet 
attempts to negotiate a new reciprocity treaty continued even after 1878. The 
National Policy was designed to stimulate native Canadian industry and attempt to 
halt reliance on American imports. Macdonald also argued that the national policy 
would “greatly tend to procure for this country, eventually, a reciprocity of trade.”6 
In this respect, however, the policy was a failure. Further attempts to negotiate a 
treaty with the United States in 1879, 1886 and 1887 failed to produce satisfactory 
results.7
 
On the other side of the trade debate was the discussion of an imperial zollverein, a 
customs union between the colonies and dominions and Britain. There was, however, 
an obvious problem with this proposal. Ever since the repeal of the Corn Laws in the 
1840s, Britain had pursued a policy of free trade with the rest of the world. Britain’s 
powerful economic position and her lead in the drive towards industrialisation meant 
free trade was a viable policy. Raw materials could be imported without extra costs 
to merchants and manufacturers. The finished product could then be exported 
without customs tariffs increasing the price to the consumer abroad, thus making 
British manufactures competitive. It was unlikely Britain would change this policy 
when half her trade was conducted outside imperial boundaries.  
 
Against this background the formation of a Commercial Union Club in 1887 by 
Goldwin Smith and others was seen by some as a step too far in favour of the United 
States, particularly given some American calls for annexation. The details of the 
debates for and against Commercial Union will be examined later in the chapter. For 
now only the key points need be made. Some members of the Commercial Union 
Club openly, and some covertly, saw commercial union as a stepping stone to a 
political union with America. Canada, in their argument could not survive on the 
                                                 
6 Canada, House of Commons Debates, Volume 1, March 1878, reprinted in Robeson, V.R. (ed) 
Debates about Canada’s Future 1868-1896 (Toronto, The Ontario Institute for Studies in Education: 
1977): 49 
7 Annett, D.R., British Preference in Canadian Commercial Policy (Toronto, The Ryerson Press: 
1948): 37 
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continent once British support was removed. Commercial Union would allow 
Canada a privileged position, one in which she would be able to negotiate political 
union with the United States. British Imperial nationalists saw the formation of the 
Commercial Union Club as a threat to the existence of the Canadian nation. 
Commercial union, they argued, would inevitably lead to political union. Given the 
historic differences between the United States and Canada, particularly the founding 
of British Canada by the United Empire Loyalists, this was an unacceptable option. 
The perceived aggression of the United States, or at least unfriendliness, seen 
through the failed Fenian invasions of 1866 gave the debate added spice. 
 
Scottish Home Rule as a response to Imperial Problems 
 
Scottish imperial nationalists’ main purpose was to campaign for a Scottish 
Parliament that would remain within the Imperial framework. They argued for home 
rule all round, claiming this would clear the legislative log-jam at Westminster 
enabling the Imperial Parliament to deal with Imperial affairs, while simultaneously 
decentralising decision-making to the home nations. Solutions to both national and 
imperial problems were expressed using symbols of the nation and the empire. They 
articulated both identities because they wanted to remain within the Empire, and 
therefore within the Union with England. The Union with England needed reform 
because the success and challenges of the Empire had left Westminster unable to deal 
effectively with domestic Scottish matters. Reform of the Union left the way open 
for reform of imperial government thus consolidating the Empire in the face of 
external threats.  
 
Thus, Scots wanted to remain within the Union with England because of the 
economic benefits of the Empire and the recognition the Empire brought Scotland on 
the world stage. But the Union that gave Scotland the opportunities of the Empire 
was not working due to both legislative delays and non-recognition of Scotland 
within the Union, therefore change was required. The impetus given by Irish Home 
Rule conditioned the discourse of the Scottish movement. The threat of Irish Home 
Rule to Scottish interests, in terms of equality within the Union, and Imperial 
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interests, given Ireland’s strategic position to potential enemies, led Scottish 
nationalists to articulate a discourse in which Scottish identity mediated imperial 
identity. The two were intertwined and reinforcing. On the one hand Scottish 
nationalists wanted to reform the Union to its benefit whilst remaining within the 
Imperial fold. On the other hand they wanted to reform the Empire to protect it from 
external threats caused by the changing nature of European Imperialism. Any 
potential threat to the Empire was seen as a threat to Scottish interests. This was only 
natural given Scotland’s disproportionate influence in the Empire in relation to the 
rest of the home countries. A threat to the Empire was a threat to Scotland. Any 
threat to Scotland was seen as a threat to the nature of the Empire. The two identities 
were mutually reinforcing.  
 
Most importantly, however, imperial reform was seen as a solution to the Irish 
problem. The reform of the Empire, according to the nationalists, could not be 
carried out without reforming the Union into a federal/quasi-federal state where each 
of the home countries had home rule. The combination of the contexts of Irish Home 
Rule, European diplomacy, in terms of protecting imperial interests, and the 
increasing democratisation of the British State led to the articulation of mutually 
reinforcing national and imperial identities.  
 
This section will analyse the ways in which Scottish imperial nationalists reconciled 
national and imperial identity. The discourse of Scottish imperial nationalists in 
relation to the Anglicisation of the Empire will be examined. We will then 
investigate the influence of the Irish problem on both national and imperial identities 
in Scotland. Finally, the solutions to the contexts outlined throughout this thesis will 
be examined to more clearly highlight the relationship between national and imperial 
identities in Scotland.  
 
Recognition of Scots contribution to the Empire and Union 
One of the most important advantages of the Union was the opportunity offered by 
the British Empire. But as Charles Waddie, secretary of the SHRA, argued, Scotland 
had played its part in acquiring Empire. “The assertion that Scotland owes her 
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prosperity from trading with England’s colonies is untrue, while the part which 
Scotland has played in the acquisition of the colonies there are few to deny.”8 The 
SHRA claimed the expansion of the Empire occurred after the Union of Scotland and 
England in 1707. The demands for recognition of the Empire as being British, not 
English, will be analysed below. But Scots’ pride in the Empire can best be seen 
through the experience of the Scottish Diaspora.  
 
The influence of Scots in the administration and management of the Empire was 
noted in the previous chapter. Scots provided missionaries, entrepreneurs, merchants, 
military personnel and settlers for the Empire. The ratio of Scots who emigrated to 
the Empire far outweighed the proportion of Scots in the British Isles. This numerical 
advantage was undoubtedly important to the success of Scots abroad. In Canada, the 
first two Prime Ministers were Scots, and many of the fathers of Confederation were 
also Scots.  
 
News of the successes of these Scots, and others like them, were symbolic to those at 
home of the important role Scots played in the Empire. Rosalind Mitchison has 
argued that emigration was largely caused by the draw of opportunities abroad, 
whether jobs, places or kin. “It was a cumulative process, assisted by the information 
provided by the networks of Scottish kinfolk and friends.”9 But the kinship network 
did more. As Harvie puts it,  
 
The ‘nation of twenty millions’ was an important myth. It preserved, within 
the Imperial experience, a cultural continuity that ultimately survived it. It 
both endorsed the Union, which made colonisation possible, and called it into 
question: why could Scots govern colonies but not Scotland?10
  
This paradox between endorsing Empire and questioning Union is clearly seen in the 
literature of the SHRA. At no point did nationalists question the existence or 
continuation of the Empire. Indeed, they wanted more Empire, or at least more 
                                                 
8 Waddie, C., How Scotland Lost her Parliament and What became of it 3rd Edition (Edinburgh, 
Waddie & Co. Ltd.: 1903): 57 – emphasis added 
9 Mitchison, R., A History of Scotland 2nd edition (London, Routledge: 1982): 401; cf Calder, J., Scots 
in Canada (Edinburgh, Luath Press: 2003) 
10 Harvie, C.,  Scotland and Nationalism: Scottish Society and Politics 1707-1994 2nd Edition 
(London, Routledge: 1994: 65 
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recognition of Scots’ input in the creation and administration of the Empire. 
Nationalists couched their questioning of the Union in relation to their role in 
Empire. Are “the people of Scotland qualified to manage their own affairs, without 
the interference of the English people?” asked John Romans, a prominent figure in 
the SHRA.  
 
Our answer is to refer to the management by Scotsmen of innumerable 
institutions involving stupendous responsibility whether at home, in our 
colonies, or in America, or elsewhere. Scotsmen in the past have taken more 
than their proportionate share of the world’s enterprise.11  
 
The success of the Scottish Diaspora gave nationalists further ammunition in their 
campaign for a Scottish Parliament. Indeed the Diaspora itself contributed to the 
campaign. A branch of the SHRA was formed in Toronto in 1888, The  
Globe commenting that “It is to be presumed that the desire to do something for ‘puir 
auld Scotland’s sake’ animates her children in Canada to such a degree that they will 
make a grand success of the proposed Canadian Branch of the Scottish Home Rule 
Association.”12 In 1892, Theodore Napier, an Australian, formed the Scottish 
National Association of Victoria and issued An Appeal to Scotsmen in Australia. The 
aims of the Association were taken from the A,B,C of the SHRA Prospectus. Its 
main object was “to support the great patriotic movement [the SHRA] in Scotland to 
obtain Local National Self Government.”13 The concluding note that all “Britishmen 
and persons of Scottish descent are eligible as members” highlighted the way in 
which the two identities were linked. A British man could be a patriotic Scot. A 
patriotic Scot was British. The two were mutually reinforcing.  
 
The paradox inherent in the Empire and Union mentioned by Harvie was also evident 
in the Diaspora movements. Napier’s appeal to his fellow Australian Scots asked the 
familiar question.  
 
Here in Australia and New Zealand we are enjoying all the privileges and 
responsibilities of self-government…What reason can then exist why the 
                                                 
11 Romans, J., Home Rule For Scotland (Edinburgh, SHRA, 1893): 12 emphasis added 
12 The Globe, 3 November 1888: 8 
13 Napier, T., Scottish National Association of Victoria (Victoria, 1892) 
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same facilities should not be granted to the nationalities that compose the 
United Kingdom?14
 
Of course the insult to Scotland being denied home rule was all the worse when the 
colonies were populated with criminals and miscreants. In Western Australia, Napier 
claimed,    
 
…we find a colony that has actually been deluged with criminals from the 
shores of Britain and whose population must still largely consist of such and 
their descendants, entrusted with local representative government or Home 
Rule; and this too, while an ancient, tried and trustworthy Country like 
Scotland is denied the same right.15
 
The clear statement from the Scottish Diaspora was that if the colonies, especially 
those used for deported criminals, were given home rule, to deny similar status to 
Scotland, which played such an important role in the Empire, would be contrary to 
the principles of British liberty.  
 
Australian Scots were not the only ones lending support. Several prominent Scots-
Canadians proposed schemes for Home Rule all round in the United Kingdom, 
including John A. Macdonald and Sir Alexander Galt.16 Often these schemes drew 
on the Canadian experience. This was a tactic the SHRA also used. Nationalists 
argued on more than one occasion that Canada provided an excellent example of how 
home rule all round could work in practice.17
 
The SHRA appealed to the Scottish Diaspora for support. In 1891, they issued an 
Appeal to the Scot Abroad calling for “pecuniary aid to enable us to fight our battle 
                                                 
14 Napier, T., Scotland’s Demand for Home Rule or Local National Self-Government: An Appeal to 
Scotsmen in Australia (Melbourne, 1892): 14 
15 Napier, T., The Arrogance of Englishmen: A Bar to Imperial Federation (Edinburgh, SHRA: 
1895):14 
16 For Macdonald’s plan see Pope, J., Memoirs of the Right Honourable Sir John Alexander 
Macdonald Vol. II (London, Edward Arnold: 1894): 223-225; For Galt (a Scots descendant) see 
Imperial Federation, 1 August, 1886: 207 and The Northern Chronicle, 31 January, 1883: 4. 
17 For example Mitchell, W., Scotland and Home Rule (Edinburgh, SHRA: 1888); Mitchell, W., Home 
Rule for Scotland – The Opening Speech Read (in part) at the discussion on that subject in the 
Conference Room of the National Liberal Club on 7th May 1889 (Edinburgh: 1889); SHRA, To the 
Members of the Imperial Parliament of 1892 (Edinburgh, SHRA: 1892) 
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for political freedom…”18 To appeal to the Scot abroad, the SHRA’s argument had 
to be broadened. They still argued for Scottish Home Rule within a home rule all 
round framework. But they emphasised the benefits of this to Scots abroad.  
 
The Imperial Parliament thus freed from all domestic legislation, would not 
only be in a position to attend to the affairs of the Empire, but would be in a 
condition to invite the Colonies and Dependencies to send Representatives to 
share equally with all British subjects at home and abroad, in the privileges as 
well as the responsibilities of the Government of the British Empire.19
 
By linking the two reforms, reform of the Union and reform of the Empire, the 
SHRA could justify the home rule argument by comparing Scotland to the colonies, 
while simultaneously commenting on the benefits to Scots abroad within the Empire. 
In the minds of the nationalists the two reforms were inextricably linked. Home Rule 
would undoubtedly benefit Scotland but it would also benefit the Empire and 
therefore Scots in Canada, Australia and across the Empire. And if it benefited the 
Empire Scotland in turn would gain.  
 
So the Scottish Diaspora was beneficial for Scotland and had itself been a beneficiary 
of Scotland’s Union with England and the resultant Empire. Through the Diaspora 
Scots lived the imperial dream. Scots took an interest in what happened to the 
Diaspora and they in turn took an interest in what happened in Scotland. Here then is 
one of the ways in which the imperial and national identity was reconciled. Without 
the Empire, the Diaspora and its success would not exist. Without Scots the Empire, 
it was argued, would not have been as successful. There was no perception that these 
two identities were inherently contradictory. In fact they clearly reinforced each 
other. Scottish national identity mediated Scot’s experience of the Empire and 
therefore Scottish Imperial identity. Using Smith’s model of concentric circles, 
Scottish national identity was the inner circle and acted as the foundation for a wider 
imperial identity.  
 
                                                 
18 SHRA, Appeal to the Scot Abroad (Edinburgh, SHRA: 1891) 
19 Ibid 
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The success and influence of the Scottish Diaspora reflected the glory of the Empire 
back on Scotland as an imperial partner. Richard Finlay argued the empire was  “a 
means of economic regeneration, a symbol of world power and …a powerful vehicle 
of propaganda…”20 The power of the Empire gave Scotland and the Scots a place in 
the world they would perhaps not otherwise have had. Charles Taylor claimed that an 
important aspect of the recognition argument was the perception of a world stage in 
which nations are gauged against each other, “a world public scene on  which people 
see themselves as standing, on which they see themselves as rated, which rating 
matters to them.”21 The Empire gave Scotland a share of world recognition with 
England in their imperial partnership. The problem was the perception that their 
partner in Union did not recognise the contribution of Scots to the Imperial project.  
 
An important element of Scottish imperial nationalist discourse, as it had been of the 
National Association for the Vindication of Scottish Rights in the 1850s, was the use 
of “England” and “English” instead of “Britain” and “British.” We noted in previous 
chapters the effect of this in terms of the recognition of Scottish national identity 
within the British State. But the incorrect use of “England” and “English” also had an 
effect on the position of Scotland within the Empire. Throughout the period under 
study the SHRA believed there had been an increasing Anglicisation of the Empire. 
The publication of Professor Seeley’s The Expansion of England in the early 1880s 
in particular caused great offence. The irrepressible Theodore Napier commenting in 
the 1890s  
 
…Englishmen arrogantly claim to be the ‘Imperial Race’ – the exalted theory 
of Professors Freeman and Seeley – and to treat Scotsmen and Irishmen as 
belonging to inferior races, and …pompously claim to have themselves 
created the Empire…22
 
This lack of recognition by the English of Scottish and Irish influence within the 
Empire was seen as particularly offensive. After all, Scots saw the Empire as a joint 
                                                 
20 Finlay, R.J., A Partnership for Good: Scottish Politics and the Union since 1880 (John Donald 
Publishers Ltd , Edinburgh: 1997): 15 
21 Taylor, C., “Nationalism and Modernity” in  Hall, J.A., (ed) The State of the Nation: Ernerst 
Gellner and the theory of nationalism. (Cambridge, Cambridge University Press: 1998): 208 
22 Napier, The Arrogance of Englishmen: 5  
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effort with the English and it legitimated Scotland’s place within the Union. Failure 
to recognise Scotland’s role in the Empire was failure to recognise Scotland’s place 
in the Union. With the problems of democratic legitimacy surrounding Scottish 
legislation further failures to recognise Scotland within the Empire and Union merely 
added fuel to the nationalists’ fire.  
 
At a lecture delivered to the Imperial Institute in 1893 by W.E.H. Lecky, historian 
and author of an eight volume The History of England,23 the Empire was claimed to 
be “the sole possession of England” and the “colonies as having been built up by 
Englishmen.”24 According to the SHRA, Lecky “ended with this extraordinary 
sentence; “Again, whatever might be the humiliation of the future, England could not 
be deprived of the glory of having created this mighty Empire.””25 The offence taken 
by the SHRA was compounded by the attendance of the Prince of Wales at the 
lecture. The letter sent by the SHRA to His Royal Highness highlights well the 
register of pride and humiliation associated with the politics of recognition.  
 
This language has given the greatest offence in Scotland; our country and 
countrymen are entirely ignored, although it is notorious that Scotland has 
contributed far out of all proportion to her population to the building up of the 
Empire. Scotsmen by their valour and their genius have won for themselves 
the first rank wherever the British flag flies. To a high spirited people like the 
Scots, such language as held by Mr Lecky gives more offence than any 
amount of material wrong.26
 
Lest it be thought that this was a one off incident a number of different pamphlets 
produced by Scottish nationalists, within and outwith the SHRA, defended the rights 
of Scots to share in the Empire’s “honour and glory.”27 As one nationalist asked, 
“Blot out the share of Scots and Irishmen in the conquest and Government of India, 
and pray, how much remains?”28  In a protest against the practice of using England 
                                                 
23 Spence, J., ‘Lecky, (William) Edward Hartpole (1838–1903)’, Oxford Dictionary of National 
Biography, Oxford University Press, 2004 [http://www.oxforddnb.com/view/article/34461, accessed 
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27 Mackenzie, B.D., Home Rule for Scotland: Why Should Scotland Wait? (Edinburgh, 1890): 15 
28 Ibid: 15 
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and not Britain, the SHRA declared the “Highland Regiments which have fought so 
valiantly in every part of the world did so to maintain the honour – not of England – 
but of the United Kingdom.”29
 
The language of recognition highlighted in the above discussion is an important part 
of nationalism in illegitimate states. Guibernau pointed out that in such multi-
national states one nation will tend to dominate.30 In the United Kingdom, the 
English outnumbered Scots by seven to one. This numerical supremacy meant 
England was the dominant nation within the state. It is unsurprising that when they 
comprise such a large part of the state that actions of the state would be taken to have 
been carried out in the name of England. After all an important part of representative 
democracy is rule by the majority. Scots nationalists, however, took this as English 
tyranny, an attempt to Anglicise the United Kingdom, and by extension, the British 
Empire.  
 
This aspect of the discourse of the SHRA is vitally important. The attack on the 
rights of Scotland under the Treaty of Union combined both elements of nationalist 
concerns, the Union and the Empire, in one context. For Scotland, the Union meant 
Empire. Without recognition in the Empire, the Union would be called into question. 
Without recognition in the Union the achievements in the Empire were lost. For 
Scottish nationalists, therefore, the two identities, Scottish and Imperial, reinforced 
each other. Again we can see the way in which Scottish national identity mediated 
imperial identity, using the idea of concentric circles. The inner circle was Scottish 
national identity and it laid the foundation for a wider imperial identity. Scot’s 
contributed to the achievements of the Empire which in turn reflected glory back on 
Scotland.  
 
                                                 
29 SHRA, Protest by the Scottish Home Rule Association Against the Misuse of the terms ‘England’ 
and English’ for ‘Britain’, the ‘British Empire’, its Peoples and Institutions. (Edinburgh, SHRA: 
Undated) – this protest was issued sometime between 1886 and 1892 since it mentions Gladstone as 
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30 Guiberneau, M., Nationalisms: The Nation-State and Nationalism in the Twentieth Century 
(Cambridge, Polity Press: 1996): 60 
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Of course Scots had contributed in substantial terms to the Union as well as the 
Empire. Scotland, the SHRA claimed, had paid more than her fair share of taxes and 
received less Imperial revenue in return.31 The genius of Scots, such as James Watt, 
benefited the whole of the United Kingdom.32 Scotland’s economic contribution to 
the Union was substantial. According to Smout, the Scottish economy laid its 
foundations in the late 18th and early nineteenth centuries, but grew strongly in the 
nineteenth century, reaching its peak in 1914.  
 
By 1913, Glasgow, claiming for herself the title ‘Second City of the Empire,’ 
made, with her satellite towns immediately to the east and west, one-fifth of 
the steel, one-third of the shipping tonnage, one-half of the marine-engine 
horsepower, one third of the railway locomotives and rolling stock, and most 
of the sewing machines in the United Kingdom.33
 
Lack of recognition of these contributions to the Union and to the Empire by failing 
to use the correct nomenclature, i.e., British not English, was seen as a slur on the 
dignity of Scots and therefore of Scottish identity. The mix of Union and Empire in 
this discussion clearly showed the nature of the relationship between national and 
imperial identity. The national (British) circumstances (lack of recognition of 
Scottish identity) impacted on Scots contribution to the prestige of the United 
Kingdom and of the British Empire. Scottish identity gained from the prestige of the 
Empire because of the contribution of the Scottish Diaspora. But Scottish identity 
was not being recognised in the Union. The articulation of both national and imperial 
identities was a reaction to this non-recognition.  Scottish identity was both imperial 
and national. The one reinforced the other. To be Scottish was to be an Imperialist. 
National identity mediated the Imperial identity.  
 
One other aspect of the Anglicisation of the Empire was the Tories appropriation of 
Empire for jingoistic ends in the 1870s. In 1872, Disraeli outlined the basis of his 
Conservatism in two major speeches in April and June of that year. The Party had 
three objectives, according to Disraeli. “To maintain the institutions of the 
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country…to uphold the Empire of England and the elevation of the condition of the 
people.”34 Disraeli approached the 1874 election campaign complaining of the 
Liberals ineffective foreign policy, a campaign that produced the first Conservative 
majority for 33 years. The Conservatives were portrayed as “the party of Empire and 
national greatness.”35
 
Salisbury, on assuming the post of foreign secretary and then the leadership of the 
party following the death of Disraeli in 1881, continued to argue that the 
Conservatives were the “Imperial Party.”36 The actions of Disraeli and Salisbury in 
this period, particularly during the Eastern Crisis of 1878, highlight the way in which 
Conservative Imperialism lacked the morality of Liberal Imperialism, as perceived 
by the Scots, resting as it did on religion and freedom. The decision to uphold the 
Ottomans against the Russians, whilst in the national interest, was a step too far for 
Scots, particularly when the Ottoman Empire carried out atrocities in reprisal against 
Christians in Bulgaria. Disraeli’s continued support for the Turks led to mass protests 
throughout the North of Britain.37 Gladstone had originally supported the idea of 
Britain supporting the territorial integrity of the Ottoman Empire. But following 
publication of his Bulgarian Horrors pamphlet the Liberal leader’s successful 
Midlothian campaign launched a tirade against Conservative imperial policy on this 
basis,38 and the Liberals swept to victory.  
 
The importance of the Empire to Scots and the influence of Scots on the Empire is 
the key to understanding the moralistic attack on Conservative imperialism during 
the Midlothian campaign and the revulsion against Disraeli’s support for a Muslim 
Empire against Christians. Scottish Presbyterianism and Liberalism were intertwined 
in Scottish imperialist ideals.39 To Scots, the Empire meant freedom, the rule of law, 
good government, and the general spread of civilisation across the world. The 
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atrocities committed by the Muslim Ottomans against Bulgarian Christians were an 
anathema to Scottish imperialism. The appropriation of what Scots saw as their 
Empire by English Conservatives was taken as further evidence of the non-
recognition of Scottish identity and its contribution to the Empire. The articulation of 
an imperial nationalist discourse once again showed that national identity mediated 
imperial identity. To protect Scottish interests the Empire had to be seen as British 
not English.  
 
A key argument of this thesis is that national identity mediates imperial identity. The 
above discussion clearly shows the relationship between the two identities. The 
perceived attack on Scotland within the Union, through failing to correctly recognise 
Scotland’s contribution to the Union, was also seen as an attack on Scotland’s 
position within the Empire. By claiming that Scotland’s financial position had 
improved through trade with “England’s  colonies”, English commentators created 
the conditions for the articulation of a discourse in which Scotland’s contributions 
both to the Union and to the Empire were emphasised. National context conditioned 
the articulation of both national and imperial identities.  
 
The important point here is the dominance of the English nation in the United 
Kingdom State. Dominant nations in a multi-national state are likely to fail to 
recognise minority identities within the state, although there are exceptions, Canada 
being the most notable. By failing to recognise these identities they fail to recognise 
the contribution of the smaller nations to the empire. Where a broad imperial identity 
exists, both the national and the imperial identity will feature in a discourse critical of 
the non-recognition of the minority identities. The non-recognition of the minority 
national identity results in the articulation of minority national and imperial identities 
both of which are seen as important to the minority nation.  
 
Irish Home Rule and Imperial Governance 
The introduction of Gladstone’s Irish Home Rule bill in 1886 is crucial to 
understanding Scottish imperial nationalism. Gladstone’s conversion to Irish Home 
Rule gave the initial impetus for the formation of the SHRA which used the Irish 
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movement as a model for their actions. The recognition of the Irish cause by 
Gladstone led to claims for a similar recognition of Scottish identity, as we have seen 
in previous chapters. This was important within the context of increasing levels of 
democracy within the United Kingdom, particularly following the 1884 Reform Bill 
which created equality in the franchises in the four home countries and in the 1885 
Redistribution Bill which increased the representation of Scotland in Parliament. If 
all four home countries were equal why should Ireland be the only one to be given 
Home Rule? The neglect of Scottish interests by Gladstone was articulated in the 
language of recognition and seen as humiliating to Scottish national identity. 
 
But Gladstone’s conversion to Irish Home Rule was not just seen as a threat to 
Scotland’s position in the United Kingdom state. It was also seen as a threat to the 
integrity of the Empire. After all, one of the reasons Great Britain wanted Union in 
1801 was to prevent an enemy invasion through Ireland. Britain had been involved in 
the Napoleonic Wars when an attempted invasion by the French through Ireland had 
been foiled prior to the turn of the nineteenth century. If Ireland posed a danger when 
outside the Union there seemed little to be gained by letting her leave the Union 
through a rebellion. Irish nationalists had called for resolution of the land issue and a 
measure of Home Rule. Meeting their demands may have been the answer.  
 
Yet Scots experience of the Irish, not least in religious terms, made home rule for 
Ireland seem just as unacceptable as allowing Ireland to leave the Union altogether. 
In the West of Scotland high levels of Irish Catholic immigrants had given Scots the 
impression that the Irish were “poor, ignorant, superstitious, and, so far as the natives 
could see, vicious.”40 This would have reinforced the existing stereotypes of the Irish 
as “subhuman porcine creatures” that coloured British political decision making 
throughout the nineteenth century.41 These were not the type of people that could be 
trusted with self government. But from the beginning the SHRA had made clear its 
sympathy with the Irish while claiming that to grant Home Rule to Ireland alone 
would be dangerous. In their first petition to Parliament the SHRA claimed  
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Your petitioners, while sympathising with the desire of the great majority of 
the Irish members that this principle should regulate the future government of 
Ireland, are of the opinion that it can only be applied with safety to the 
Empire and in justice to the United Kingdoms, by the simultaneous creation 
of a legislative Body for each Kingdom, subject always to the Imperial 
Parliament, and duly represented therein.42
 
Once again the inter-related nature of the problems of empire and union can be seen. 
On the one hand, home rule all round will solve the problems of the Union, not least 
the Irish problem. But at the same time, for the safety of the Empire the Irish should 
not be the sole nation to be given its own parliament. Rather home rule all round was 
the answer.  
 
Another reason for linking the two elements through Irish Home Rule was for 
practical considerations. The furore Irish Home Rule had created in the country and 
in parliament was hardly likely to benefit Scottish Home Rule. As William Mitchell 
noted the phrase “home rule” brought with it images of Irish “outrages” and 
“prejudice.”43 By introducing the more moderate idea of home rule all round it was 
hoped that the “misconception” of Home rule could be overcome. By emphasising 
the benefits of home rule all round to the Empire, the SHRA attempted to broaden 
the appeal of home rule beyond Scottish nationalists. 
 
But prejudice against the Irish was not the only problem for home rule. The fear of 
what might result if home rule was granted was very real. The spectres of the 
attempted invasion of the French via Ireland in the eighteenth century remained and 
would continue to haunt statesmen until the Second World War.44 The Canadian 
Prime Minister, John A. Macdonald made clear the possible consequences in 1871:  
 
Experience shows us what continued agitation will do as to Irish matters. In 
the long run the English people and Parliament will, from a mere sense of 
weariness, yield, as they have always done, to Irish turbulence and then 
would come the severance from England.45
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The experience turned out to be very different. Parliament never yielded to Irish 
demands. This failure led to the Easter Rising of 1916 and the declaration of the Irish 
Free State in 1922.46 But Macdonald’s comment clearly outlines the claims that were 
made against Irish Home Rule. If it were granted Ireland would inevitably slide 
towards independence. William Mitchell offered a contemporary view in 1894, when 
he claimed,  
 
…the fear of separation, and the proud impossibility of keeping Irish 
Representatives in the Imperial Parliament and allowing them a legislature of 
their own for domestic purposes without making them our masters, have all 
combined to frustrate the solution of the Home Rule question as confined to 
Ireland.47
 
The key issue was how to ensure the Irish would remain loyal to the Union, thus 
preventing danger to the Empire without giving them undue influence in the Imperial 
Parliament. The objections to the first Irish Home Rule bill in 1886 revolved around 
the separation issue. The 1886 Bill made no provision for Irish representation at 
Westminster. As Fry pointed out, Gladstone on that occasion treated Ireland like a 
colony.48  With nothing to tie the Irish to Westminster and the Empire, and with Irish 
opinion against the existing Union, Frederick Young’s mantra of “federation or 
separation” took on real meaning. The second Irish Home Rule Bill of 1893 
attempted to retain Irish Representation at Westminster. But without Home Rule all 
round, the Scottish nationalists were unhappy at the prospect of the Irish being 
masters in Parliament.  
 
How dangerous Ireland outside the Union would have been can only be guessed at. 
But we have seen above and in previous chapters that there was a plethora of 
potential threats to the Empire across Europe and in America. The diplomatic 
tensions with France were particularly relevant given the nature of Ireland’s 
incorporation in the Union of 1801. The common religion of France and the majority 
of the Irish was an important factor. The Americans had already shown their support, 
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if implicit, to Fenianism in North America, following the border incursions into 
Canada in 1866, 1870 and 1871. With these various threats fresh in the memory, 
Gladstone introduced his Irish Home Rule Bill. The potential threat to the Empire 
was clear for everyone to see. As William Mitchell claimed, in relation to Irish Home 
Rule, “[f]or the British Empire the issue is nothing less than Federation or 
Separation.”49
 
Irish Home Rule posed a threat on two grounds. Firstly the threat to Scotland’s 
position in the United Kingdom in terms of the politics of recognition argument 
mentioned in previous chapters. But Irish Home Rule also posed a threat to the 
Empire. With nothing tying the Irish to Westminster the threat of separation and 
leaving a flank exposed to potential enemies was unacceptable. But Irish Home 
Rule’s threat combined these two aspects. As Michael Fry has argued, Gladstone’s 
1886 bill had implications for Scotland. “If for example, Gladstone’s plan was to set 
a precedent for Scots, it would shut them out of Imperial affairs, an unacceptable 
prospect.”50 Scotland’s effort and commitment to the Empire in terms of missionary 
activity and military support, not to mention the Scottish Diaspora, meant that the 
potential prospect of being shut out of Imperial decision making was unacceptable. 
The only solution, therefore, to the problem posed by Irish nationalism was Home 
Rule All Round. Only this solution would protect imperial interests and satisfy the 
nationalists in Scotland.  
 
One final consideration was taken into account by Scottish nationalists: would the 
manner in which the Irish problem was handled have an effect on the rest of the 
Empire? The SHRA claimed the mother country, “still possesses an immense reserve 
of influence over her colonies in the pride and affection with which colonist regard 
their old home.”51  But the bond could be broken if Westminster was seen to 
mishandle the Irish situation.   
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Through maladministration at home or abroad, the Mother Country might 
easily lower the pride with which the colonies regard her, and if they ceased 
to regard the mother country with pride the tie of affection would snap if 
subjected to the strain of opposing interests…The attitude of Great Britain 
towards Ireland has, for this reason, more importance than a domestic 
quarrel.52
 
Once again actions of the United Kingdom state in relation to Ireland, and in 
particular Gladstone’s Irish Home Rule proposal, were seen as potential threats to the 
Empire. If Ireland was allowed to go its own way then Britain would be seen as 
abandoning pretensions to Empire on her own doorstep. Why then should Canada or 
the Australian colonies thousands of miles away worry about the Empire? The Irish 
situation had to be settled with regard to the interests not just of Ireland and Britain 
but of the whole empire.  
 
The Irish Home Rule debate was an important context for the articulation of imperial 
nationalist discourse in Scotland. The perceived threats to Scotland in the United 
Kingdom state and to the Empire were sufficiently great for the formation of the 
Scottish Home Rule Association. These imperial nationalists proposed reform of 
both the governance of the state and of the Empire. Again we can see that national 
identity mediated and reinforced imperial identity. Any threat to the Empire was seen 
as a threat to Scottish identity. The threat to Scotland’s position within the United 
Kingdom was seen as a potential threat to the Empire. The two issues were 
practically indistinguishable in the discourse of Scottish imperial nationalists.  
 
The multi-national state and recognition are once again key aspects of the discussion. 
Democracy and legitimacy in multi-nation states depends on a perception of equal 
treatment of each nation. Failure to recognise a minority identity will result in the 
expression of national identity. Where imperial identity is also important to the 
nation, this identity will also be articulated in the discourse critical of the state. 
Perceived threats to national identity will result in the articulation of dual/multiple 
identities. 
 
                                                 
52 Ibid: 62 
 231
The context of the non-recognition is also important. In the first part of this section 
we argued it was general non-recognition of Scottish contributions to the Union and 
the Empire that resulted in the articulation of both a national and imperial identity. 
The Empire legitimised the Union. One context affected both identities. In the case 
of Irish Home Rule, a different context was perceived as a threat to Scotland’s 
position in the Union and in the Empire. Here again, context affected both identities. 
Identity as contextual brings us back to our theoretical discussion. Where one context 
affects more than one identity, those identities will be articulated in the discourse that 
responds to the context. The relationship between the identities will then depend on 
the context, but as in the cases above, national identity mediated and reinforced 
imperial identity.  
 
Solutions for a “Scottish sort of Empire” 
Most discourses have antagonism at their heart. They are shaped by what they 
oppose. The antagonisms of Scottish imperial nationalists have been reviewed above. 
But the discourse must also offer solutions to the antagonisms raised. The solutions 
offered can tell us as much about the identity articulated as can the antagonisms. 
Solutions solve problems and therefore the solution can tell us much about the 
perceived nature of a problem. An analysis of the solution presented by Scottish 
imperial nationalists can help understand the nature of the problem. When 
considering the benefits of Home Rule all round to the Empire and the associated 
benefits to Scotland the relationship between Scottish and Imperial identity becomes 
apparent. 
 
We have argued that national identity mediated imperial identity. We would 
therefore expect the solution to the SHRA’s antagonism to solve imperial concerns 
as well as national concerns. The creation of a Scottish Parliament would, therefore, 
have been seen as a solution to Imperial issues. In their manifesto of 1892, the SHRA 





The Scottish People through the conferences of the Scottish Liberal 
Association held at Glasgow and Perth last autumn, have demanded Scottish 
Home Rule in order that a host of imperial questions urgently pressing for 
attention may be solved…53
 
In solving the Irish problem, home rule all round would have preserved the Empire 
against potential threats from European competitors. Freeing Parliament of domestic 
affairs would leave it free to debate important imperial affairs which the SHRA 
claimed were in much need of attention, such as federation of the colonies, 
codification of the laws of the Empire and India.54 Resolution of these problems 
would ensure the maintenance of the Empire. By preserving the Empire, home rule 
all round would have ensured the Scottish Diaspora, so important to Scotland’s sense 
of place in the Empire, remained within the imperial fold. By affirming Scotland’s 
place in the Empire, the Union remained legitimate and ensured Scots remained 
committed to the partnership with England. Home Rule all round as a solution to the 
problems of the time reflected the mixture of identities articulated by the SHRA. It 
would have benefited Scotland specifically in domestic terms and it would benefit 
the Empire specifically by preventing its dissolution. Scotland would also benefit as 
an imperial partner.  
 
This review of the solution to the Irish problem illustrates the way in which national 
identity mediated imperial identity. Solution of a national problem, the threat to 
Scotland’s political position in the United Kingdom state also resolved the wider 
imperial problems caused by the Irish nationalist outrages and campaigning. Scottish 
interests in the United Kingdom state and in the British Empire were both expected 
to be solved by home rule all round.  
 
A second benefit for Scotland would have been the reduction in English influence 
over the minority nations following the introduction of colonial MPs at Westminster 
in an Imperial Federation. Waddie claimed the equality of all states within the 
Parliament would have to be recognised and the population principle discarded. 
“When States enter in to a Federation, they surrender a portion of their natural rights, 
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but all must surrender a like, for if one has a preponderating voice in the assembly, 
the others become her vassals.”55 Again the question of legitimate and illegitimate 
states became the important issue. With a dominant English nation in the multi-
national Imperial Parliament, a nationalist reaction against perceived English tyranny 
would have been a real danger. The interests of the minority nations must be 
acknowledged and represented effectively. But to what extent should this override 
the interests of the majority? Waddie acknowledged the English would find the 
tyranny of the minority arrangement unacceptable. Even if the population principle 
was not discarded, however, the increased numbers of non-English members would 
dilute English influence to an extent. As Fry claimed, the resultant institutions of 
government would have resulted in “a Scottish sort of Empire,” a “spectacular 
example of contemporary Scottish self-confidence.”56  
 
Scottish self-confidence in proposing the reforms to the Union and to the Empire 
would have increased further with the greater glory a united Empire would have 
reflected on Scottish identity. A more cohesive Empire united through an Imperial 
federation would, claimed Waddie, “create the most powerful state the world ever 
saw, no foreign power or combination of rivals could ever hope to wage a successful 
war against us.”57 The Empire, and by association Scotland, it was hoped, would be 
recognised as pre-eminent in the world. Scotland with her disproportionate influence, 
would bask in the reflected glory of the Empire. Max Weber argued that states, and 
we could argue nations, prefer small neighbours. Power over other states and nations 
gives prestige to larger states. As the largest Empire of its time, the British Empire 
held a prestigious position in world affairs. Scotland as a small nation would, 
imperial nationalists argued, gain prestige from association with a large Empire.   
 
This section has illustrated the way Scottish imperialists and nationalists reconciled 
national and imperial identity. The Anglicisation of the Empire and Irish Home Rule 
were seen as a direct threat to Scottish interests in both the British Empire and the 
United Kingdom state. A discourse articulating both a national and imperial identity 
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was the result. These identities, however, were not articulated separately rather each 
one reinforced the other. The solutions were presented as a whole. Home rule all 
round and imperial federation together would solve Scotland’s national problems. By 
solving the issues presented in their discourse, the groups assumed imperial problems 
would be automatically resolved. The focus on Scottish national grievances in this 
way marked the SHRA as implicit imperial nationalists.  
 
Solutions presented as part of a discourse can highlight the way identities within that 
discourse interact. Reforms to multi-national and/or imperial states that include 
greater representation for minority nations will clearly highlight the importance of 
each identity to the nation. If greater focus is given to one aspect of the reform over 
another, for example home rule all round over imperial federation, we can assume 
one of two things. Either the national identity is more important than the imperial 
identity, or vice versa, or the national identity is under greater threat. In the case of 
Scottish nationalists, the focus was on reform of the governance of the United 
Kingdom state, not the Imperial structure. Scottish interests were under much greater 
threat within the United Kingdom, primarily due to Irish Home Rule and non 
recognition of Scottish identity. The reform of the United Kingdom State was, 
therefore, the priority.  
 
British Canada – the British Empire and the trade debate 
  
The key aim of Canadian imperial nationalists in the late nineteenth century was to 
secure a voice in Canadian foreign affairs. Canada, as a Dominion of the Empire, had 
no control over its own foreign policy. Diplomatic relations between the United 
Kingdom and the United States rarely, they claimed, took account of Canadian 
interests. Rather they were designed to maintain friendly relations between the two 
powers. Through Imperial Federation, Canadian nationalists hoped the fledgling 
nation would gain a voice in affairs affecting Canadian interests. Imperial federation, 
however, would also give Canada a voice in the affairs of the Empire more generally. 
The creation of an imperial federation would also prevent Canada being annexed by 
the United States. Canada would therefore maintain her status as a nation whilst the 
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Empire, and by association Canada, would benefit from the maintenance of the 
Dominion on the North American continent. Both national and imperial symbols 
were used to articulate a discourse critical of imperial governance but not of the 
existence of the Empire.  
 
The main argument of this section will be that the maintenance of Canadian 
institutions against perceived American aggression, particularly in the debate over 
the direction of trade between the two nations, was the key to understanding the 
expression of both a national and imperial identity. The formation of the Commercial 
Union Club in 1887 was seen as a major threat to the integrity of Canada, a precursor 
to political union with the United States. The historical antagonism of British 
Canadians towards the southern union was made clear through use of the flight of the 
United Empire Loyalists in the 1780s, the War of 1812 and the Fenian invasion of 
1866 as symbols expressing British Canadian identity as both imperial and Canadian. 
As compared to the Scots, Canadian nationalists were explicit in both their 
nationalism and imperialism. Reform of the imperial structure was to be beneficial 
both for the British Canadian nation and for the Empire. National identity both 
mediated and reinforced imperial identity.  
 
This section will be split into three parts. The first part will examine the trade debates 
of the late 1880s and early 1890s. The importance of the imperial connection to 
Canadian national identity will be examined within this context. The second will 
examine Canadian antagonism toward imperial governance. The nature of the 
complaints will be put in the context of the importance of Canadian relations with the 
United States and their importance for the Empire. The final part will briefly 
examine the solution of imperial federation as the vehicle for expressing Canadian 
and Imperial identity.  
 
Commercial Union and the threat of Annexation 
For nationalists in Canada one of the biggest threats to Canada and the Empire was 
the formation of a Commercial Union Club. In 1887, Goldwin Smith and various 
others, including Henry Darling, President of the Toronto Board of Trade, organised 
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a Commercial Union Club in Toronto with Smith as President. The objective of the 
club was “to improve the trade relations and develop the industries of Canada by 
securing unrestricted reciprocity of trade between this country and the United 
States.”58 The movement for commercial union, according to Smith, had its origins 
“at a convention of farmers, who had grown tired of being forced to sell in the 
cheapest market and buy in the dearest.”59 The convention was held by the Farmers 
Institute in Canada in April 1887. A resolution was passed in favour of Commercial 
Union.60 In a letter to the Officers of the Farmers Institute in Canada, the President 
of the Central Farmers Institute in Ontario, Valancey Fuller, argued that the 
American Farmer’s position was far superior to the Canadian farmer as he had less 
debt as a result of having a better market. Canadian Farmers wanted access to this 
market.61
 
One of the main arguments against Commercial union at the time was that it would 
be injurious to Canada’s young manufacturing industry. Fuller denied this on two 
counts. First, it may adversely affect manufacturers but this would only be 
temporary. Second the interests of manufacturers should not take precedence over 
the interests of the farmers as their “welfare is so dependent upon the welfare of the 
farmers, that what aids the farmer still more improves the position of the 
manufacturer.”62  
 
In a similar manner, James Pearson, a member of the Toronto Club executive and a 
United Empire Loyalist descendant, argued that the manufacturers were in the 
minority and the policy adopted should be for the greatest good not just for a select 
few. Pearson went further in his assessment and argued that in opening themselves 
up to a bigger market with more competition from the Americans it would “make us 
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more Canadian and independent than ever.”63 This response to the argument that 
commercial union would lead to annexation, was a theme which the Attorney 
General of Nova Scotia, J.W. Longley, took up in a pamphlet dismissing objections 
to the policy. Longley argued that there was concrete evidence that the reciprocity 
treaty of 1854 ended calls for annexation and that the same would happen if 
commercial union were granted. He also believed that Canada had no fear from 
conquest and that annexation could only happen if desired by the majority of 
Canadians.64
 
Another aspect of the case against commercial union was that it would end the 
relationship with the Empire. Longley brushed this aside lightly.  
 
We are practically independent at the moment. We make our own laws, frame 
our own tariffs, and in no sense accept any interference with our affairs from 
the British people.65
 
But at the time the Colonial Secretary, Joseph Chamberlain, was on his way to 
Washington to take part in a Joint High Commission to discuss the fisheries dispute 
and any possibility for a new reciprocity agreement. Canada, whilst having control 
over revenue policy could not negotiate foreign treaties. This included a treaty that 
would result in Commercial Union. One of the aims of nationalists since the days of 
Canada First had been to gain powers over treaty making through an Imperial 
Federation. Incidentally, Chamberlain, in a private letter to Goldwin Smith believed 
that Commercial Union would inevitably lead to Canada’s separation from the 
Empire.66 W.H. Lockhart Gordon, a vice president of the Commercial Union Club of 
Toronto, argued that, on the contrary, Commercial Union was the only way to 
prevent annexation, especially given the economic problems and threats of secession 
from Nova Scotia.  
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If we wish confederation to hold together; if we wish to have peace and 
prosperity in our midst; if we wish this Canada of ours to flourish, to remain 
an integral part of the Queen’s domain, we must look the present state of 
affairs fairly and squarely in the face and at once devise some means of 
restoring contentment, happiness and prosperity to this great country.67
 
Resolution of the economic problems of Canada would, he argued, prevent Nova 
Scotian secession. Commercial Unionists, such as Lockhart Gordon, claimed only 
commercial union could resolve Canada’s economic problems.  
 
This alternative to an imperialist discourse and the use of the symbol of monarchy 
showed the importance of the imperial connection to British Canada. If an imperial 
identity had not been present in Canada there would have been no need to use the 
monarchy (Canada as the “Queen’s domain”) to support calls for Commercial Union. 
Joseph Chamberlain’s claim that such an economic agreement would lead to 
annexation must have been echoed by others in British Canada. Discourses, after all, 
are shaped by what they oppose.  
 
Whilst the rhetoric of the commercial union supporters may have been Canadian in 
appeal, as Lockhart Gordon above, the true motives of some of their number at least 
were substantially different. For example, Longley, despite being Attorney General 
of Nova Scotia, was in favour of annexation, something that in 1890 he had not been 
keen to make public.  
 
I am satisfied that the avowal of annexation might injure a man not only as a 
candidate in his constituency but his usefulness generally as a public man in 
Canada. Under these circumstances I am pursuing what I conceive to be the 
most judicious course.68  
 
The various calls for secession from the Confederation by some Nova Scotians since 
1867 may render this comment unsurprising. Yet despite the history of secessionist 
movements in Nova Scotia, not everyone in the Province was in favour of 
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annexation. There was, however, a realisation among some politicians that 
annexation was the real intent behind the support for commercial union. We know 
from his Canada and the Canadian Question that Goldwin Smith, leader of the 
commercial union movement, was in favour of annexation.69  
 
It seemed too that there was awareness among the voting public that there may be 
hidden agendas involved. In a letter to Goldwin Smith in 1889, Longley complained 
that “there is too much lethargy among the people and too little confidence in the 
genuineness of the motives of those who are forwarding the movement…”70 This 
was despite the fact that, according to Longley at least, 
 
Nearly every person believes in reciprocity with the United States but few 
people seem to care enough to take any active measures to bring it about… I 
have had large and attentive audiences but I have seen no healthy political 
agitation follow my remarks.71
 
Reciprocity, however, was a much less binding agreement than a full commercial 
union, although in the minds of the opponents of commercial union the two issues 
came to be seen as one.  
 
In 1888, a branch of the Imperial Federation League was formed in Toronto, no 
doubt in part as a reaction to the momentum generated by the Commercial Union 
movement. The delay in its formation was surprising given the traditionally loyalist 
views held by some in the city. At the first meeting it was one of those loyalists, the 
old firebrand, George Denison, who attacked the commercial unionists. 
 
There was a crisis at the moment in the affairs of the country and it behoved 
every patriotic son of Canada to rally around the old flag which had so often 
frustrated the evil designs of traitors. They were upon the verge of two roads 
and would have to choose one or the other. He called them traitors because 
the movement for Commercial Union was originally designed by traitors… 
Commercial Union… aimed at the destruction of the national life of the 
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country by subjecting the people to the power and dictates of a foreign 
country.72
 
Patriotic Canadians, in Denison’s view, were British and must fight under the Union 
Flag to ensure annexation to the United States was prevented. The distinction of the 
United States as a foreign country leads back to the United Empire Loyalists and 
their decision to head north to Canada following British defeat in the American Wars 
of Independence. The United States was “an aggressive and grasping country” 
according to Denison. Citing expansion through Florida, Louisiana, Alaska, Maine, 
Texas, California and Mexico as examples of American aggression, Denison claimed 
the United States “had never evinced a friendly feeling towards Canada.”73 This is 
typical of the rhetoric that Denison had used since the first days of Canada First and 
highlighted his view of Canada as a British nation protecting itself from an 
aggressive United States. Denison did all he could to ensure that nothing came 
between the Empire and Canada.  
 
On a more positive note, Denison echoed a view of Canada George Grant had 
alluded to at the inaugural meeting of the League in Montreal. Imperial federation, he 
claimed, “was designed to build up Canada and her industries…It would consolidate 
the Empire and give the Canadian people greater influence amongst the nations of 
the world.”74 At the same meeting a resolution moved by Alex McNeill used the 
same ideas of strength and glory to create a picture of a Canadian nation playing a 
full part in the greatest Empire the world had seen.  
  
…while having every reason to be satisfied with their position as citizens of 
the greatest empire the world has ever known, enjoying in the fullest sense 
the rights of self government, with a large measure of protection from 
external foes, Canadians now numbering five millions, with their continental 
territory, rapidly developing resources, growing and far reaching commerce 
and increasing wealth, have attained a position from which they can 
contemplate with a high degree of confidence such well matured plans as 
may be proposed by Imperial and colonial statesmen for a closer union of the 
component parts of the empire and for an increase in the responsibilities and 
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duties necessarily arising out of a union from which so much may be 
expected of strength, of prosperity and of glory.75
  
In his speech supporting the resolution, McNeill argued that the imperial federation 
cause was “a cause of peace and progress and civilisation.”76 The mission of 
Britannia, at the head of a federal British Empire, to civilise the world would bring 
strength and glory to Canada as a senior partner in the imperial project. In the same 
way that we argued Scotland benefited from association with the Empire, British 
Canadians also wanted to benefit.  
 
By and large the IFL in Canada saw the imperial connection as the only way of 
ensuring Canada’s survival as a nation. The opening line of the resolution and 
McNeill’s comments in his follow up are a clear indication of the enabling factor that 
the Empire had on Canadians at the time. Most Canadian’s had some link to Great 
Britain and, although it is difficult to understand nowadays, the Empire was the 
greatest ‘civilising mission’ the world had ever seen, surpassing in magnitude even 
the Roman Empire. There was, among some Canadians at least, a sense of 
missionary zeal attached to the Imperial project, as we examined in the previous 
chapter. The desire then to be a Canadian nation and to remain a part of the Empire 
must be viewed in this light and not as something paradoxical. These notions of 
identity are largely the same that we saw in the period of Canada First in the years 
following Confederation when it was seen that the loss of the imperial connection 
would have left Canada vulnerable to attack from the United States. The view of 
Canada First was that independence from the Empire would lead to annexation by 
the United States. This defensive nationalism is based on the maintenance of the 
existence of the state to which the nation belongs. Canadian identity mediated 
imperial identity. The national context conditioned the attitude toward the greater 
identity. The perceived threat to the Canadian nation resulted in the articulation of 
both a national and imperial identity. Whilst in the late 1880s there was not the same 
threat militarily as there may have been in the 1860s the imperialist conception of 
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Canadian identity used the threat of annexation through Commercial Union in much 
the same way.  
 
Following the accession of the French Canadian Wilfrid Laurier to leader, in 1887, 
the Canadian Liberal Party adopted commercial union as a “bold policy” with which 
to woo the electorate.77 This was a major setback for British Canadian nationalists. 
The biggest critic of the policy (albeit in private) was former Liberal leader Edward 
Blake. He raised several key issues regarding the form of trade agreement adopted by 
Laurier. Would it not lead to political union? Would the Imperial government not 
resent and resist it? Would the protected industries be able to endure such a union? 
And most importantly were the Canadian people ready to accept it? Blake’s answers 
to all the above questions were negative.78 Having made his views known to Laurier, 
however, Blake agreed to keep his misgivings from becoming public for the sake of 
the Liberal party.79
 
More setbacks were to come for nationalists in Canada. Those in favour of a customs 
arrangement with the United States had gained support from Provincial Leaders. At 
the Inter-Provincial Conference in 1887 the following resolution was passed.  
   
This inter-provincial conference, consisting of representatives of all political 
parties, desires to record its opinion that unrestricted reciprocity would be of 
an advantage to the provinces of this Dominion; that this Conference and the 
people it represents cherish fervent loyalty to Her Majesty the Queen and 
warm attachment to the British Connection…80  
 
The conference also argued that the British connection would not be damaged by any 
reciprocal agreement arranged with the United States. Clearly the conference was 
trying to avoid the criticisms aimed at the Commercial Union movement and thus 
were trying to meet the wants of the majority of Canadians. Unrestricted Reciprocity, 
or free trade, between the United States and Canada would have all the advantages of 
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a Commercial Union without the disadvantages of disputes over the common tariff. It 
would also enable British Canada to maintain the connection with the Empire 
cherished by so many.  
 
Worse still was to come for the imperialists as the movement for commercial union 
steamed ahead. In 1888, Benjamin Butterworth introduced a bill to the United States 
Congress whose intention was,  
 
To provide for absolute reciprocity of trade between the two countries 
[United States and Canada] as to all articles of whatever name or nature 
produced in the said countries respectively.81
 
Moreover the Bill was introduced with the aim of resolving the ongoing fisheries 
dispute between the United States and Canada, for which a Joint Commission had 
been set up. Butterworth was not the only one to see Commercial Union as a way to 
resolve this dispute. Robert Hitt, the representative for Illinois, agreed. In 1889, Hitt 
put forward his own resolution in the House of Representatives. The resolution 
would have paved the way for discussions over Commercial Union to be opened if 
the desire was there between the parties.82
 
Hitt’s resolution was more successful than Butterworth’s Bill, passing the House of 
Representatives, although rejected by the Senate. Erastus Wiman, a successful 
businessman who emigrated from Canada to New York, saw Commercial Union as 
outlined in the Hitt Resolution, as bringing enormous stimulation to Canadian 
growth. He also believed that the relations formed on an economic and social level 
by a Commercial Union would lead to political union.83  
 
The immediate response to Hitt’s resolution was a resolution moved in the Canadian 
House of Commons by Sir Richard Cartwright, a senior Liberal.  
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That in the present condition of affairs, and in view of the recent action of the 
House of Representatives of the United States, it is expedient that steps 
should be taken to ascertain on what terms and conditions arrangements can 
be effected with the United States for the purpose of securing full and 
unrestricted reciprocity.84
 
The debate in Ottawa lasted several days, and towards the end the resolution came 
under strong attack from Henry Cockburn who argued that his discussions with 
various American politicians led to the conclusion that Canada could only gain 
unrestricted access to the United States markets if Canada was prepared to give up 
the British flag. It was Cockburn’s sincere wish that he “ never live to see that day.” 
 
Canada is not for sale. We love our country dearly sir; we are proud of its 
past, we are hopeful of its future; and come weal or come woe, we are 
determined to work out our own destiny and we refuse…to exchange the 
proud title of citizen of the great British Empire for that of any other 
nationality under heaven.85  
 
Cartwright’s resolution was defeated on April 6 1888.86 The above quote highlights 
the important links between Canadian identity and imperial identity. Canadians were 
citizens of the British Empire. They were both British and Canadian. The desire to 
pursue an independent future, free from American interference was seen as an 
inherently British Canadian trait, a legacy of the flight of the United Empire 
Loyalists in 1783. But the prestige to be gained from being an important part of the 
powerful British Empire was vital to the success of the British Canadian idea. 
Without the Empire, the threat of annexation to the United States was greater. To 
maintain Canadian identity, it had to be British. National identity depended on 
imperial identity for its maintenance.  
 
Once again we see national identity mediating and reinforcing imperial identity. In 
terms of Smith’s concentric circles, Canadian national identity is the inner circle that 
informs the outer circle of imperial identity. To be British in North America was to 
be Canadian. To maintain Canadian identity against the threat of the United States, 
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Canadian identity had to be British. In a sense the two identities were mutually 
reinforcing.  
 
The Bills introduced in the United States Congress were reported in the United 
Kingdom and comments regarding the likelihood of Canada being annexed were 
seized upon by the SHRA as examples of the threat the Empire faced and used to 
justify the calls for home rule all round and an imperial federation. “The Secession of 
Canada would be the end of the British Colonial Empire…Canada has been invited 
to join a United States Zollverein…”87 The answer was to clear the Imperial 
Parliament of the domestic business of the United Kingdom and invite 
representatives from the Empire to sit at Westminster.  
 
In the latter half of 1888 the Joint High Commission agreed measures to resolve the 
fisheries dispute and to introduce a measure of reciprocity between Canada and the 
United States. President Cleveland, a Democrat, approved this treaty but a 
Republican Senate who believed that Canada would seek annexation if reciprocity 
was not gained blocked its passage.88 Goldwin Smith’s frustration was evident in a 
letter to Dr Francis Wharton, solicitor for the United States Department of State, 
when he wrote,  
 
…so long as there is a majority in the Senate opposed to the political party to 
which the President belongs, no foreign power can enter into negotiations 
with the government of the United States; any foreign power which does so 
will only be exposing itself to certain rebuffs and insults.89  
 
Matters, it would appear, were not long in progressing. In a letter to the Editor of the 
St Stephen’s Review, the Treasurer of The National Association for the Preservation 
of Agriculture and our other Industries, S.W. Poynter, warned of a danger to the 
Empire from annexationist support within the United States. The letter quotes 
correspondence from Erastus Wiman to the Empire newspaper in Toronto, advising 
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of a measure being discussed by the Senate Committee on Foreign Affairs. “So far 
have matters progressed,” he advised,   
  
that it is not at all unlikely that a resolution will be reported for the concurrent 
action of both Houses, declaring it to be the duty of the President to open 
negotiations with Great Britain looking to political union between the English 
speaking nations on this continent.90
 
Poynter’s assessment that “the probability of such a programme being carried out 
may be quite ‘in nubibus,’” was accurate. But the existence of the proposition 
revealed “most clearly a specific danger which we, as a nation, cannot afford to 
disregard.”91 He argued in his letter for an imperial federation, a “binding together of 
the many component parts of our vast possessions into one great Empire”, and 
warned that in the near future without a closer union, Britain would find herself once 
more “a small Island in the North Sea…”92
 
On September 10, 1890, the United States Senate passed the McKinley tariff bill, a 
measure that raised tariffs, with the seemingly paradoxical aim of reducing revenue 
from duties.93 At least on the face of it, this was a major defeat in the United States 
for the Commercial Union movement. Macdonald had attempted through his agents 
in Washington to gain some reciprocal benefits for coal and lumber in the Bill but the 
Senate defeated these amendments.94  The advocates of Commercial Union, 
however, remained unsure what the results of the bill would be. Robert Hitt, for 
example, wrote to Goldwin Smith in June 1890 advising 
 
What the effect of the McKinley tariff when in operation will be upon public 
sentiment in Canada is a problem, whether it will retard by irritation or 
advance the cause by more clearly demonstrating where lie the material 
interests of the Canadian artisan, farmer, fisherman, lumberman and miner.95
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Macdonald argued that the real aim of the tariff was to starve Canada into 
annexation.96 Grant, likewise, saw in the Tariff, an opportunity for closer trade links 
with Great Britain and a further reason for supporting imperial federation. He argued 
that Canada had wasted 10 years asking for reciprocity with no results.97 The 
Liberals argued that there was more need than ever to pursue their policy of 
unrestricted reciprocity.98  
 
The election of 1891 marks the turning point in the debate between Continentalists 
and Imperialists. In 1890 the Liberals had performed well in Provincial elections and 
there was a sense of optimism among the Continental Unionists dampened only by 
concerns over the impact of the McKinley Tariff. Robert Hitt wrote to Goldwin 
Smith of his “personal satisfaction [of] the result of your recent provincial elections, 
which shows a general growth of liberal sentiment…”99 Evidently Macdonald was 
also concerned and decided to fight the election on the grounds of loyalty to Great 
Britain. “A British subject I was born, a British subject I will die” he cried. 
Macdonald came out with guns blazing accusing the Liberals of disloyalty on the 
basis that unrestricted reciprocity with the United States was really just annexation in 
disguise. Using his old tricks of blackmail, bribery and sheer skulduggery, 
Macdonald won the election with only a marginally reduced majority.100
 
The election of 1891 can be seen as an endpoint in the debate over Continental 
Union. Whilst the Liberals mellowed their policy to more free trade, Macdonald 
pushed for a plan for Imperial preference that never made the House of Commons, 
due to his death. The depression in the United States in 1893 took all the heat out of 
the movement especially as the Canadian economy at this time was doing well. The 
death of the Imperial Federation movement in Britain in the same year created 
problems for the Canadian movement that reformed as the British Imperial League in 
1894. The Liberal victory in the 1897 election and the Republican Dingley tariff in 
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the United States heralded the offer of imperial reciprocity by Laurier and ended any 
possibility of commercial ties with Canada’s southern neighbour.  
 
The debate over the direction of Canadian trade illustrates the nature of imperial 
nationalism in British Canada. Commercial Union, even unrestricted reciprocity, 
were seen potential threats to the existence of the Canadian nation. Closer links with 
the United States were treated with suspicion because of the historic antagonism 
between them. Imperial nationalists claimed an inevitable result of any customs 
union with the United States would be political union. Reliance on the imperial 
connection therefore was the key to maintaining the Canadian nation. The national 
issue, maintenance of the territory of Canada against perceived American aggression, 
mediated the articulation of Imperial identity. But the imperial government generally 
disregarded the interests of Canada when dealing with America. Reform of imperial 
government, therefore, in the form of an imperial federation was necessary to obtain 
a voice for Canada in her foreign affairs. National Canadian identity and affairs, the 
trade dispute, mediated Imperial identity.  
 
We argued in the previous section that Scottish imperial nationalists emphasised their 
national identity because it was under greatest threat within the United Kingdom 
state. The articulation of identity being contextual we claimed that the articulation of 
dual identities must mean the context affects both identities. The relationship 
between the two identities is dependent on the context. In the context of the trade 
debates, the emphasis of British Canadian imperial nationalists was on Canada’s 
connection with the Empire. Maintenance of the imperial connection was vital to the 
security of Canadian territory and therefore to the British Canadian nation. The 
national context mediated the imperial identity.  
 
Visions of Canada’s place within the Empire 
Aside from the economic and military benefits of being a Dominion in the Empire, 
one of the key themes articulated by British Canadian nationalists was the reflected 
glory gained by Canada as senior associate of the empire. At the initial meeting of 
the Imperial Federation League in Canada, Mr Allen of Owen Sound, argued the 
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objective of the League was to draw “together more closely the bonds of friendship 
and alliance between Great Britain and her world wide Colonial Empire in which this 
Dominion occupies such a conspicuous if not indeed the foremost place.”101
 
Canada as senior dominion in the Empire could only benefit by association. Jehu 
Matthews in moving the second resolution of the meeting argued that Imperial 
Federation was “the policy under which Canada could enjoy greater financial 
advantages; a greater local independence; and brighter prospects both economically 
and morally than by any other path open to her.”102 D’Alton McCarthy, President of 
the League in Canada, argued on the evening of the first meeting that “We could 
have no higher ambition or greater aspiration than to become an integral part of that 
great Empire…”103 In a similar vein Alex McNeill, M.P. for North Bruce, asked, 
 
Is there to be dreamed of for any nation, a prouder, a more glorious destiny 
than that she should become one of the most potent factors in the mightiest 
and noblest Empire ever known to man?104
 
Principal George Grant asked the evening meeting, “is not the one aim and end of the 
Federation scheme to raise us out of the merely colonial position, and to make full 
citizens of the grandest state.”105   
 
This is a key theme throughout the debates on the future of Canada in this period. 
Imperialists carried out a cost benefit analysis, or, to use concepts more familiar to 
political science, Meadwell’s idea of an “enabling” and “constraining” condition.106 
In this case the Empire was used as both by imperial nationalists. The Empire 
enabled them to develop as a nation, economically and institutionally with the benefit 
of protection and assistance from Great Britain. Weber’s ‘Prestige of Power’ 
argument is useful in this context. Canada, as a small nation, in comparison to the 
United States, gained prestige and power from being an associate of the prestigious 
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British Empire. But the Empire also acted as a constraining condition as Canada did 
not have full power over foreign relations. This was a crucial aspect of the desire for 
Imperial Federation as without this control many, including Grant, were unable to 
see Canada as being independent. 
 
Historically at least, the key critique, and constraint, of the Empire was Canada’s 
relations with the United States. This was linked to the idea of recognition, in this 
case a lack of recognition by the Imperial Government. Westminster was 
characterised as ignoring or disregarding Canada’s rights, especially territorially. 
Canada was thus disadvantaged by the actions of the Empire and imperial 
nationalists threatened independence as a result. The straw that broke the camel’s 
back was the Treaty of Washington in 1871. Several pamphlets were published as a 
result, berating the Empire for failing to look after Canadian interests, the most 
stinging from Robert Haliburton, entitled A Review of British Diplomacy and its 
fruits. 
 
The pamphlet was written as a direct reaction to the Treaty of Washington, a treaty 
between the United States and Great Britain concerning Canada. The treaty included 
many important provisions but perhaps the most contentious was the right of 
navigation of the St. Lawrence, a right given in perpetuity. Haliburton’s pamphlet is 
a massive tirade against the Treaty and Britain’s treatment of Canada by agreeing to 
sign the agreement. It sets the negotiations of the treaty in the context of a century of 
imperial neglect and mismanagement, especially in relation to Canada’s relations 
with the United States. It is one of the few pamphlets issued by one of the Canada 
First movement that proposes separation from the Empire. But this is only as a 
reaction to the treaty and a threat if the wrongs of the Treaty are not redressed. 
Ultimately the sub-title of the pamphlet The Dream of the United Empire Loyalists of 
1776 tells us the writer’s true ambitions for Canada and its relations with the 
Empire.107   
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This is an excellent example of identity being experiential and contextual. We have 
already seen that Haliburton, as a United Empire Loyalist supporter, was a keen 
Imperialist. Likewise we have seen his love of Canada the nation. In this pamphlet, 
his Canadian credentials come to the fore, as a result of a lack of recognition of 
Canada’s right to determine her future, especially in relation to the United States. 
Clearly his experience of Imperial Government increased his sense of belonging to 
Canada.  
 
Despite these failings one of the key visions of the Empire to the British Canadian 
nationalist was as a motherland. It may seem fairly obvious but the conception of the 
Empire as the motherland and Canada as a child is found in much of the literature the 
nationalists produced.108 This is important because it was this conception of the 
relationship between Canada and the Empire as mother and child that allowed 
Canadian nationalists to dream of a Canadian nation. It also highlights the way in 
which national and imperial identities were reconciled.  
 
As with the concept of Canada as a child, the Empire as a mother has certain 
connotations: a nursemaid, a protector, defender and nurturer. The most important of 
these from the nationalists’ point of view was the role of defence. Any argument that 
Canada was not a nation in the immediate post-confederation period due to the 
imperial tie, must take into account the way Canadian nationalists conceived of the 
Empire as a defender. Many pamphleteers and speakers outlined the perceived threat 
of annexation, citing territorial breaches in 1812 and 1866 as evidence. The debate 
over the country’s economic policy in the late 1880s saw Canada as threatened by 
the Commercial Union movement, a group led by a self confessed annexationist in 
Professor Goldwin Smith. The idea of an imperial preference, a key idea of the 
Imperial Federation League in Canada, set the Empire up as the defender of Canada. 
Canada would be unable to survive without protection of the Empire. The British 
Empire, for imperial nationalists, having provided support through confederation 
would protect (nurse?) the fledgling nation whilst it grew into adulthood.   
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The importance of the mother/child metaphor to Britannia was discussed in the 
previous chapter. But the metaphor was also important to the relationship between 
national and imperial identity. Individual identity, our local culturally rooted identity, 
mediates all our other identities. But as identity can only exist within societies which 
regulate those identities, the first society that regulates our individual identity must 
be the family. We identify ourselves as having a place within that family, one that 
changes as the family grows and ages. But our family also has a place within a wider 
society of families. Our individual identity, gained from our familial experiences, 
mediates our place in the wider society. British Canada was seen as belonging to the 
family of Britons, who shared the prestige of the Empire in the wider society of 
nations. The Empire was seen as the most powerful family in the world.  
 
But the Empire was not just seen in a negative sense as a protector (successful or 
otherwise). It was also Canada’s route to recognition. George Denison in the course 
of his 1871 lecture tour, argued: 
 
I hope the day will come when the British Empire will be united into one 
great power of confederation of great nations…And rest assured, if we 
Canadians are only true to ourselves the day will come when Canada will be 
not only the largest but the most populous, the most warlike and the most 
powerful of all the members…109
 
Denison clearly displayed both a British imperial identity and a Canadian identity. In 
attempting to reconcile the two, he claimed Canada’s future was as a cornerstone of 
the Empire, more powerful than the United Kingdom itself. There was no inherent 
contradiction in this. The family metaphor highlighted above allowed nationalists in 
Canada to see the Empire as a family that grew and aged. As the colonies grew up, so 
their relative positions in the Empire would change. It was inevitable given the 
resources of Canada that the possibility of being more powerful than the metropolis 
one day would be mentioned. By being true to themselves Canadians would gain the 
recognition they desired from nations on the world scene. Being true to themselves, 
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for Denison and British Canadian nationalists at least, meant the maintenance of the 
imperial connection.   
 
The way Canadian national identity mediated imperial identity is clear in this view of 
Canada as a member of the Imperial family. The experience of empire was seen 
through Canadian eyes. The future strength of the Empire was measured in terms of 
the future strength of Canada. Despite being British Canadians, the foundation of 
their identity was Canadian. The inner concentric circle was Canadian identity and 
built upon this was British imperial identity.  
 
Looking at the Empire through Canadian eyes, George Grant, one of the most 
prolific writers in support of Imperial Federation, spelt out why the prestige of the 
Empire was so great. Grant’s sense of belonging to the Empire was in part a desire to 
belong to the greatest civilising mission the world has ever seen: 
 
The Empire to which we belong is admittedly the greatest the world has ever 
seen …Is it to be thought that we would separate from such a flag, still less 
place our country in a position of antagonism to it? Think what it has always 
represented – personal and national freedom; civil and commercial, 
intellectual and religious freedom; righteousness in private and public affairs 
and the proclamation of eternal life to every son of Adam.110
 
The tolerance and libertarianism of the Empire highlighted by Grant is typical of the 
view held of the Empire in the nineteenth century. The British Empire brought 
tolerance, free trade, civilisation and of course religion to the “savages”. The Empire 
was depicted as representing “the highest ideals of any political organization the 
world has known”. Words and phrases such as magnanimous, peace, freedom, 
righteousness, honourable, “loftiest plane of political action” and so on were all used 
in connection with the Empire, especially by Grant. Why on earth would Canada 
want to end that connection? 
 
Admittedly all empires think they are the greatest the world has ever seen. The 
difference here was that the British Empire was undoubtedly the largest. The sun 
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never set on the British Empire. The mission of the British Race, to spread liberal 
values throughout the world and bring peace, the Pax Britannica, led, in Grants’ 
words, “virile, aggressive, self-governing communities which, though possessing the 
strength and almost every attribute of youthful nations,” to see, “in their unity with 
each other and the mother country, the prospect of a nobler future than could be 
expected, were they to form separate states.”111 The Empire was seen as something 
more than just Britain and Canada. It was a union of the British race, Britannia, of 
the self-governing colonies and dominions that had been born of British imperialism. 
Something “different from and greater than the United Kingdom.”112 By the end of 
the century then, in Canada at least, the Empire was conceived of “as allied nations 
in one indivisible commonwealth.”113
 
The key to understanding the desire of the British Canadian nationalists is in the 
conception of a future federation of Canada, Australia, New Zealand, South Africa 
and Britain. An Imperial federation would see Canada as an equal to Britain, thus 
giving Canadian identity the recognition craved by Imperial nationalists. As with the 
trade debates, both national and imperial identities were highlighted in the above 
discussion. In this context, however, it was the illegitimacy of the multi-national 
Empire that was important. Failure to recognise Canadian interests in Imperial 
dealings with the United States sent a clear signal to Canada’s significant other that 
America was seen as the more important of the two. Independence was not an option 
for Canada. The threat of annexation without the Empire for support was too great. 
The only solution, for imperial nationalists at least, was reform of imperial 
government to allow Canadian interests a voice.  
 
Multi-national empires rely on legitimacy for their continued maintenance. Without 
legitimacy nationalist challenges to the state are likely. But when a imperial identity 
exists alongside a national identity, as in Canada, the nationalist challenge will focus 
on reform of the existing structures of government. A discourse critical of the empire 
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will be articulated expressing both a national and imperial identity.  The relationship 
between these identities is context dependent. The context may affect both the 
national and imperial identity in different measures. In Canada, the context of 
imperial mismanagement of affairs with America affected both British Canadian and 
Imperial identity. National interests, Canadian territorial relations with America, 
mediated imperial identity.  
 
Imperial Federation as a solution to British Canadian Nationalism 
In September 1889, Principal George Grant, continuing the fight against Commercial 
Union, delivered a lecture in Winnipeg outlining his case for Imperial Federation. In 
this lecture Grant argued, “The making of Canada into a nation has been a long 
process and the process is not yet ended.”114 Grant saw the process ending in one of 
two ways, a closer imperial relationship or the disintegration of the British Empire.  
 
Canada cannot continue as a mere dependency. Clearly that is impossible. No 
living organism can continue long in a condition of arrested development. It 
must grow to its full stature or petrify.115
 
Grant’s vision of the future of Canada revolved around closer imperial ties, i.e., 
imperial federation. Federation would enable Canada to have her fair share in the 
management and responsibilities of common affairs.116  This was a theme that Grant 
had spoken of at the inaugural meeting of the league. He strongly believed that for 
Canada to progress to full membership of the Empire she must share responsibility 
for the running and costs involved. 
 
You may say that Britain does not demand this of us, that at present we gain 
by her generosity. And these are the arguments of men of honour, of grown 
men! They are willing to be wards as long as they possibly can, to accept 
rations as long as they are offered…I demand the privileges of a fully grown 
man, and first of all the privilege of paying my own way.117
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This idea of Canada growing into adulthood is a common theme among the writings 
of the Imperial Federation League and had been used in the past by members of 
Canada First. Canada was seen here as the child of Great Britain whose maternalistic 
protection saves her ward from the evil intentions of the United States. Grant in a 
lecture to the Canadian Club in New York on Canada First outlined this position 
clearly. “A baby when attacked, runs to its mother apron strings, and though the fault 
may be wholly its own, the responsibility is principally the mothers”118 Grant 
believed that talk of war with the United States was met by the laidback attitude that 
the Empire would protect the Dominion, but as soon as there was talk of contributing 
towards the cost of the Imperial defence costs the attitude became one of the Empire 
only used the Imperial Navy for Britain’s protection and her commercial supremacy. 
“Is that not the baby’s attitude?” Grant asked.119 The use of the family metaphor, 
although negative, again highlights the way national identity mediated imperial 
identity in Canada. In order for Canada to survive as a nation, the imperial 
connection had to be maintained, but with Canada taking a place in the government 
of the Empire.  
 
Grant’s desire was for Canada to attain a place in the history of nations and this 
could only be done through Imperial Federation.  
 
…by Imperial Federation we would gain full self government, and with it self 
respect and that only by this method would we gain our rightful place in the 
history of the world, the place, to which our historical evolution points.120
 
This is typical of the arguments of British Canadian imperial nationalists and 
highlights the importance of prestige, honour and recognition in imperial nationalist 
discourse. The general argument of Taylor and Weber, that states and nations see 
themselves as part of a hierarchical world order and the desire to be recognised as 
being in the top echelon of nations, is clearly expressed in Grant’s quote. Not only 
would Canada from imperial federation gain in terms of the legitimacy of imperial 
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governance but it would also bring recognition of Canada’s place as a partner in the 
British Empire and therefore an important force in the world. 
 
In a similar vein to Grant’s The Case for Canada, J. Castell Hopkins, outlined the 
problems of not maintaining closer links with the Empire. In what, at the time, must 
have seemed a very powerful argument, Castell Hopkins argued that independence 
would result in annexation. “Independence in our case would mean the most 
complete isolation from British power, protection, or influence, and as complete 
dependence upon the will of the United States of America.”121
 
Independence, however, would also mean that Canada would need to fully develop 
the machinery of the state, an efficient navy to protect coastal fisheries, a standing 
army, not to mention a foreign and diplomatic service. Although the problems of 
debt, defence and commerce are more related to the state, in modern politics, than the 
nation, in Castell Hopkins’ view the two were intimately related. He argued, like 
Grant before him, that only through Imperial Federation could Canada achieve her 
full status as a nation. 
  
The principle we desire to clearly express is that when the people of this 
Dominion are prepared to assume national burdens and receive national 
privileges, they should do so in conjunction with the Mother Country, 
receiving power from her prestige, and giving additional strength to her world 
wide system.122
 
Canada would benefit from an imperial federation by closer association with the 
Empire. By the implicit acknowledgement that Canada was an equal of Scotland, 
Wales, England or Ireland, there would be an increased confidence in Canadian 
identity. This recognition would increase Canada’s standing on the world stage. But 
the Empire would also benefit from Canada remaining in the Empire. The recently 
completed Canadian Pacific Railway connected the Pacific with the Atlantic and 
formed an important contribution to imperial defences.  
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The argument for Imperial Federation existed on established British principles of 
constitutional democracy, that “where important interests exist there should be some 
form or other of representation.”123 Imperial Federation was, therefore, only the 
logical outcome of the British constitutional development. But one final call to arms 
was required.  
 
What then, are Canadians going to do? Shall we sacrifice our British 
principles, our allegiance to a constitutional sovereign, our national birthright 
and traditions for a spurious and brief independence, or for the privilege of 
being absorbed by a neighbouring nation? Shall we not rather adhere to the 
past, preserve its memories and conserve its glories while building up an 
edifice of national greatness which shall have for its basis imperial unity and 
equality, and for its final consummation a share in power so great, in 
prosperity so unprecedented in peace so secure and in an Empire so wide and 
far reaching in extent…124
 
The series of quotes above clearly outline the way in which Canadian and Imperial 
identities were reconciled by nationalists in Canada. Without the Empire, Canada 
would not have the security or the finances required to build a great nation. The 
border with the United States and the choices that had been made historically to 
remain British were vitally important to a sense of what being Canadian meant. To 
be Canadian, for British Canadian nationalists at least, was to be British. The British 
connection meant the success of Canada. Therefore to be a British North American 
was to be Canadian. The two identities were mutually reinforcing. There was still an 
emphasis on being Canadian, as we would expect if the national identity was to be 
the foundation of nationalist discourse. The success of Canada was the focus. For 
Canada to be successful, however, meant the Empire had to remain intact. The 
reform of imperial government was seen as the best way of achieving the success of 
Canada. National identity and national concerns mediated imperial identity and 
imperial concerns. The inner circle of national identity was the foundation for the 
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Reconciling Identities – the Comparisons 
The final section of this chapter will bring together some of the key themes from the 
discussions above of the ways in which elites reconciled the articulation of both a 
national and an imperial identity. Identity defines our roles in society. But it also 
informs our judgement of the benefits and drawbacks in belonging to a particular 
society. The discussions were included to indicate that in some cases what may be 
taken as a commitment to the Empire, or the Union, was in fact merely a utilitarian 
decision based on the benefits to the individual or group. Having said that, there is no 
doubt that over a longer term the combined benefits of the Union and/or Empire 
would ensure that a stronger commitment would result. The lack of extended 
discussion by the SHRA of the benefits of the Union and Empire to Scots could be 
taken to mean there were no benefits. It is argued here, however, that in fact the lack 
of discussion meant the Union and Empire were not up for discussion. The 
importance of both the Union and the Empire to Scottish identity was taken for 
granted. There was no need for the SHRA to tell its audience what was obvious. The 
discourse of the SHRA showed the extent to which being Scottish and belonging to 
the Empire was mutually reinforcing. The solution offered to the problems outlined 
by the SHRA was two-fold, solving both the problems of Scotland and the Empire. 
To an extent these problems were seen as being one and the same. If the empire 
faced problems so did Scotland and vice versa. 
 
Imperial nationalists in Canada were more likely to outline the benefits of remaining 
within the Empire. But rather than them being articulated in the manner of a rational 
choice argument, the Empire was seen as an integral part of Canadian identity. 
Canada could not survive outside the Empire, they argued. Some within the United 
States had made overt moves to tempt annexation, as had some in Canada. Canadian 
identity historically was based on British principles of government and culture, 
therefore any attempt to annex Canada to the United States, which had specifically 
rejected those principles would be an anathema. Being British and being Canadian 
again was seen as one and the same thing. The Canadian experience of the Empire 
might not have been perfect but Canadian identity gained strength and prestige from 
being imperial, i.e., British.  
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The key theme to emerge from the above discussion of contexts was the threat posed 
to national and imperial identities. We mentioned at the beginning of this chapter that 
we would expect to see multiple contexts when multiples identities are displayed. 
After all if, as has been argued, identity is gained by experiencing the world, context 
must be important in the articulation of identity. There is no doubt there were 
multiple contexts at work in the background. But one context dominated in Scotland 
and another in Canada. In both Scotland and Canada the dominant context still 
brought both national and imperial identities into imperial nationalist discourse. We 
highlighted that this was because the context was seen to affect both of these 
different identities. In our analysis of the solutions presented to imperial nationalist 
antagonisms, we saw that the emphasis of home rule all round in Scotland and 
imperial federation in Canada highlighted which of the two identities was most under 
threat. The relationship between the two identities, however, did not change. 
National identity mediated imperial identity.  
 
In Scotland, the Irish problem and Gladstone’s conversion to Irish Home Rule 
dominated the writings of the SHRA. Home Rule all round and imperial federation 
were presented as the solution to the problem. Home rule all round as a solution to 
the threat to Scottish identity can be understood in the context of the Politics of 
Recognition, as we have seen in previous chapters. Imperial Federation as a solution 
to the Irish problem, however, requires some more analysis. Ireland outside the 
Union would have posed a threat to the Empire. Giving Home Rule to Ireland alone 
would eventually lead to Irish separation. An important element of being Scottish in 
the 1880s was being imperialist. Any threat to the Empire was a threat to Scottish 
identity. Although only one context, the Irish problem provided a threat/challenge to 
both Scottish and Imperial identity, hence the two-fold response to the threat by the 
SHRA.  
 
In Canada, the trade debates of the 1880s formed the backdrop to the activities of the 
IFL in Canada. The proposed solution to the perceived threat of the annexation of 
Canada to the United States was closer imperial ties through an imperial federation. 
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This time the solution makes sense when viewed from an imperial point of view. 
Canada, a key Dominion within the empire, provided a fast communication route to 
the Australian colonies via the CPR. We know from the Imperial Conference of 1887 
that this was an important part of imperial defences.125 To understand the importance 
of the trade debates on Canadian identity requires some more analysis. As we argued 
above, annexation was seen as the subjugation of Canadian national identity under a 
“foreign” power, the United States. To maintain and strengthen Canadian national 
identity meant that everything American was seen as immoral, impure and 
unprincipled. Various defects were noted in American public life, such as 
Presidential rule, legislative methods, divorce laws and morals, the elective judiciary 
and a lack of respect for the law.126 Canadian institutions, laws and institutions, 
based as they were on British designs were seen as superior in every way. 
Maintaining Canadian identity on the North American continent meant emphasising 
the British-ness of Canada. This was done through the Imperial connection. In North 
America to be British was to be Canadian and to be Canadian was to be British. 
There was, therefore, no inherent contradiction between the national and the imperial 
identities.  
 
Both Scottish and Canadian identities shared the commitment to Empire. There was 
no inherent difference, for the imperial nationalists at least, between being Scottish 
or Canadian and identifying with the Empire. One key reason for this must be the 
existence of the Scottish and British Diasporas. It was noted above that the Scottish 
Diaspora legitimised the Union. The implication of this is that without the Union, 
Scots would not have had access to Empire. The Empire, therefore, legitimised the 
Union. The Scottish Diaspora benefited from the Empire which provided opportunity 
for all classes of Scots. Scots abroad took an interest in events at home and those at 
home took an interest, and were proud, of there compatriots abroad. In Canada the 
high numbers of British expatriates tried to ensure Canadian identity remained 
British. We argued above that the debate over the direction of Canadian trade was 
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perceived by Imperial Nationalists as a debate over Canada’s survival as a nation. 
The IFL in Canada saw the Dominion as a British child. The defeat of the 
Commercial Unionists was seen as a success for the maintenance of British Canadian 
identity.  
 
The existence of the Diaspora and Canada’s status as a Dominion settled largely by 
Britons meant both Scotland and Canada had a British identity, one essentially based 
on the existence of the Empire. Both, however, had specific national concerns that 
were articulated in the rhetoric of nationalism. Scotland had concerns over the failure 
of Westminster to pass much needed Scottish legislation. Canada had concerns over 
the absence of a Canadian voice in foreign affairs affecting the Dominion. Both of 
these concerns were nationalist in character. A British imperial identity prevented 
these issues developing into movements for separation from the Union or the Empire. 
 
Conclusion  
We began this chapter by claiming that if, as we suggested in Chapter two, identity 
was experiential and contextual, we would expect to see imperial nationalism take 
different forms in Scotland and British Canada. Although the symbols, history and 
future of the Empire would be shared by all Britons, their local experiences would 
affect the way a dual national and imperial identity were articulated in imperial 
nationalist discourse.  
 
Our analysis of both cases showed this was the case. Imperial nationalism in 
Scotland was much more implicit than it had been in British Canada. In Scotland the 
focus of imperial nationalist discourse was the reform of the United Kingdom state to 
allow for national parliaments for each of the home nations. There was little 
discussion of the Empire, save in one or two key pamphlets. The policy of the SHRA 
and some of the IFL was for the maintenance of the imperial connection and reform 
of imperial government. This has been taken to show that imperial identity was 
maintained through what Michael Bilig called ‘Banal Nationalism’. The Empire was 
a way of life, a non-negotiable aspect of being Scottish.  
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In Canada, the focus of imperial nationalist discourse was reform of imperial 
government to allow Canada a voice in its own foreign affairs and also imperial 
affairs. There was no real discussion of Canadian government, other than as a focus 
for Canadian identity. Canadian identity was non-negotiable. The maintenance of 
Canadian identity, however, depended on the Imperial connection and Canada 
gaining a voice in the Imperial Parliament. Without this voice Canadian interests in 
relation to the United States could not be heard effectively.  
 
Both cases highlighted the extent to which national identity gained in prestige from 
the Empire. The power of Empire, particularly in Africa and Asia, gave it 
tremendous prestige in world society. Imperial identity in both Scotland and Canada 
emphasised the need to maintain that prestige through imperial federation based on 
Britannia. Weber argued that prestige comes from power. States, and we argued 
nations as well, prefer smaller less powerful neighbours. As small nations, in relation 
to their neighbours, both Scotland and Canada would be unable to gain the prestige 
of power in their own right. The only way they could gain this prestige was through 
the powerful British Empire. National identity was reinforced by the power gained 
from belonging to the Empire.  
 
The relationship between national and imperial identities was the same in both 
Scotland and British Canada. National issues, whether the Anglicisation of the 
United Kingdom, Irish Home Rule, the Trade debates in Canada, or antagonism of 
British Canadians towards Westminster, all resulted in the articulation of imperial 
nationalist discourse. The context for imperial identity was national. Imperial 
nationalists thus reconciled national and imperial identities by mediating imperial 
identity through national identity. Imperial identity was used to strengthen national 
identity.  
 
The visual model of concentric rings that we introduced in Chapter two is 
particularly useful. The outer ring of imperial identity depends on the existence of 
the inner ring of national identity. Identities exist within societies. Each larger 
society regulates the relationship between smaller identities. International relations 
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provided the context for imperial identity. Imperial relations provided the context for 
national identity. The joint context for imperial nationalism was found at the point 






The aim of this final chapter is to bring together the theory of imperial nationalism 
and the analysis of the substantive chapters. Following a logical review of the 
argument of the thesis the chapter will outline what we have learned about the two 
cases and their political and historical contexts, highlighting their historical 
specificity. It will also examine what this suggests more generally about the 
legitimacy of nationalisms within complex multi-level political systems. The concept 
of multi-level governance nationalism will be introduced as the modern equivalent of 
imperial nationalism. The position of Scotland and Canada today in their European 
and North American contexts will also be considered.  
 
We began this thesis by asking the following question. Are nationalism and 
imperialism antithetical concepts or can they be expressed simultaneously in 
nationalist discourse? Traditionally, we argued academics have seen nations as 
entities that break away from empires. There have been few investigations of the 
desire of some nations to remain within an empire but with more autonomy, as was 
the case in Scotland and British Canada at the end of the nineteenth century. By 
gaining a better understanding of the relationship between nations and empires we 
will better understand the relations between nations and supra-national institutions in 
multi-level governance. The way in which dual identities are reconciled can also 
inform the contemporary political world. The relationship between nations and 
supra-national institutions can be illuminated by an examination of the attitude of 
nationalists toward empire. The concept of imperial nationalism has uses beyond its 
application to Scotland and British Canada.  
 
Restating the Problem 
The question of whether nationalism and imperialism are antithetical concepts has its 
roots in Gellner’s assertion that “political systems which combine cultural pluralism 
with a persisting inequality between cultures are doomed, in virtue of their violation 
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of the nationalist principle…”1 Multi-ethnic empires, according to this statement, are 
incompatible with “a political principle which holds that the political and the national 
unit should be congruent.”2 Yet in identifying cases where nationalists wanted to 
remain within the empire this thesis has sought to revise this traditional view of 
nationalism and imperialism. Central to this revision lies the issue of legitimacy. 
What form of government is considered legitimate by the people, by the nation? 
Under what circumstances is it acceptable for nations to remain within a larger multi-
ethnic political system, such as empires? These circumstances were conceptualised 
through the term imperial nationalism. 
 
Imperial Nationalism – Theory and Practice 
Although the phrase imperial nationalism has been used before by Krishnan Kumar, 
to name but one, it has been used here in a different context.3 Kumar used the phrase 
to indicate the extent to which English nationalism was driven by imperialism. The 
mission of the English nation was imperial hence the alternative term ‘missionary 
nationalism’ was also used by Kumar. The term ‘imperial nationalism’ has been used 
in this thesis to indicate a political discourse that is at one and the same time 
nationalist and imperialist. In contrast to anti-colonial nationalism, which suggests 
the break-away of the nation from the empire, imperial nationalism involves 
proposals to reform imperial government for the benefit of the nation and the empire.  
 
The basis of imperial nationalism is the idea that nationalism is a matter of political 
legitimacy, rather than the simple notion that nations and states should be congruent. 
Nationalism is a political expression of the relationship between recognition of 
identity, democracy and the legitimacy of government. Where potentially illegitimate 
states i.e. multi-national states, exist, the question of legitimate government becomes 
important to minority nationalists when non or mis-recognition of their identity 
results in a failure to adequately represent the interests of the nation. Independence is 
not an inevitable outcome of minority nationalism. Nationalism will only become 
                                                 
1 Gellner, E., Nationalism (London, Phoenix: 1997): 104 
2 Gellner, E., Nations and Nationalism (Oxford, Basil Blackwell: 1983): 1 
3 Kumar, K., “Nation and empire: English and British national identity in comparative perspective” in 
Theory and Society Vol 29 (2000) 
 267
important when the interests of the minority identity are not recognised. The aim of 
nationalism in many of these cases will be to reform the existing government in 
favour of the minority nation, rather than declaring outright independence. 
Nationalism as a theory of political legitimacy then is not antithetical to imperialism 
provided the imperial government recognises the interests of its subjects.  
 
Scottish nationalism conformed to this basic model of minority nationalism. Despite 
the failure of Westminster to adequately legislate for Scotland throughout the early 
1880s, there were only vague mutterings of the reinstatement of a Scottish 
Parliament. The focus of nationalist activity was on the campaign for a Scottish 
Secretary. Only after Gladstone introduced his bill for Irish Home Rule did Scottish 
nationalist activity turn its attention to the idea of Scottish Home Rule. The Scottish 
Home Rule Association acknowledged this debt to Irish Home Rule but consistently 
argued that Scotland’s legislative problems were just as great as Ireland’s. 
Recognition of Irish identity by Gladstone was perceived as not only undemocratic 
and a potential source of illegitimacy but as an insult to the honour and dignity of 
Scottish identity. The lack of attention to Scottish affairs and the dominance of 
English MPs in Parliament were noted as further causes of an illegitimate system of 
government. This could only be rectified by the creation of a Scottish Parliament.  
 
British Canadian nationalism also followed this model, although the context was 
very different. British Canadian nationalists perceived their position on the North 
American continent to be threatened by the United States. The boundary symbols 
revolved around invasions by their southern neighbour that were repelled by 
Canadians. The discourse of British Canadian nationalists, such as Canada First, 
therefore, revolved around imperial recognition of Canada’s interests in North 
America. The reaction to the Treaty of Washington, in which the United States 
gained important concessions from Britain, at the expense of Canadians, was 
symptomatic of the general feeling that Britain did not recognise Canadian identity 
when dealing with the United States. The illegitimacy of the system of imperial 
government was all the greater given the anomaly between Canadian control of 
domestic affairs but lack of influence over foreign affairs.  
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Imperialism, of course, is usually pursued by states seeking to expand their territories 
through domination and exploitation. The interests of colonists are not always 
important to imperial authorities, as we can see from the above. In order to maintain 
empire, however, imperial authorities need to collaborate with colonists. This is all 
the easier in settler empires where emigrants from the home nation(s) take the values 
and culture with them to the new territories. In these cases the maintenance of empire 
rather than being antithetical to the creation of a new nation is sometimes seen by 
small nations as beneficial. The geopolitical approaches to imperialism taken by 
Weber and Reynolds, highlight the importance of prestige and security. This can be 
just as important to small nations remaining within empires as the economic benefits.  
 
Scottish nationalists approach to the Empire reflected these concerns, although they 
were more implicit in their imperialism than British Canadian nationalists. The desire 
for recognition of the Empire as the most powerful force in the world was an 
important factor in the schemes for Imperial Federation. The Empire faced numerous 
challenges around the world. The Empire, however, had to maintain its superior 
position in world affairs. The aim was to bring peace by creating the most powerful 
state in the world. Nationalists used the symbol of the national mission to spread 
peace, civilisation and the protestant religion to legitimate the various proposals for 
closer imperial union. As important, however, was the use of this symbol as a 
signifier of a Britannic identity shared by Britons throughout the Empire. The SHRA 
discourse claimed imperial government was no longer capable of dealing with the 
challenges facing Britannia, particularly as the bonds of the imperial relationship 
among Britons were so weak. The only way to meet the geopolitical challenges faced 
was to reform the imperial state and allow representatives of the settler dominions to 
sit in the Imperial Parliament.  
 
The discourse of British Canadian nationalists also reflected these concerns, although 
once again the context was different. The threat of the United States, highlighted in 
the nationalism of Canada First and the Imperial Federation League in Canada, lent 
urgency to demands for reform of imperial government. British Canadian nationalists 
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were explicit in their imperialism. Again, however, the rhetoric of the mission of 
Britannia, to spread civilisation and peace was apparent. The recognition of the 
Empire as pre-eminent on the world stage was also vital to British Canadian 
nationalists. The shared sense of Britannic identity was expressed in the vision of 
Canada as a child of the Empire, sharing Britain’s fears, hopes and desires. Strength, 
prestige and protection of the Empire, and therefore Canada, would only come 
through increased unity between the settler dominions and the mother country. Again 
the proposals revolved around imperial federation, allowing Canadians a place in the 
Imperial Parliament and a say in the affairs of the Empire as British subjects.  
 
Nationalists in Scotland and British Canada, then, clearly articulated both a 
nationalist and an imperialist discourse. Imperial nationalism seeks to reform the 
internal workings of the empire for the benefit of the nation, whilst maintaining the 
power and honour of the empire. According to this definition, we can also argue that 
Scottish and British Canadian nationalists were imperial nationalists. Both wanted to 
reform imperial government, whether by home rule all round and/or imperial 
federation, for the benefit of their respective nations and argued that these measures 
would not only benefit the nation but would maintain and enhance the power and 
strength of the British Empire. The final piece of the puzzle is how imperial 
nationalists reconciled the two aspects of their discourse.  
 
Reconciling the imperial and the national in imperial nationalism 
An important argument throughout this thesis has been that identity is experiential 
and contextual. With each increasing level of identity, from local to national and 
beyond, we simplify these identities through symbols. But each smaller identity 
informs our understanding of the greater identity. Based on this argument we would 
expect national identity to mediate imperial identity. Using the visual model of 
concentric circles we would expect the centre ring of national identity to inform the 
broader ring of imperial identity. If identity is expressed in response to a certain 
context, and two identities, national and imperial are expressed in the same 
discourse, we must argue that there are either two separate contexts simultaneously 
challenging national and imperial identity, or one context that affects both identities.  
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In Scotland, Irish Home Rule posed a challenge to Scotland’s place within the Union 
and, therefore, the Empire. Within this context, the importance of the Empire to 
Scottish nationalists’ sense of Scotland’s place in the world became apparent. 
Without the Empire, Scotland would not have the prestige it had belonging to the 
greatest empire of the age. Yet, Scottish imperial nationalists also valued Scotland’s 
contribution to the Empire, particularly militarily, but also in the work of the Scottish 
Diaspora. The perception was that giving Ireland home rule alone, as Gladstone 
proposed, would eventually lead to Irish independence. The potential threat to the 
Empire this would create was unacceptable. The importance of Scotland’s place in 
the Union, and thereby the Empire, meant the Irish Home Rule proposals created a 
twin challenge to Scottish national and imperial identity. The resultant discourse 
focussed heavily on Irish Home Rule in its critique of Westminster rule. The 
challenge to Scottish identity was still mediated through national identity, hence the 
reason Scots were implicit imperial nationalists.  
 
In Canada, the threat of the United States was the all important context that 
challenged both Canadian and Imperial identity. An important part of this discourse 
was the founding myth of British Canada: the flight of the United Empire Loyalists, 
although defence against perceived American aggression was also a factor. British 
Canadians used the United States as a foil and contrast in their creation of the 
symbolic boundaries that differentiated them from their American cousins. Not only 
was the United States set up as an “aggressive and grasping country” but their 
political system, values and origins were contrasted with those of Canadians, “the 
true men of the North.” The threat of the United States, however, was not just seen in 
terms of a threat to Canada. It was also seen as a threat to Canada’s place within the 
Empire and therefore the Empire itself. Without the Empire, Canada’s provinces 
would only ever be another state in the Union. The Empire, however, provided 
Canada with the opportunity to develop as a nation and contribute to the greatest 
Empire of the age. Through the Empire lay Canada’s claims to prestige. Through the 
Empire lay the key to Canada’s survival as a nation. Again, national identity 
mediated and reinforced imperial identity.  
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The Historical Specificity of Imperial Nationalism 
Although the aim of this thesis has been to gain a general theoretical understanding 
of why minority nationalisms would want to embed themselves within larger 
political systems, it has also been made clear that the cases we have examined are 
influenced by a very specific set of historical and political circumstances. This 
section will briefly examine what we have learned about these two cases and their 
political-historical context whilst the following section will analyse what this 
suggests more generally about the legitimacy of nationalisms within complex multi-
level political systems.  
 
Earlier chapters comprehensively examined the reasons for nationalist activity in 
both Scotland and British Canada, arguing that the lack of recognition of Scottish 
and British Canadian identity led to a failure by Westminster to recognise national 
interests which in turn created a system of government that was illegitimate in the 
eyes of the nationalist groups. In Scotland, the perceived insult to Scottish identity 
created by Gladstone’s proposal for Irish Home Rule and the lack of parliamentary 
time created by the focus on Irish nationalism was an important context. In Canada, 
the failure to recognise the interests of Canada in Britain’s dealings with the United 
States created nationalist antagonism toward Imperial Rule. Yet in both cases 
independence from Westminster rule was neither desired nor mentioned. A further 
factor, therefore, must have been at work. For this we must turn to the international 
context.  
 
Following the collapse of the Concert of Europe, tensions between Europe’s leading 
powers increased. The nature of the balance of power in Europe changed as a result 
of German unification and the subsequent imperial ambitions of both Germany and 
Russia. Britain until the late 1870s had enjoyed a near hegemonic imperial position. 
Britain ruled the waves with the tacit acceptance of the rest of Europe. German and 
Russian threats to that near hegemony in the 1880s meant that Britain was no longer 
able to maintain the informal imperial relationship it had enjoyed with colonies up to 
that point. From the late 1870s tensions increased with Russian incursions into 
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Afghanistan, which threatened India, the jewel in the crown of the British Empire. 
Diplomatic relations with Russia were also severely tested in disputes over the 
Ottoman Empire, which Britain supported as a crucial land link to India. Tensions 
over imperial possessions in North Africa, particularly Egypt, and the need for 
British control (or at least not French control) of the Suez Canal led to deteriorating 
relations with France. The Scramble for Africa, spearheaded by the rapidly 
expanding German Empire, rapidly brought Britain into conflict with Belgium and 
France as well as Germany. In addition, diplomatic relations with the United States 
had been strained following British support for the Confederates in the American 
Civil War. The competition faced during this period is the key to understanding the 
imperialism of nationalists during this period. At no other point in the history of the 
Empire had competition from rival powers been as intense or diplomatic tension so 
great.  
 
The specific form the British Empire had taken following the recognition of the 
rights to British subjects abroad to responsible government meant that the bonds of 
Empire had been loosened to a great extent. The idea of imperial federation, 
supported by nationalists in both Scotland and British Canada, was intended to 
strengthen those bonds and therefore strengthen the Empire against the challenges 
posed by America and the European powers. At the same time, however, the 
nationalism displayed was intended to strengthen the positions of both Scotland and 
British Canada within the Empire, with the added benefit that their increased strength 
would enable the Empire to better meet the challenges it faced.  
 
In Scotland, the proposals for Irish Home Rule to the Empire Scots had done so 
much to create were unacceptable at a time of such diplomatic uncertainty, 
particularly as Ireland had previously been the arena for a thwarted attempt by 
French forces to invade Britain. But proposals to grant Home Rule to Ireland alone 
were seen as attempts to both destabilise the Empire and create an illegitimate system 
of government within the United Kingdom. Proposals for Home Rule all round and 
Imperial Federation were put forward as solutions to both strengthen Scotland’s 
position within the United Kingdom and the Empire itself.  
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In Canada, the nationalist discourse focussed on the bond with Empire and the failure 
on a number of occasions of the Empire to recognise the rights of Canada when 
dealing with the United States. Control over Canadian foreign affairs became the key 
goal of nationalist groups. Yet control was sought through closer ties with the 
Empire in which Canada would have greater say in all imperial matters, not just 
those affecting Canadian relations with the United States. The proposals for Imperial 
Federation were again put forward as of benefit to both Canada and the Empire.  
 
The specific national and international contexts found in Scotland and British Canada 
were clearly vital in shaping the nature of the nationalist discourse articulated by 
nationalist groups. Without the challenges the Empire faced there may have been no 
illegitimate system of government in the United Kingdom. Westminster may have 
had sufficient time to adequately deal with the Irish problem without Parnell having 
to resort to obstructionism and land wars. Canadians may have had less need to have 
control over foreign affairs and the informal nature of the imperial relationship may 
have been perfectly adequate. But this is speculation. The fact is the Empire for the 
first time in its history faced multiple challenges from a range rivals in Europe and 
America. These challenges certainly contributed to the lack of Parliamentary time 
available for Scottish and Irish affairs. The decision of Gladstone to pursue Irish 
matters first merely added to the frustration of Scottish nationalists. They reacted to 
the contexts they faced at the time and proposed reform of the political system that 
would benefit both Scotland and the Empire. In strengthening one the other would be 
likewise strengthened. British Canadian nationalists were more concerned about 
strengthening the imperial bond between Westminster and the white settler colonies 
among which Canada was pre-eminent. Strengthening this bond would enable 
Canada to develop as a nation and, more particularly, secure her position as a nation 
on the North American continent next to, not annexed by, the United States. Imperial 
Federation was as much as matter of security for Canada as it was prestige.  
 
The two cases, however, also shared an imperial identity, expressed through the 
imperial mission of the Pax Britannica, the symbols of the Queen and Protestant 
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religion. The prestige of these small nations belonging to the almighty British Empire 
was an important element in the contexts mentioned above. The British Empire was 
worth belonging to because of this shared identity. It was, therefore, worth protecting 
and strengthening against the new challenges it faced from rival powers.  
 
Moving Beyond Historical Specificity – Nationalism within Systems of 
Multi-Level Governance 
Throughout this thesis and the above review of the development of the idea of 
imperial nationalism, the central problem of the apparent theoretical incompatibility 
of nationalism and imperialism has been challenged. We began by revising Gellner’s 
definition of nationalism. By viewing nationalism as a matter of political legitimacy, 
who is best equipped to govern the nation and what form of political system is most 
effective, we were able to argue that nationalism does not necessarily mean 
independence from the state. In accepting this definition of nationalism, it becomes 
possible for nationalists within a multi-ethnic system of multi-level governance, such 
as the British Empire, to argue for reform of the system without asserting 
independence from that system.  
 
Where nationalists argue a system of government is no longer legitimate the 
solutions proposed in their discourse will depend on a number of factors, including 
economic benefits, security, identity, geo-political position, relative strength and so 
on. The benefits of remaining within the larger political system may outweigh the 
benefits of declaring independence, yet require reform of the existing system to 
maintain its legitimacy in the eyes of the nation. We saw in our review above that 
prestige, shared imperial identity and security were key factors in the imperial 
nationalist discourse in Scotland and British Canada. 
 
The aim of the thesis, however, has been to improve our general understanding of 
nationalism. We must, therefore, examine the implications of our understanding of 
these historically specific cases for nationalism in the modern world. Can the 
principles of imperial nationalism be applied to nationalisms which aim to embed 
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themselves within supra-national organisations or complex systems of multi-level 
governance?  
 
Firstly it should be made clear that there are clear differences between complex 
multi-level political systems in the modern day compared to the Empires of the late 
nineteenth century. Imperial identity is clearly lacking in a supra-national political 
system such as the European Union (EU). There is far less populist involvement in 
the creation of such an institution. The sense of exploration and adventure in the 
creation and maintenance of Empire is missing. In short, there is far less popular 
enthusiasm for modern multi-level government than there was for Empire.  
 
The sense of superiority involved in imperial mission is also missing from modern 
day political systems such as the EU. There is no desire to conquer territory and 
people, a key aspect of the definition of empire. Take away some of these key 
elements of empire, such as identity and superiority, and empires, in their essentials, 
are complex systems of multi-level government. We can apply the lessons learned 
from our examination of Scottish and British Canadian imperial nationalism to the 
modern world. 
 
The key to understanding imperial nationalism as it has been presented throughout 
this thesis is two-fold. The most important aspect is political legitimacy. Failure of a 
state to ensure legitimate government of the nation will result in a nationalist 
challenge against the state. The nature of that challenge brings us to the second point 
of imperial nationalism: the geopolitical position of the nation. Neither Scottish nor 
British Canadian nationalists desired independence from the Empire. This was 
largely as a result of the position of each on the global stage. The Union/Empire, 
gave Scot’s the opportunity to gain global prestige. To ensure the Empire survived 
the geopolitical challenges from Germany, Russia, France and the United States, the 
Empire had to reform itself. The nationalist reaction to illegitimate government 
maintained the links with Empire but advocated reform of imperial government to 
the benefit of both the nation and the Empire. British Canadian nationalists also saw 
the Empire as a route to prestige and status on the world stage. But the more 
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immediate threat of the United States was of greater concern, resulting in a more 
explicit imperial nationalism. Geopolitical concerns were at the forefront of both 
Scottish and British Canadian Imperial nationalism.  
 
In this respect the modern world is no different. Ceding some level of sovereignty to 
the supra-national institutions such as the European Union promotes stability within 
the wider European region, enhances the prestige of smaller nations and enhances 
economic prospects. The recent entry of a number of Eastern European states into the 
EU is testimony to the importance of the institution on the world stage. Small nations 
in particular are likely to gain more from entry into such a supra-national institution 
than larger nations. Collective bargaining powers are gained which allow smaller 
nations to negotiate a better deal than would otherwise have been possible had they 
been independent. Concerns over defence are allayed, thus securing the existence of 
the state. These benefits generally far outweigh the drawbacks involved in 
membership of such institutions, especially the loss of some aspects of decision 
making. If it is deemed legitimate by the nation for some aspects of its sovereignty to 
be ceded to a higher level, whether a multi-national state or a supra-national 
institution, and the existing system of government is deemed illegitimate then the 
modern equivalent of imperial nationalism can be said to be in existence. For the 
moment the phrase multi-level governance nationalism or MLG nationalism can be 
used to categorise this type of nationalism.  
 
Based on our understanding of imperial nationalism, we would expect the following 
characteristics to be found in MLG nationalism. A minority nation will already be 
embedded in a multi-national state. A context must exist in which the exiting system 
of government is considered illegitimate by minority nationalists. At this point there 
may be a range of options, such as independence from the existing system of MLG 
and embedding the nation in a further system of MLG or reform of the existing 
system of MLG. Either way one option which cannot exist in MLG nationalism is 
outright independence for the nation. The geopolitical position of the small nation 
will make the feasibility of outright independence for a minority nation extremely 
doubtful. For nationalism to be considered MLG nationalism, therefore, there must 
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be a desire for the nation to be embedded in a supra-national political structure which 
will maintain the existence of the nation and bring some measure of recognition of 
the nation on the world stage. Some illustrations will help highlight the 
characteristics of MLG nationalism. 
 
Multi-level Governance Nationalism in Modern Day Scotland 
The policies of the Scottish National Party (SNP) in Scotland and the Parti 
Quebecois (PQ) in Quebec Canada, to take two common examples from the modern 
day, show the importance of a rational approach to government in the era of 
globalisation. Both the SNP and the PQ argue for Scottish and Quebec independence 
respectively whilst simultaneously claiming it is necessary for Scotland and Quebec 
to remain embedded within supra-national institutions, the European Union (EU) and 
the North American Free Trade Agreement. (NAFTA) 
 
Scottish nationalism, however, has always been broader than the SNP’s 
independence stance. Indeed, MLG nationalism has been the predominant form of 
nationalism in Scotland since the formation of the SHRA in 1886. The successors to 
the SHRA such as the Young Scots, the second SHRA,4 the National Party of 
Scotland, the Scottish Party, and the pre Second World War SNP, were all in favour 
of home rule for Scotland as opposed to independence, although some 
independentists did exist within some of these groups.5 The Labour Party in the early 
part of its history supported Home Rule. The campaign for a Scottish Parliament in 
the 1970s drew support from a wide range of parties. The Labour Party of the 
modern era has supported Home Rule for Scotland, as has the Scottish Liberal 
Democrats. Indeed the campaign for a Scottish Parliament, led by the Scottish 
Constitutional Convention in the 1980s, was an excellent example of MLG 
nationalism. The failure of the Conservative Government to recognise Scottish 
identity led to a rise in Scottish nationalist sentiment, culminating in the SNP’s 
Govan by-election victory in 1987. Both Labour and the Liberals, recognised that the 
existing system of government, where Scotland regularly voted Labour but had a 
                                                 
4 The first movement reformed at the end of the First World War. 
5 Fry, M., Patronage and Principle: A political History of Modern Scotland (Aberdeen, Aberdeen 
University Press: 1987): 211-214  
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Conservative government forced upon it, was illegitimate. They were against the 
SNP’s independence policy, however, and advocated the creation of a devolved 
Scottish Parliament that was still firmly embedded in the United Kingdom’s political 
system. The economic and security benefits of remaining within the United Kingdom 
were vital to Scotland’s place on the world stage. A minority nationalism advocated 
reform of the system of multi-level government in its favour whist wishing to remain 
part of that system.  
 
In response to arguments during the 1980s that Scotland would be unable to survive 
as an independent nation, the SNP switched from outright separatist nationalism to 
MLG nationalism using the campaign slogan “Independence in Europe.” This policy 
still lies at the heart of the SNP platform. In their 2004 European Election Manifesto, 
the SNP leader at the time, John Swinney, argued that the “world is changing fast, 
Europe is moving on. In such a dynamic international environment our country must 
move on too. In the great international forums of the world, like the EU, Scotland 
needs a voice. And we need it urgently.”6 The protection of Scottish national 
interests, such as fisheries, in the international community is a key part of this 
argument. Without this voice, the SNP argue, an independent Scotland would be at 
the mercy of larger nations in Europe. Scotland must take part in the decision making 
process to ensure this does not happen. The decision then to argue for maintenance of 
ties to a supra-national institution is based on geo-politics. An independent Scotland, 
outside of the European Union, would be significantly disadvantaged, so argue the 
SNP, on the world stage. Influencing the decision making process in the EU, 
however, would give Scotland an important place in Europe. Again there is a 
minority nationalist movement advocating removal of the nation from one multi-
level government to another. 
 
In Canada, the key challenge has been nationalism within the multi-national state. 
During the 1960s the Quiet Revolution in Quebec heralded the start of a campaign 
for Quebec separatism that has continued to the present day. The formation of the 
Parti Quebecois in 1967 was, unlike the SNP before it, always in favour of 
                                                 
6 Scottish National Party, Vote for Scotland – 2004 European Election Manifesto (Edinburgh, SNP: 
2004): 3 
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maintaining some form of link with the Canadian state, despite the party’s policy of 
independenece. René Lévesque, the first leader of the PQ had sought to dispel doubts 
about Quebec’s ability to survive as an independent state by linking Quebec 
sovereignty with the idea of an economic association with Canada. This idea has 
continued to find favour among Quebec nationalists, although there has been debate 
over the issue, and in 1994, the PQ Provincial Government issued a draft 
independence Bill in which the vague idea of an economic association with Canada 
was mentioned. A 1995 survey of Quebeckers showed that nearly three-quarters of 
those polled agreed association with Canada would be essential to a successful 
independent Quebec. The 1995 Referendum question was framed around the idea of 
sovereignty association.  
 
“Do you agree that Quebec should become sovereign, after having made a 
formal offer to Canada for a new Economic and Political Partnership, within 
the scope of the Bill respecting the Future of Quebec and of the agreement 
signed on 12 June 1995?”7
 
The association idea moved from being purely economic to something more akin to 
the European Union, where common interests are dealt with by supra-national body. 
Again, the recognition that complete independence in an era of globalisation would 
be disadvantageous led to proposals for independence and maintenance of ties with 
supra-national institutions. Geopolitically, an independent Quebec would have to 
ensure its interests were not over-ridden by its larger neighbours. Once more we have 
the idea of a minority nationalist group advocating reform of the relationship with a 
system of MLG not complete independence from it. 
 
Scotland and Canada Today 
The collapse of the British Empire in the aftermath of World War Two and the loss 
of British prestige that went with it changed the nature of nationalism in Scotland 
and Canada. Scottish political nationalism had turned towards independence, 
although it was not until 1967 that it made any electoral headway, whilst Canada had 
taken control of her own foreign affairs in the inter-war period. As has been noted 
                                                 
7 Roberts, K., Misconceiving Canada: The Struggle for National Unity (Toronto, Oxford Polity Press: 
1997): 223-6 
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the last 30 years of the twentieth century in Scotland and Canada have been 
characterised by strong nationalist parties in favour of independence yet remaining in 
favour of embedding themselves within a wider supra-national framework.  
 
The contexts that were present at the end of the nineteenth century have all but 
vanished in the early twenty-first century. The British Empire has gone replaced by a 
weak British Commonwealth. The European scramble for empire has been replaced 
by political and economic bonds in the European Union. Britain itself has radically 
changed with each of the constituent parts (excluding England) having its own 
Parliament or Assembly, albeit with varying levels of power. Whilst this may be a far 
cry from the policy of Home Rule all round it has nonetheless been widely welcomed 
by most. The Scottish Parliament has power over many aspects of domestic policy, 
including health, education and culture, as well as having tax-varying powers. 
Political nationalists in Scotland were not completely satisfied, however, and 
continue their MLG nationalist campaign for Scottish independence within Europe, 
arguing that without the fiscal autonomy independence would bring Scotland will 
always be at the mercy of English politicians.   
 
The Irish Question has also been resolved, at least partially. Independence from 
Britain was gained for the southern provinces of Ireland in the inter-war period. 
Ulster continued to be a problem for much of the second half of the twentieth century 
but it did not have the same effect on Scottish nationalism as the Irish Home Rule 
Association had done in the late nineteenth century. Home Rule has now been 
granted to Northern Ireland within the United Kingdom framework.  
 
The modern Scottish context then is different in many ways from that which existed 
at the end of the nineteenth century and the nature of nationalism has also changed. 
Yet according to Scottish nationalists, Scotland must retain a voice in the wider 
political system if it was to have any influence on the international context, hence the 
requirement for independence within the European Union.  
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The context on the North American continent is also different in many ways. The 
borders between the United States and Canada have been fully settled. Canadian 
westward expansion has also been fully achieved. The existence of an independent 
Canada on the North American continent is no longer an issue. In addition, Canada is 
no longer reliant on the British Parliament for any material changes to its constitution 
following the passing of the Constitution Act in 1982. Canada is no longer the senior 
Dominion in the British Empire but retains links with Britain and her former 
dominions and colonies through the British Commonwealth. Having full control over 
her own relations with the United States and no longer feeling the United States 
poses a threat to its existence has removed the need for British Canadian nationalism 
of the type found at the end of the nineteenth century. The links with the United 
States have strengthened, particularly since the creation of the North American Free 
Trade Agreement (NAFTA). The arguments for and against were reminiscent of the 
debate over commercial union in the late nineteenth century.  
 
The modern Canadian context then is again very different from that of the late 
nineteenth century and the nature of British Canadian nationalism has also changed. 
Now it must respond to threats from within. The main challenge Canada faces today 
is from Quebec separatism. It is within Canada that MLG nationalism can be found 
as was discussed above. Quebec nationalists recognise that Quebec would be 
disadvantaged as an independent state without any connection to the Canadian state 
and or NAFTA, hence the policy of sovereignty association. 
 
Context clearly conditions politics. As a political principle, nationalism must 
likewise be affected by the context it faces. Although imperial nationalism is not a 
force in the contemporary environment, there is a greater need than ever for small 
nations to gain power and status through membership of supra-national institutions 
such as the European Union and NAFTA. The ideas behind imperial nationalism, 
illegitimate governments being faced with nationalist challenges that advocate 
maintenance of ties to supra-national institutions, still has relevance. The concept of 
Multi-level governance nationalism can be usefully employed to analyse the anomaly 
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